Mr Fokin
Mr Fokin
Mr Andrei Fokin is a Russian citizen resident in Cyprus. His current position is protector of the Firstline Trust, having been appointed to this position on 17 March 2022. Until 22 January 2024, he was a director of AIM Capital. He acknowledged these roles in his witness statement.
It became apparent from Mr Fokin’s oral evidence that, although no longer a director of AIM Capital, the other directors asked him to remain an advisor to the board; thus, he in fact still has a role within AIM Capital. It also became apparent that, from 31 March 2020 until 18 March 2022, he was also a director of Linetrust PTC. Indeed, from 9 to 18 March 2022 he was the sole director of Linetrust PTC, and from 9 March to 22 June 2022 he was the sole director of AIM Capital. From 25 February to 18 March 2022, he was also the sole director of Linea. He said that, during these periods, it was difficult to find anyone else willing to serve in these roles – evidently, because of the sanctions imposed on Mr Melnichenko.
Mr Fokin accepted in cross-examination that he was also the manager of Mr Melnichenko’s family office. He said that he did not continue in this role after March 2022, but I have seen no documentation relating to this and Mr Fokin refused to say who the current manager of the family office is, if not him. In these circumstances, it is not clear to me that Mr Fokin no longer has any role within Mr Melnichenko’s family office. Mr Fokin accepted that he travels frequently to the UAE (specifically, Dubai) (where Mr Melnichenko is now resident) and it is apparent that he is sometimes there for substantial periods. It is not obvious to me why he needs to travel to the UAE, as mere protector of the Firstline Trust.
It also became apparent that Mr Fokin was involved in the appointment of those who succeeded him as directors of Linetrust PTC – i.e., the individuals who are responsible for the trustee of the Firstline Trust – and he said in evidence that he discussed these appointments with Mr Melnichenko. In particular, he was involved in the appointment of Ms Irina Skittides and Mr Yorgios Lillikas, and, I infer, Mr Ioannis Constantinides, all of whom I discuss below.
None of these details was set out in Mr Fokin’s witness statement. That witness statement was confined to perfunctory and anodyne assertions regarding various written commitments he has made, in similar form to those made by various others (notably within EuroChem AG), to the effect that, as protector of the Firstline Trust, he would not allow Mr Melnichenko to exert any influence over the Firstline Trust assets.
When Mr Fokin’s witness statement was served by the Claimants, they indicated that he would not be called, being beyond the seas. They did not offer to make Mr Fokin available for cross-examination remotely. Mr Fokin also refused repeated requests to produce documents. Mr Fokin only came to give evidence because ING issued a Letter of Request to the Cypriot court, with the result that Mr Fokin was compelled (under threat of arrest) to attend by videolink from Cyprus.
Mr Fokin was always polite, but his reluctance to give evidence was palpable and his answers were frequently evasive or obfuscatory. It would lengthen this judgment unnecessarily to detail every unsatisfactory aspect of his evidence, but two items were especially significant.
First, he was asked about an email he sent to Mr Melnichenko on 10 March 2022, which referred to an attachment setting out bank balances, but was disclosed with all information regarding these bank balances redacted. He initially said that he did not know what this was about, then claimed (knowing that the relevant information was redacted) that the cash available was very near zero. Soon after this, I required the redactions to be removed. They showed that cash transfers for over US$132 million had been executed on 9 March 2022. The relevant accounts were said to be Mrs Melnichenko’s, or to be subject to trusts in her favour, but it is apparent from the context that they were treated by Mr Fokin and Mr Melnichenko as if they belong to Mr Melnichenko.
Second, Mr Fokin was asked about a restructuring which was undertaken in respect of other trusts belonging to Mr and Mrs Melnichenko in which Mr Fokin was involved (“the Valla trusts”). The Valla trustees refused to act without an indemnity from Mr Melnichenko, as was apparent from an email from Mr Fokin to Mr Melnichenko of 9 March 2022. A draft of the indemnity was disclosed, initially in redacted form. I again required the redactions to be removed. It was then apparent that the draft indemnity referred to the restructuring as something done by Mr Fokin pursuant to a power of attorney in order to allow Mr and Mrs Melnichenko to continue to enjoy the benefit of the trust assets. Furthermore, it was drafted so as to bear the date of 28 February 2022 (i.e., before sanctions were imposed on Mr Melnichenko), even though it was not signed until after 9 March 2022. In evidence, Mr Fokin denied that he had any such power of attorney or that the restructuring took place. However, it is apparent from documents filed in legal proceedings in Italy and in the EU that, contrary to his evidence, the restructuring did take place. This means that, contrary to his evidence, Mr Fokin must have had the power of attorney. It was also apparent, as Mr Fokin accepted, that the indemnity was signed with an incorrect date.
