[2025] EWHC 1430 (Comm)

The court gave permission to the parties to call expert evidence in relation to the fields of Russian politics, public policy and economics. The expert topics were, in summary:

AerCap served and relied on evidence from Professor Timothy J Colton, who is currently the Morris and Anna Feldberg Professor of Government and Russian Studies at Harvard University, having previously taught at the University of Toronto between 1974 and 1989.

WR Insurers served and relied on the evidence of Dr Richard Connolly. Dr Connolly was a Lecturer in Russian political economy at the University of Birmingham between 2011 and 2020, during which time he was director of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies there. Since 2020 he has worked for his own research and analysis consultancy, Eastern Advisory Group.

DAE served and relied on evidence of Individual 1. A summary of their background and qualifications appears in paragraph 2 of the Confidential DPSI Schedule.

AR Insurers served and relied on the evidence of Professor Samuel Greene, who is a political sociologist focussed on the study of politics and power in contemporary Russia, and who currently holds the position of Professor of Russian Politics at King’s College London, having been for 10 years Director of the Russia Institute at the same University.

All four were qualified to give expert evidence, and each gave evidence which was of assistance to the court. I found this expert evidence particularly helpful in understanding the background against which to evaluate the evidence as to what had occurred, and its significance, in the period after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions. In general, I found it distinctly less helpful insofar as it commented on the facts, and considered the terms of the various pronouncements of the Russian Government and officials in that period, or as to how particular pronouncements would have been understood. The court had, by the end of the trial, been placed in a position where it had all the most relevant available evidence of what had occurred before it, and was in a position to form its own views as to what that evidence established.

As to the evidence of the individual experts:

There was much which was not in any or any serious dispute between the experts. Many of the issues which there were, including as to methodology, do not need to be resolved. In what follows, I set out features of the expert evidence which I accept and which are, I consider, of some assistance in analysing and understanding the facts of the present case.

There was no significant disagreement between the experts on the formal structure of power in Russia. This involves, inter alia, the following aspects:

The experts agreed that, looking at the realities, Russia is governed by a regime with strong authoritarian characteristics. Dominant power is concentrated in the hands of the country’s President, whose power is, on key issues, weakly or not effectively constrained by formal checks and balances. Russia has, moreover, become progressively more authoritarian over time. More specifically, the exercise of power in Russia has become more authoritarian than it was prior to the invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. I would accept the view of Individual 1, Professor Colton and Professor Greene that this has amounted to a ‘step change’, albeit a continuation of an ongoing process.

Informality – by which is meant the exercise of power other than through formal institutions, rules and procedures – is an important part of politics in Russia. Informal mechanisms and norms coexist with formal mechanisms and norms at all levels of state power, and the two sets of norms and mechanisms are mutually influential. Informal instructions and signals form a part of Russian political life. The public dressing down by President Putin of Oleg Deripaska in the famous ‘Pikalevo pen’ incident is an instance of a signal being sent to society and economic leaders, in an informal fashion. There are a number of ways in which the state may informally communicate decisions to commercial enterprises, including, but not limited to, conversations in closed meetings and phone calls, non-public written communications, public statements not bearing the imprimatur of formal authority or outside a formal procedural setting. Precisely how important and extensive such informal exercise of power is in general is not of any great significance in the present case.

The invasion of Ukraine and the Western sanctions which ensued were portrayed by President Putin as part of a vital struggle with the West. In February and March 2022 he referred to the threat, and then the actuality of sanctions, as amounting to blackmail, and like a war; he described Western containment of Russia as a matter of life and death and a threat to the existence and sovereignty of the Russian state. As Professor Colton accepted, President Putin regarded Western sanctions as a belligerent, hostile step against Russia, against which it was necessary to ‘counterpunch’. I accept Individual 1’s evidence that the Western aviation sanctions were unusual in that, to be effective, they presupposed that Russian entities would cooperate with the West in returning aircraft. They were thus a case in which the Russian regime could swiftly demonstrate that the sanction was ineffective, and instead imposed a cost on Western companies. I also accept Individual 1’s evidence that it would have been apparent to everyone within the aviation industry that, unless it was approved by the government, to act in a way which could be construed as implementing the Western sanctions exposed the actor to serious adverse consequences from the regime.

