CL-2024-000510 - [2025] EWHC 1523 (Comm)

Fecha: 19-Jun-2025

Introduction

Introduction

The Claimants (“V” and “N” respectively) bring an arbitration claim challenging a Partial Final Award made by LMAA arbitrators dated 12 August 2024 (the “Award”) under sections 68(2)(a) and 67 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (“the Act”). There are also a number of related applications:

(1)

The Defendant (“K”) applies to set aside purported service of the Amended Arbitration Claim Form (the “Claim Form”) on the ground that it was not validly served in time. In response, the Claimants apply to validate service retrospectively under CPR 6.15 and purport to seek relief from sanctions.

(2)

K applies to set aside the order of Bright J. of 10 September 2024 (the “Bright J. Order”) by which the Claimants were granted an extension of time to bring their claim and to serve the Claim Form. As K’s application was itself served late (although filed on time), K also apply for an extension of time and relief from sanctions.

I agree with K that the resulting issues for the Court logically arise in the following order:

(1)

Should the Claimants’ service of the Arbitration Claim Form be retrospectively validated pursuant to CPR 6.15(2) or CPR 3.9?

(2)

If so, should K be granted a retrospective extension of time to serve its application to set aside the Bright J. Order?

(3)

If so, should the Bright J. Order extending time for challenging the Award and serving the Claim Form be set aside either (i) because it was not appropriate to extend time; or (ii) for breach of the duty of full and frank disclosure?

(4)

Have the Claimants waived their rights to pursue their ss. 67 and/or 68 challenges under s. 73(1) of the Act?

(5)

If not, should the Claimants have permission to amend the Claim Form to include a challenge to the Award under s. 67 of the Act? If so, was the Award made without jurisdiction because the Claimants terminated the arbitration agreement?

(6)

If the Tribunal had jurisdiction, should the Award be set aside pursuant to s. 68?

However, I propose to address the substantive merits of the challenge under sections 67 and 68 first for reasons which shall become apparent.