[2025] EWHC 1368 (Comm)
Commercial Court

[2025] EWHC 1368 (Comm)

Fecha: 05-Jun-2025

I VTB’S CHALLENGE TO JURISDICTION

I VTB’S CHALLENGE TO JURISDICTION

Gateway

169.

For any JPM Entities unable to avail themselves of the right to serve proceedings within the jurisdiction on a process agent, it is necessary to show that proceedings can be served out of the jurisdiction. The JPM Entities served proceedings out of the jurisdiction under CPR 62.5(1) and CPR 62.5(2A). CPR 62.5(1)(c) applies where “the claimant – (i) seeks some other remedy or requires a question to be decided by the court affecting an arbitration (whether started or not), an arbitration agreement or an arbitration award; and (ii) the seat of the arbitration is or will be within the jurisdiction or the conditions in section 2(4) of the 1996 Act are satisfied.”

170.

CPR 62.5(2A) states that “an arbitration claim form falling within (1) … (c) above may be served out of the jurisdiction without permission if— (a) the seat of the arbitration is or will be in England and Wales; and (b) the respondent is party to the arbitration agreement in question.”

171.

In the event, the only challenge made to the application of these provisions was the suggestion (which I have rejected so far as the “wholly contractual” anti-suit applications are concerned) that the anti-suits did not relate to claims falling within the relevant arbitration agreement. It has been held that CPR 62.5(1)(c) can be relied upon even if the anti-suit injunction is sought under s.37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and no arbitration proceedings have been or will be commenced provided the arbitration agreement designates a seat (as they do here): Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC v AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant LL [2013] 1 WLR 1889, [50].

172.

To the extent that any issue had arisen as to the availability of these arbitration specific gateways so far as applications under the vexation and oppression jurisdiction are concerned (and none was raised), where an EJC or arbitration agreement governed by English law is a central feature of the alleged vexation and oppression, which in essence involves a complaint of improper circumvention of that agreement, I would note that CPR Practice Direction 6B para 3.1(6)(c) applies where a claim is “in respect of” a contract governed by English law, words of obvious width on which I commented in the QBE case (see [111(ii)] above).