Civil aviation is important to the functioning of the Russian economy and the Russian state as a whole, including maintaining connectivity across Russia’s territory. It had a particular importance in the aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine and the imposition of Western sanctions. I accept Professor Greene’s evidence that the political importance of any particular sector of the economy depends, at least in large part, on the circumstances. While civil aviation might not at other times, and in other circumstances, have been regarded as a ‘strategic’ sector, it ‘received a much more strategic treatment and importance for Russia’, to quote Individual 1, in the aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine.

The experts agree that the Russian state and its representatives have significant influence over both private and state-owned enterprises; that this influence has increased in recent years; and that this influence is exercised through both formal and informal means. I accept that there are spheres of the Russian economy in which the state intervenes little, at least most of the time. I accept also that in relation to civil aviation, airlines had autonomy to make decisions about day-to-day matters such as routes, services and internal organisation. But I accept Professor Greene’s evidence that ‘autonomy is always situational … you always have to understand what’s expected of you in a given moment … and whether the autonomy that you might have understood yourself to enjoy yesterday no longer exists today.’ It was not atypical for people in Russia to be nervous of going against the state’s wishes. The state had a range of weapons which assisted it in creating an atmosphere of fear. As Dr Connolly accepted, these included: threats of prosecution; threats of investigation, including into tax affairs; a pliable legal system in which state interests influenced the outcome of certain cases; and a notorious history of government action against high-profile figures who had demonstrated disloyalty to the regime.

In relation to the field of geopolitics, the experts agreed that Western sanctions, and Russian counter-measures, were only likely to be lifted after there is a durable resolution of the war in Ukraine. They also agreed that, while an end to the war was a necessary precondition for the lifting of sanctions, it was not likely to be sufficient. They agreed that, if Ukraine was not made whole – i.e. if it did not achieve the restoration of its territorial integrity, was not provided with robust post-war security guarantees and/or was otherwise left a defeated or partially defeated party – Western governments were likely to maintain large-scale sanctions on Russia.

Individual 1 was not challenged on their evidence that as of 8 March 2022 there was no credible prospect of the Western sanctions in general, and aviation sanctions in particular, being lifted in the foreseeable future. During his cross-examination, Dr Connolly accepted that by 8 March 2022: the prospect of a swift military victory by Russia had gone; that even if there had been a swift military victory, there was only a theoretical possibility that sanctions would be lifted or that Russia would not have retained its fleet of aircraft; and a ceasefire (rather than a peace agreement) would not have resulted in the relaxation of sanctions. Dr Connolly’s overall assessment was that it was ‘highly unlikely’ that, as at 8 March 2022, sanctions would be lifted in the foreseeable future. He estimated what he himself said was ‘not a scientific number’ of a 10-20% chance of this.

Dr Connolly also agreed that, though peace talks were proceeding in the period February 2022 to April 2022, the objectives of the two sides were existential and inconsistent; there was never any discussion as to borders and territory; there was no momentum for any form of summit between Presidents Zelensky and Putin; and there had been no consultation with Western countries as to whether security guarantees would be provided, and no agreement from Russia that such guarantees would be acceptable even if available.

The court gave permission for expert evidence to be adduced on the Russian civil aviation sector. Specifically, evidence was permitted on the following issues:

The parties served voluminous expert evidence in relation to these topics. Four witnesses gave expert evidence.

AerCap served reports from and called Boris Rybak. Mr Rybak has long experience as a consultant to and commentator on the Russian civil aviation industry. In 1997, with a business partner, he launched Air Transport Observer, the first Russian language airline magazine. From 1992 to 2020 he was a regular commentator on aviation news in Russia and countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc. Since October 2022 he has been CEO of Mark Comm LLC, a Seattle-based aviation consultancy start-up. He is a native Russian speaker.

WR Insurers relied on the evidence of Andrew Pyne. Mr Pyne is an aviation professional, with experience of managing a number of airlines. Most of this experience was not with Russian airlines or in Russia. His experience of working for a Russian airline was between 2007, when he started working towards the start-up of Avianova, and 2011, when Avianova ceased operations. He remained in Russia until 2014, establishing an aviation consultancy, and a general sales agency for the marketing and sale of (primarily) airline tickets.

Merx called and relied on the evidence of Andrei Kozhanov. Mr Kozhanov has long experience in the Russian civil aviation sector. Amongst other roles, he was Chief Financial Officer for VDG between 2003-4; Director of Strategy and Planning and Board Member at I-Fly between 2008 and 2010; Aviation Leasing Department Head at Gaztechleasing between 2013 and 2014; and Fleet Development Director at Smartavia and Red Wings between 2016 and 2022. Since May 2022 he has been an independent consultant.

