[2025] EWHC 1368 (Comm)
Commercial Court

[2025] EWHC 1368 (Comm)

Fecha: 05-Jun-2025

The UMAA and the Client Agreement

The UMAA and the Client Agreement

77.

JPMCB and JPMS plc each seek to restrain the proceedings brought against them in the UMAA and Client Agreement Claims respectively, on the basis that such claims are brought in breach of the UMAA and CA Arbitration Agreements.

78.

I am satisfied that they are right that those claims are being pursued in breach of the applicable arbitration agreement. Indeed, the contrary is not seriously arguable. Both arbitration agreements are expressed in very wide words, and benefit from the benevolent presumption of “one stop adjudication” approved in Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov [2007] UKHL 40.

79.

I can deal with Mr Fenwick KC’s two contrary arguments briefly (and with no disrespect).

80.

First, it is said that there is no dispute about the terms or performance of those contracts. That is not correct. Taking the agreements in turn:

i)

The UMAA is for the operation of accounts for precious metals, with a running balance and provision for transfer, and a right on JPMCB’s part not to act on a transfer instruction which might be contrary to any applicable law. The obligations survive termination (clause 10.3). The arrangements for transferring any balance on the closure of the accounts had to be acceptable to JPMCB London branch. Clearly, therefore, the UMAA addressed issues of entitlement to payment of any undisputed balance. There is a dispute as to whether JPMCB has acted wrongfully in not making the transfer. That clearly has a close connection with the UMAA.

ii)

The Client Agreement also provides for the liquidation of the open positions to generate a single sum payable to one or other party, for the circumstance in which money received from VTB or generated from trading conducted on its behalf can be released to VTB, and for the circumstances in which JPMS plc is relieved from performing its obligations. Clause 37 confirms the continuation of the Client Agreement after termination until all business is wound-up.

iii)

More generally, the suggestion that a dispute as to the transfer of money or property when a contract is terminated does not engage the terms of the contract under which the money was due, or the property held, but rather unspecified “general principles of law” (in this case, apparently, Russian law as the person demanding transfer is a Russian entity seeking to receive them there) is hopeless. If a bank account is closed with a credit due to the account holder, the obligation to pay the debt will arise under the terms of the contract governing the account, and, in any event, a dispute about a failure to pay that debt will fall within the dispute resolution agreement in that contract and be governed by its applicable law.

iv)

Even if the claimant relies on a property right (and I think it highly doubtful that VTB has a proprietary right in specific gold or silver, as opposed to a contractual right under the UMAA to delivery of a particular quantity of gold and silver or its value), a dispute about whether JPMCB was obliged to transfer such property falls within the arbitration agreement in the UMAA, just as a dispute about whether a shipowner was obliged to deliver cargo to its owner or a warehouse to redeliver goods to the bailor would fall within a dispute resolution clause in the contract of carriage or warehousing terms.

81.

Second, it is said that the UMAA and Client Agreement Claims are brought in tort. I accept that the claims are tortious as a matter of Russian law, but that is of no moment when considering the application of the UMAA and CA Arbitration Agreements, the applicability of which does not depend on the type of cause of action advanced (see Mustill & Boyd: Commercial and Investor State Arbitration (3rd) [3.118]-[3.121]). Claims for, in substance, failing to make transfers alleged to be due following on from the termination of agreements under which the debt arose clearly fall within the scope of the arbitration agreements in issue.

82.

Finally, I should record that the Claimants submitted in a footnote in their submissions:

“To the extent necessary, the Claimants will argue that the Second to Ninth Claimants may also enforce the UMAA Arbitration Agreement pursuant to the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999”.

83.

This argument was not otherwise developed. I have been unable to identify any obligation capable of engaging section 1 of the 1999 Act, and hence either s.8(1) or 8(2) – provisions I discuss in more detail shortly. The Second to Ninth Claimants had the burden of persuading me of this argument, and they have not done so.