LM-2024-000238 - [2025] EWHC 1441 (Comm)

Without prejudice to the Jurisdiction Application, Ashenden applies for an order striking out the claim pursuant to CPR r. 3.4(2)(a), which provides:

“(2)

The court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court—

(a)

that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim”.

Practice Direction 3A provides in relevant part:

“1.2

The following are examples of cases where the court may conclude that particulars of claim (whether contained in a claim form or filed separately) fall within rule 3.4(2)(a):

(1)

those which set out no facts indicating what the claim is about, for example ‘Money owed £5000’,

(2)

those which are incoherent and make no sense,

(3)

those which contain a coherent set of facts but those facts, even if true, do not disclose any legally recognisable claim against the defendant.

…

1.5

A party may believe they can show without a trial that an opponent’s case has no real prospect of success on the facts, or that the case is bound to succeed or fail, as the case may be, because of a point of law (including the interpretation of a document). In such a case the party concerned may make an application under rule 3.4 or apply for summary judgment under Part 24 (or both) as they think appropriate.”

Accordingly, the Strike-out Application will succeed only if Ashenden establishes either (i) that on its face Jefferies’ case cannot succeed or (ii), without conducting a mini-trial, that the prospects of success for Jefferies’ case are at best fanciful.

Ashenden’s case on the Strike-out Application rests on the Agency Issue and on the assumption (contrary to Ashenden’s primary case) that the Terms of Business were incorporated into the contract for the Trade. As Mr Mukherjee acknowledged, the case raises two issues: first, the factual question whether Ashenden was acting as an intermediary; second, the legal question of the proper construction of clause 5 of the Terms of Business. Jefferies disputes that Ashenden was in fact acting only as an intermediary in respect of the Trade, and it further contends that clause 5.4 applies only if the existence of a different principal has been disclosed before the trade is made or, at the latest, before the agreed settlement date.