AR Insurers called and relied on the evidence of Ms Anastasia Dagaeva. Since 2007 Ms Dagaeva has worked as a journalist, analyst and expert specialising in the air transport sector. From 2007 to 2011 she worked as a news correspondent for Vedomosti. From 2011 to 2017 she worked for a private equity firm, participating in writing and editing analytical reports. Since 2018 she has been self-employed; continuing her journalistic activities, and being involved in a number of corporate consulting projects. She is a native Russian speaker. Like Mr Rybak, she has been resident in the USA since 2022.

Mr Rybak and Ms Dagaeva were both qualified to speak as experts as long standing close observers of and commentators on the Russian civil aviation sector. I considered, however, that Mr Rybak’s evidence had to be treated with some caution. His oral evidence involved a number of concessions which were not reflected in his written reports. This suggested that his reports had not been prepared in a way which presented his full views. Mr Kozhanov’s evidence was that of someone with long practical involvement in the Russian civil aviation sector. In part his evidence was factual evidence, and I will consider it in that context as well.

AR Insurers launched an attack on Mr Pyne, contending that he lacked relevant expertise, and that his evidence could be accorded no weight at all. The criticisms made were, in some respects, overstated, and Mr Pyne did give some evidence which was not given by other experts and which was of assistance to the court. But I agree that he lacked experience of the Russian aviation sector at, or for quite some years before, the relevant events in 2022.

As with the evidence of the experts on Russian politics, I considered the evidence of the Russian civil aviation experts to be helpful in providing the background against which to evaluate and understand the evidence, both of documents and factual witnesses, as to what had occurred, and its significance, but markedly less helpful when it was a commentary on the facts of what had occurred and why in the period after the invasion of Ukraine.

As in the case of the Russian politics experts, I will set out a number of features which I considered established by the Russian civil aviation expert evidence, and which I regard as of some assistance in assessing the questions of loss, peril and causation which confront the court.

The civil aviation sector in Russia has to be considered in the light of geography. Russia is the largest country in the world by area, and more than half its territory is only practically accessible by air transport.

Most of the current Russian airlines grew out of the Soviet Aeroflot after the collapse of the USSR. The Russian aviation sector has survived a number of crises, and in 2019 set a record in terms of the number of passengers carried (128 million). Major Russian airlines were severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, but survived, usually by refocusing on the domestic market, and receiving some support from the government in the form of emergency one-off subsidies.

Russian airlines have a high dependence on Western Leased Aircraft. The Russian aircraft-manufacturing industry is unable to meet Russian airlines’ needs for a competitive and fuel-efficient fleet of passenger airliners.

For a long time, the Russian passenger air transport market has had Aeroflot as the largest player, and has other participants, many of the most important of which I have described above.

Following the invasion of Ukraine and the imposition of Western sanctions, there have been serious changes in the Russian air transport market. In particular there has been a transformation of the route network, with a reduction of international routes, and a sharp increase in domestic routes.

Civil aviation in Russia is a sector which is strictly regulated by the relevant public authorities. That regulation is primarily directed to flight safety. FATA is the sector regulator. Its functions include the certification of airlines, airports, aircraft and engines and the licensing of various services and activities, as well as checking flight safety and carrying out inspections. FATA has some 30 subordinate structures, including the State Air Traffic Management Corporation (‘SATMC’), and is itself subordinate to MinTrans.

In addition to the sectoral authorities, the activities of the air transport market are regulated by the relevant resolutions of other authorities, to the extent that those activities fall within the remit of those other authorities. Such other authorities include the Federal Antimonopoly Service, the Federal Tariff Service, the FCS, the Federal Tax Service, the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Investigative Committee, the FSB, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

FATA, in general, interacts with airlines by orders and recommendations. It transmits them in the form of telegraphic messages (telegrams), which are sent via the Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunications Network. I accept the evidence of Mr Kozhanov who, given his experience, was very well qualified to express a view, that:

…communications from FATA to airlines concerning the agency’s decisions, or changes to regulations, are adhered to without questions. If FATA communicates a requirement to follow law or regulations (such as the Federal Aviation Rules), breaches will result in repercussions (e.g. fines) imposed against the airline and/or its personnel. Furthermore, in my experience, even if FATA simply recommends doing something (or recommends not doing something), then the airline will normally do what is recommended, treating the recommendation as an order, because of FATA’s status as a government entity, and because of its powers in general over an airline’s operations…

The relationship between the Russian Government and the airlines was essentially hierarchical, with the government, to the extent it wished to, exercising dominance over the airlines. Mr Kozhanov said that ‘there is a strong sense of hierarchy between Russian airlines and MinTrans/FATA’. Ms Dagaeva said that ‘the dominance of the state is not even up for discussion’, where the ‘complex symbiosis between the air transport market and the state’ was characterised ‘often with the latter’s unconditional dominance’. Mr Rybak, when asked if he agreed that the government was the dominant party, replied ‘Absolutely correct’; and when asked whether, if the government chose, it was a relationship involving subordination to the government, he said ‘Correct’.

