F THE APPLICATION TO RESTRAIN CLAIMS ON THE “VEXATIOUS AND OPPRESSIVE” BASIS
F THE APPLICATION TO RESTRAIN CLAIMS ON THE “VEXATIOUS AND OPPRESSIVE” BASIS
The relevant principles
The principles for the granting of anti-suit relief on the vexation and oppression basis are summarised by Males LJ in SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 599 at [90]-[91], [103] and [108]:
The basic principle is that the jurisdiction is to be exercised “when the ends of justice require it”.
Established categories of case where an injunction may be appropriate (which may overlap) include cases where an injunction is necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the English court and cases where the pursuit of foreign proceedings is regarded as vexatious or oppressive, but the jurisdiction is not confined to these categories and must be applied flexibly.
Great caution must be exercised before such an injunction is granted, at any rate in cases where the injunction is not sought in order to enforce an arbitration or exclusive jurisdiction clause, because of the requirements of comity.
When an anti-suit injunction is sought on grounds which do not involve a breach of contract, comity, telling against interference with the process of a foreign court, will always require careful consideration.
Comity requires that in order for an anti-suit injunction to be granted, the English court must have “a sufficient interest” in the matter in question. Often that sufficient interest will exist by reason of the fact that the English court is the natural forum for the determination of the parties' dispute. In a case where the injunction is sought in order to protect the jurisdiction or process of the English courts, the existence of a sufficient interest will generally be self-evident.
It has been noted that the categories of factors which may amount to vexation and oppression are not closed (Elektrim SA v Vivendi Holdings EWCA Civ 1178, [83]).
Even in cases in which injunctive relief is not sought on a contractual or quasi-contractual basis, the fact that the foreign proceedings involve the circumvention of an agreement for arbitration with an English seat, or an English EJC, can itself be relevant in determining whether the commencement and pursuit of the foreign proceedings is vexatious and oppressive, as well as establishing the necessary “sufficient interest” of the English court to act. In Clearlake Shipping Pte Ltd v Xiang Da Marine Pte Ltd [2019] EWHC 2284 (Comm), Andrew Burrows QC relied upon the EJCs in the head and sub-voyage charterparties and the bills of lading, which pointed to England as “the natural forum” ([34(i)], and found that Xiang Da had “manipulated its third party claims to try to avoid being caught by the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the Clearlake charter”, the claim being a “procedural manoeuvre designed to evade the exclusive jurisdiction clause” ([34(ii)]).
The second of those considerations featured prominently in Renaissance Securities. At [55], Singh LJ stated that he saw “some force in the submission made by Mr Paul Lowenstein KC for the Appellant that the proceedings in Russia … are vexatious and oppressive” even if not in breach of the arbitration agreements, because “they do appear to be designed to circumvent and undermine the effect of those agreements.” At [56] he identified three reasons why the court should be prepared to contemplate granting an anti-suit injunction in that case:
to protect the integrity of the arbitral process;
to protect the integrity of the orders made by courts of this jurisdiction, in particular the anti-suit injunctions made by of Dias J and Henshaw J; and
to protect the public policy of the United Kingdom in having the sanctions regime which it does.
In relation to that last point, at [59], Singh LJ referred to the following passage in HHJ Pelling KC’s judgment in Barclays Bank plc v PJSC Sovcombank [2024] EWHC 834 (Comm), [25]:
“It might have been said on behalf of the defendants or Sovcombank at any rate that commencing proceedings in England deprives them of a legitimate juridical advantage because the Russian courts will disregard as a matter of public policy the sanctions laws imposed by English law. If and to the extent that is relied upon then, in my judgment, it is a proposition to be rejected. The parties having agreed English law, to attempt to litigate in a foreign jurisdiction where full effect is not given to English law including therefore sanctions law is not to seek to obtain a legitimate juridical advantage but, on the contrary, is to seek to obtain an illegitimate juridical advantage, a point which has been recognised in the case law as a reason for treating a claim brought in such a jurisdiction as vexatious and oppressive.”
At [60] Singh LJ said he agreed “with the principle which lies behind that passage” which was not “confined to cases in which the parties have agreed that English law should apply to their dispute because, in my judgment, for a party to seek to circumvent the sanctions regime of this country is to seek an ‘illegitimate juridical advantage’.” However, he did not reach a final conclusion on the “vexatious and oppressive” anti-suit application due to evidential uncertainties as to whether the appellants still had a sufficient interest in the application (there having been company sales in the period since the first instance judgment). That was also the view of Males LJ, who said that for that reason “it is unnecessary to decide whether an injunction should be granted on the ground that the proceedings brought by the Respondents … in Russia are vexatious and oppressive” but that “at first sight, there appears to be a powerful case that they are”.
Singh LJ’s judgment refers to the illegitimate advantage which a party who has agreed that English law will apply to a dispute would obtain by commencing proceedings in another jurisdiction where a different law would apply. Where the application of foreign law to a particular dispute is exorbitant and unnatural, this can be a factor supporting anti-suit relief, although the mere fact that the content of the foreign law which will be applied is different to English law will not (Thomas Raphael KC, The Anti-Suit Injunction (2nd), [5.30]-[5.31]). The interest of the English courts in the protection of contractual rights governed by English law is also manifest in the rule of public policy in Adams v National Bank of Greece SA [1961] 1 AC 255, by which retrospective legislation in the country of the debtor’s domicile was held to be incapable of discharging an obligation governed by English law.
- Heading
- A INTRODUCTION
- The parties
- The evidence
- The UMAA
- The Client Agreement
- The ISDA Master Agreement
- The Terms
- The Correspondent Bank Account
- C THE BACKGROUND
- Proceedings in the Russian courts
- D THE “WHOLLY CONTRACTUAL” ANTI-SUIT CLAIMS
- The UMAA and the Client Agreement
- The 2017 Terms
- Which of the JPM Entities are entitled to enforce the 2017 Terms Arbitration Agreement?
- What is the effect of the contractual hierarchy provisions on the status of the 2017 Terms Arbitration Agreement in relation to the various claims brought by VTB?
- The ISDA Master Agreement
- E THE APPLICATION BY A CONTRACTING PARTY TO RESTRAIN CLAIMS AGAINST NON-CONTRACTING PARTIES AS A MATTER OF CONTRACT
- Contractual promises not to sue third parties
- Cases where a third party seeks to enforce a contractual right which is subject to an arbitration agreement
- The special status of arbitration agreements under English law
- The authorities
- The construction argument
- An implied term
- F THE APPLICATION TO RESTRAIN CLAIMS ON THE “VEXATIOUS AND OPPRESSIVE” BASIS
- The UMAA and Client Agreement Claims
- The ISDA Claim
- G SHOULD THE COURT REFUSE TO MAKE THE INJUNCTION IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS DISCRETION?
- H THE CLAIM FOR AN ANTI-ENFORCEMENT INJUNCTION
- I VTB’S CHALLENGE TO JURISDICTION
- Forum non conveniens
- Alternative service
- Conclusions
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