CL-2021-000341 - [2025] EWHC 1684 (Comm)

Fecha: 04-Jul-2025

PERMISSION TO APPLY FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(D)

PERMISSION TO APPLY FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

47.

CPR 24.4(1) provides:

“A claimant may not apply for summary judgment until the defendant against whom the application is made has filed – (a) an acknowledgement of service; or (b) a defence, unless – (i) the court gives permission; or (ii) a practice direction provides otherwise.”

48.

There is no requirement for a party to obtain permission under CPR 24.4(1) before issuing a summary judgment application: both applications can be made in the same application notice: FBN Bank (UK) Ltd v Leaf Tobacco A Michailides SA [2017] EWHC 3017 (Comm) § 17 (Andrew Baker KC); European Union v Syria [2018] EWHC 1712 (Comm) § 62 (Bryan J); and Punjab National Bank (International) Ltd v, Boris Shipping Ltd [2019] EWHC 1280 (QB) § 30-32 (Christopher Hancock KC).

49.

Bryan J summarised the principles relevant to the exercise of the court’s discretion under CPR 24.4(1) in European Union v Syria:

“(1)
The purposes of the rule are to ensure that no application for summary judgment is made before a defendant has had an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and to protect a defendant who wishes to challenge the Court's jurisdiction from having to engage on the merits pending such application.
(2)
Generally, permission should be granted only where the Court is satisfied that the claim has been validly served and that the Court has jurisdiction to hear it. Once those conditions are met there is generally no reason why the Court should prevent a claimant with a legitimate claim from seeking summary judgment.
(3)
The fact that a summary judgment may be more readily enforced in other jurisdictions than a default judgment is a proper reason for seeking permission under CPR 24.4(1).” (§ 61)

50.

In relation to (3), in my view it is sufficient that the claimant has a reasonable belief that a summary judgment may be more readily enforced than a default judgment. There is no justification for the court subjecting any such belief to minute examination, when the permission the claimant is seeking is no more than the opportunity to obtain a reasoned judgment on the merits of its claim.

51.

In the present case:

The Claimant validly served the Claim Form on the Defendant in accordance with the court’s orders, as set out in §§ 10-13 above. The Defendant has had multiple opportunities to participate in these proceedings or to challenge jurisdiction and has chosen to do neither.

ii)

The court has jurisdiction to hear the claims, since the Contract contained an exclusive jurisdiction agreement in favour of the English courts. The court thus has jurisdiction under CPR 6.33(2B) (b).

iii)

A summary judgment may be more readily enforced in other jurisdictions than a default judgment.

52.

The evidence indicates that Sudanese legal advice obtained by the Claimant indicates that for a foreign judgment to be enforceable in Sudan, it must be final and conclusive in the sense that it cannot be varied, re-opened or set aside by the court which delivered it or by any court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, although it may be subject to appeal to a court of higher jurisdiction. A default judgment does not fulfil these criteria because it is open to the Defendant to apply to have a default judgment set aside. Accordingly, the evidence suggests that the Sudanese courts would be much less likely to refuse to recognise and enforce a reasoned English judgment following a hearing on the merits.

53.

Further and in any event, there may be assets belonging to the Defendant that are found outside Sudan, in which case a simple default judgment may not be effective for enforcement purposes.

54.

In all the circumstances, it was clearly just to grant the Claimant permission to apply for summary judgment, and I did so at the hearing on 2 May 2025.