As Mr Rybak said in evidence, the top management of Russian airlines are often, and were in February 2022, strong and seasoned leaders, with experience of surviving crises and difficult market conditions, and who often had no difficulty in making difficult decisions and acting in the interests of their businesses. Equally, however, it appeared to me clear from the expert evidence, including from Mr Rybak’s evidence on Day 27, that it was a feature of such leaders that they would be alive to how their decisions would be regarded by the state, and whether those decisions might expose them to civil, commercial or regulatory liability, or prejudice their ability to operate successfully in Russia.

After the invasion of Ukraine, and the imposition of Western sanctions, airlines were faced with a number of different considerations to weigh up. Undoubtedly, as was emphasised by Mr Pyne, most airlines would have wished to seek to preserve much if not most and perhaps all of their fleet. That typically provided a motive for them to seek to retain their Western Leased Aircraft because immediately to return all or much of their fleets would have meant immediate operational disruption, and have threatened long term survival. In this regard, the airlines would have been aware that the Western Leased Aircraft could not be replaced, certainly in the short, or indeed medium, term, by Russian-manufactured planes.

As Ms Dagaeva said the commercial interests of all the airlines were not identical. Her evidence was also, however, that the most important commercial interest of the airlines was complying with the requirements of the Russian Government. I accept the thrust of that evidence, although it does not of itself answer what any such requirements were and whether the airlines in fact acted in compliance with them.

Mr Rybak said that in general, state regulation of civil aviation can be described as ‘manual’ management and in an almost permanent systemic crisis, since the measures taken are usually aimed at a quick response, and ‘doing something’ here and now. He agreed that the airlines would have expected the Russian authorities to ‘do something here and now’ when faced with the prospect of the Western Leased Aircraft being lost. I accepted that evidence, which appeared to me to be realistic.

Mr Rybak gave evidence that Russian airlines would have wanted to benefit from subsidies from the government, which started to be announced from late March 2022. A RUB 100 billion subsidy programme was adopted, under which airlines received compensation in the amount of RUB 1.11 per passenger-kilometre provided that from April to October 2022 the airline retained at least 72% of its passenger turnover for the same period in 2021. Airlines were incentivized to keep flying. The RUB 100 billion was distributed among 32 carriers, with half of these funds being received by the Aeroflot group. In addition due to a spike in jet fuel prices in 2022 payments to airlines under the damper mechanism amounted to RUB 98.6 billion; and RUB 19.54 billion was allocated to refund passengers the cost of tickets cancelled due to external restrictions. More than RUB 27 billion was allocated to traditional programmes for subsidising regional transportation. As a result of these large-scale subsidies the total net profit of the 27 leading passenger airlines in Russia at the end of 2022 amounted to a record RUB 87.8 billion, 2.8 times more than in 2021.

Mr Pyne produced material as to Available Seat Kilometres (or ‘ASK’s). These indicated that some of the airlines, including S7, Ural, and Smartavia increased the average utilisation of their aircraft in 2022 and also that the ‘NEO’ aircraft at certain airlines, Aeroflot, Nordwind, S7 and Ural, continued to post ‘good utilisation numbers’ even in January 2023.

Mr Pyne, when asked what would have been the response of airlines if MinTrans had told them on 26 February 2022 that it was not going to take steps to facilitate the operation of the aircraft in Russia, said ‘there would have been a big question mark about what was the point of holding on to aircraft.’

The evidence of some 29 factual witnesses was adduced, of which 23 gave oral evidence. 13 of these were called by AerCap, 2 by DAE, 2 by KDAC, 2 by Merx, 2 by Genesis and 2 by AR Insurers.

The bulk of the time taken in examination of the factual witnesses was devoted to the issues of peril and causation. The preponderance of these issues in the time spent on oral evidence was in part due to the fact that the issues in the case had narrowed somewhat since the witness statements were produced. In particular, AerCap had prepared witness evidence to deal with various issues which by the time of the trial were no longer contested.

