Case C‑590/17
Henri Pouvin and Marie Dijoux
v
Electricité de France (EDF)
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation (France))
Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 21March 2019
(Reference for a preliminary ruling— Directive 93/13/EEC— Scope— Article2(b) and (c) –Concepts of ‘consumer’ and of ‘seller or supplier’— Finance for the purchase of a home— Mortgage loan granted by an employer to its employee and to his spouse, the jointly and severally liable co-borrower)
1.Consumer protection— Unfair terms in consumer contracts— Directive 93/13— Concept of consumer— Employee of an undertaking and his spouse, concluding with that undertaking a loan contract, reserved, principally, to members of staff of that undertaking, with a view to financing the purchase of real estate for private purposes— Included
(Council Directive 93/13, Art.2(b))
(see paragraphs29-32, 43, operative part)
2.Consumer protection— Unfair terms in consumer contracts— Directive 93/13— Scope— Concept of trader— Undertaking concluding a loan contract, in the context of its trade, business or profession, with an employee and his spouse, with a view to financing the purchase of real estate for private purposes – Included— Conclusion of loan contracts which do not constitute the main activity of that undertaking— Irrelevant
(Council Directive 93/13, Art.2(c))
(see paragraphs39-43, operative part)
Résumé
In the judgment Pouvin and Dijoux (C‑590/17), delivered on 21March 2019, the Court ruled on the interpretation of the concepts of ‘consumer’ and ‘seller or supplier’, as defined by Directive 93/13, in the context of a request for payment of outstanding sums owed in the context of a mortgage loan granted by a company to its employee and his spouse, in order to finance the purchase of their main residence.(1)
According to a term of that loan agreement, the latter was to be automatically terminated where, for whatever reason, the borrower ceased to be a member of that company’s staff. Following the resignation of the employee, the latter and his spouse ceased to pay the loan instalments. Therefore, in accordance with that term, the company issued a summons against the borrowers for payment of the sums remaining payable in respect of capital, together with interest and in respect of the penalty clause.
Ruling on that case, the court of first instance found that the term providing for automatic termination of the loan contract was unfair. That judgment was then overturned by the appellate court, which held that the automatic termination of the contract at issue occurred on the date of the resignation of the employee. Since they consider that they acted as consumers and claim that a term which provides for the termination of the loan on the occurrence of an event that is external to the agreement is unfair, the employee and his spouse brought an appeal in cassation before the supreme court.
As regards, in the first place, the concept of ‘consumer’, the Court has held that that concept covers the employee of an undertaking and his spouse, who conclude a loan contract with that undertaking, reserved, principally, to members of staff of that undertaking, with a view to financing the purchase of real estate for private purposes.(2) To that effect, the Court stated that the fact that a natural person concludes a contract, other than an employment contract, with his employer, does not, in itself, prevent that person from being classified as a ‘consumer’ for the purposes of Directive 93/13. The Court also pointed out that the fact that certain types of contract concluded by consumers are reserved for certain groups of consumers does not deprive the latter of their status as ‘consumer’ for the purposes of that directive. Moreover, as regards the exclusion of employment contracts from the scope of application of Directive 93/13, the Court ruled that a real estate loan contract offered by an employer to its employee and to the latter’s spouse cannot be classified as an ‘employment contract’ in so far as it does not regulate an employment relationship or employment conditions.
As regards, in the second place, the concept of ‘seller or supplier’, the Court held that that concept covers an undertaking which concludes, in the context of its professional activity, a loan contract reserved, principally, to members of its staff with one of its employees and his spouse, even if granting loans does not constitute its main activity.(3) In that regard, the Court noted that even if the main activity of such an employer consists not in offering financial instruments, but in supplying energy, that employer has technical information and expertise, and human and material resources that a natural person, namely the other party to the contract, is not deemed to have. Moreover, the Court held that offering a loan contract to its employees, thus offering them the possibility of being able to buy property, serves to attract and maintain a qualified and skilled workforce facilitating the exercise of the employer’s professional activity. In that context, the Court pointed out that the existence or otherwise of a potential direct income for that employer provided for by that contract, has no bearing on the recognition of that employer as a ‘seller or supplier’ for the purposes of Directive 93/13. Therefore, the Court considered that a broad interpretation of ‘seller or supplier’ serves to attain the objective of that directive consisting in protecting the consumer as the weaker party to the contract concluded with a seller or supplier and to restore the balance between the parties.
1Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L95, p.29).
2Article2(b) of Directive 93/13.
3Article2(c) of Directive 93/13.