With some exceptions, the factual evidence in relation to the issues of peril and causation was of rather limited assistance. Largely, it was the evidence of employees of lessors, and not representatives of lessees, or of Russian Government officials, or even of people who had been in Russia at the relevant time. Often it represented the relaying of things told to the lessors by lessees and others at the time, or a description of what the witness had understood the position to be from such communications. It was thus, in large part, second or third hand. Moreover, the oral evidence often added little of value to what appeared in the contemporaneous communications or call reports.

Because of the lack of centrality of much of the oral factual evidence, it is not necessary to give an appraisal of each of the witnesses’ evidence. Some witnesses’ evidence does, however, call for specific treatment.

Mr Aengus Kelly is the CEO of AerCap and has been since 2011. His oral evidence was mainly directed to issues relating to peril and causation, that is, why the AerCap Aircraft were kept in Russia. There were severe limitations on the value of his evidence on this subject, however, as he was not in Russia at any material time, had limited contact with the lessees, and does not appear to have been in contact with Russian officials.

Moreover, I considered that Mr Kelly’s evidence was in various respects unsatisfactory and too influenced by a desire to support AerCap’s primary case, viz that the relevant peril was an AR Peril. By way of example, he argued unnecessarily, and implausibly, as to whom he had meant by ‘the Russians’ in the phrase ‘the Russians will not hand them back’ in a WhatsApp message of 26 January 2022 to Mr Hanney, the Irish ambassador to the EU, and what he had meant by ‘Russia’ in the sentence ‘Russia would never give the aircraft back and won’t pay’, in a WhatsApp message to the Irish Minister of Foreign Affairs on the same date. In relation to both he argued that he had meant only the Russian lessees, whereas I regard it as clear, not least from the identity of the recipients, that what he intended to be understood either was, or at least did not exclude, the Russian state. He also expressed views about lessees’ (including S7’s) lack of honesty which were difficult to reconcile with the sentiments which he was expressing at and about the time of the invasion and with the absence of any contemporary record of his having had such views, and which had not been squarely raised in his witness statement. His refusal to accept that the final two OTI Group AerCap Aircraft were the subject of a government restraint, despite the acceptance of that in AerCap’s Opening Submissions, revealed a lack of objectivity.

Perhaps most importantly in this connexion, Mr Kelly gave an account of a conversation which he said that he had had with Vladislav Filev on 1 April 2022, while on the touchline of a football pitch watching one of his children’s matches. There was no note of this conversation, and it was not summarised in any contemporaneous email. Mr Kelly’s account of it, and in particular the suggestion that it was apparent from it that S7 was keeping its Western Leased Aircraft for commercial reasons, was difficult to reconcile with what Ms Mashkova and probably Mr Filev had said to Mr Leahy and Mr McCray Smith on 30 March 2022, what Mr Filev said to Mr Houlihan on 31 March 2022 and what Ms Mashkova, in Mr Filev’s presence, said to SMBC on 2 April 2022, each of which was the subject of a contemporary record. In all of those, S7 had said that it was not permitted to return its Western Leased Aircraft by the government. I concluded that Mr Kelly’s account was unreliable in suggesting that there had been a clear message that the aircraft were being kept for commercial reasons, and displayed his tendency to give evidence which favoured AerCap’s case.

Peter Anderson is Chief Commercial Officer of AerCap. He was able to give some first-hand evidence about the nature of AerCap’s leasing business with Russian airlines generally, as to meetings he had attended in Moscow with certain Russian airlines prior to the invasion, and steps he and AerCap had taken in the lead up to and following the invasion to understand AerCap’s risk, and the structure and organisation of AerCap’s mitigation efforts. He also addressed, at a high level, the steps AerCap took following the invasion to recover the AerCap Aircraft. Much of his evidence was not the subject of challenge. He was not involved in the day-to-day communications with lessees, and to the extent he gave evidence in relation to their stances and motivations in relation to return of the AerCap Aircraft it was not of great assistance.

Anton Joiner was the Chief Risk Officer for AerCap at the time of the relevant events. He was responsible for managing distressed situations. His evidence had a particular focus on AerCap’s recovery efforts, was generally reliable, and indeed much of it was not challenged. But I think it is fair to say that he was at points evasive and overly reticent about accepting some points which might be contrary to AerCap’s primary case. He was loath to make appropriate concessions. By way of example, he declined to say whether there were any differences between the political environment in Russia and that in Ireland; and also was unwilling to identify from whom the ‘reprisals’ were feared by Red Wings and Smartavia which he had mentioned in his witness statement.

Morgan McCray Smith is the head of AerCap’s Legal Leasing team, responsible for all legal work in relation to the aircraft leasing process. He gave evidence on a number of aspects of AerCap’s legal response to the crisis, and as to the process of negotiating the Russian Insurance Settlements, which was the subject of no significant challenge. He gave his evidence carefully and accurately.

Dr Niels van Antwerpen was the AerCap Leasing Executive responsible for managing the relationships with Aeroflot and Rossiya, Alrosa, Aurora and Ural. He was generally an impressively careful and straightforward witness, though sometimes perhaps too fastidious in his refusal to accept the premise of questions, and on occasion gave unrealistic answers.

I should also record that there was a particular absence from those giving oral evidence for AerCap. This was of Robert Leahy, who was the Leasing Executive for S7 from 2018-2022. Two witness statements of Mr Leahy were served by AerCap, and put before the court under a Hearsay Notice. Mr Leahy had left AerCap due, as Mr Kelly said, to ‘performance issues’. He was at the time of the trial resident in the USA and was not available to AerCap. Insofar as Leasing Executives were able to give illuminating evidence as to the issues of peril and causation, his role and his statements were amongst the most significant of AerCap’s deponents.

DAE’s principal witness was David Houlihan. Mr Houlihan is the President of DAE Capital. Mr Houlihan is responsible for all customer-facing activities at DAE, including sales, trading, aircraft investor services and the work of the technical teams. One particular significance of Mr Houlihan’s evidence was that he had gone to Moscow between 6 and 11 March 2022 to meet DAE’s Russian lessees, to seek to get DAE’s aircraft returned. During that period he met with Mr Akpinar of Nordwind, Messrs Budnik and Ilmensky of UTair, Mr Burtin of I-Fly, Messrs Klyucharev and Tikhonov of Red Wings, Mr Savostin and others of Smartavia, Ms Mashkova and Ms Saltykova of S7, Mr Isaykin of AirBridgeCargo, and Mr Minaev and Ms Balakina of Aeroflot.

Mr Houlihan’s evidence was given in an open and frank fashion. I had no doubt that his evidence was entirely honest, and reflected what he recalled and believed to be true. His evidence was, at times, overly influenced by his sympathy for his customers, the Russian airlines. It was however generally reliable.

The evidence of David Leggett, DAE’s other witness, was given in a straightforward fashion. I also considered that, although the extent to which their evidence could assist on contested issues was limited, KDAC’s, Merx’s and Genesis’s witnesses sought to give honest and helpful evidence.

Of the witnesses called by AR Insurers, I considered that it was necessary to approach the evidence of Individual 2 with some caution. I refer to the reasons given at paragraph 3 of the Confidential DPSI Schedule. Furthermore, there had been a number of departures from expected norms of fairness in relation to the preparation of this individual’s witness statements. There was a lack of transparency in the deployment of material from third parties, which I did not consider was adequately accounted for by concerns as to the personal security of those involved. These are important caveats. WR Insurers did not, however, invite me to withdraw permission to rely on Individual 2’s witness statements. Nor did I consider that the criticisms to be made of the way Individual 2’s evidence was prepared and presented meant that it could not be relied on at all. I concluded that it was honestly given, and could be given weight if treated with circumspection.

As to Individual 3, I considered that they were an honest witness, and indeed the contrary was not put to the witness by WR Insurers. There were some inconsistencies as between their written and oral evidence, and I had regard to this when assessing their evidence. Generally, however, their evidence was of considerable assistance to the court, being that of someone whose perspective was, amongst the witnesses in the case, almost unique, and who was able to add usefully, from personal and contemporaneous knowledge, to what was apparent from the correspondence.

As I have said above, Mr Kozhanov’s evidence was in part factual. Insofar as it was, I considered it to be honestly given.

There was a very large amount of documentary evidence, much of it emanating from the lessors. There was very little in the way of documentation internal to the lessees or to the Russian Government. What this meant was that some of the documentation which would have been most germane to deciding on the issues of loss, peril and causation was not available.

With that said, the documentation that there is provides much of the most reliable material before the court as to what occurred, and for the purposes of assessing whether there was a loss and if so what was/were its operative cause(s). With the aid of a very comprehensive extended chronology prepared by the parties at my request, I have been able to consider the documentation referred to the court in context and in detail. It is neither practicable nor desirable to seek to refer to all that documentation in what follows.