These two matters are of particular significance, not only because they were occasions when Mr Fokin was being deliberately untruthful in evidence, but also because of their subject-matter:
The cash transfers of 9 March 2022 show that Mr Fokin was working closely with Mr Melnichenko in the immediate aftermath of the imposition of sanctions, specifically to evade those sanctions.
The documentation relating to the restructuring of the other trusts again shows Mr Fokin working with Mr Melnichenko to negate the effects of sanctions. It also shows that those involved deliberately backdated the documentation to 28 February 2022: i.e., a date before sanctions were imposed. This backdating is relevant to the issues regarding the date of Mr Melnichenko’s resignation as discretionary beneficiary of the Firstline Trust.
Notwithstanding the difficulties with Mr Fokin’s evidence, Mr Fenwick KC submitted that some of Mr Fokin’s evidence was not challenged in cross-examination, and so must be accepted. I sensed that this submission was advanced more in hope than expectation. The cross-examination was conducted by Mr Kitchener KC, with exceptional skill, and in circumstances where the time difference between this country and Cyprus, and the need to make progress with the trial as a whole, meant that his time with Mr Fokin was limited. It was nevertheless clear to everyone in court, including Mr Fokin, that Mr Kitchener KC was seeking to explore Mr Fokin’s general honesty and reliability as a witness. In my view, it was no less clear that Mr Kitchener KC established that Mr Fokin was neither honest nor reliable. By the end, I felt unable to rely on any of Mr Fokin’s evidence, save to the extent that it was clearly supported by documents or was inadvertently helpful to the Banks.
- Heading
- PART A: INTRODUCTION AND PARTIES [1]-[22]
- II: The Claimants [11]-[17]
- III: The Banks and Tecnimont [18]-[20]
- IV: The new Kingisepp plant [21]-[22]
- PART B: THE BONDS AND EUROCHEM NW2’S DEMANDS [23]-[45]
- VI: Designation under Regulation 269 [29]-[33]
- VII: Termination of the Contracts [34]-[37]
- VIII: EuroChem NW2’s demands on the Bonds [38]-[40]
- IX: Rejection of the demands [41]-[45]
- PART C: THE ISSUES AND THE WITNESSES [46]-[98]
- XI: The Claimants’ EuroChem AG witnesses [59]-[66]
- Mr Valters and Mr Solzhenitsyn
- Mr Hechler
- Mr Collishe
- Ms Basyrova
- XII: The Claimants’ EuroChem NW2 witness [67]-[73]
- XIII: The Claimants’ Trust witnesses [74]-[94]
- Mr Fokin
- Mr Noble
- XIV: The Banks’ witnesses [95]-[98]
- PART D: THE FACTS RE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL [99]-[211]
- The Trusts above EuroChem AG
- The structure from EuroChem AG downwards
- XVI: The ownership structure after sanctions [110]-[123]
- Changes at the level of EuroChem AG
- Changes in directorships
- XVII: Other group structural changes [124]-[144]
- The “Future of EuroChem” memorandum
- The transfers to MCC EuroChem
- The UAE trading cluster
- Changes within EuroChem AG and the EU subsidiaries
- XVIII: Mr Melnichenko’s involvement before March 2022 [145]-[151]
- XIX: The Claimants’ first pleading point [152]-[154]
- XX: The date of the Deed of Retirement [155]-[165]
- XXI: The role of Mrs Melnichenko [166]-[175]
- XXII: Mr Melnichenko’s involvement after March 2022 (1) [176]-[187]
- XXIII: The Claimants’ second pleading point [188]-[197]
- XXIV: Mr Melnichenko’s involvement after March 2022 (2) [198]-[204]
- XXV: The Assignment [205]-[211]
- PART E: REGULATION 269 [212]-[305]
- XXVII: The supplementary EU materials [220]-[225]
- XXVIII: Decisions of the CJEU [226]-[229]
- XXIX: How to interpret Regulation 269 [230]-[240]
- XXX: Article 2(1) [241]-[248]
- XXXI: Article 2(2) [249]-[259]
- XXXII: “Ownership” [260]-[278]
- XXXIII: The Claimants’ third pleading point [279]-[282]
- XXXIV: The MP Bank v Pugachev point [283]-[293]
- XXXV: “Control” [294]-[305]
- PART F: THE NCAS [306]-[347]
- XXXVII: Firewalls and the NCAs [312]-[313]
- XXXVIII: The French NCA: the DGT [314]-[326]
- XXXIX: The Italian NCA: the CSF [327]-[332]
- XL: The Swiss NCA: the SECO [333]-[337]
- XLI: The Cypriot NCA: the SEOK [338]-[341]
- XLII: The Dutch NCA: the BTI [342]-[347]
- PART G: APPLYING REGULATION 269 [348]-[411]
- XLIV: Inferences [360]-[369]
- XLV: Article 2(1) and the Bonds [370]-[378]
- XLVI: The LIA v Maud point [379]-[399]
- XLVII: Article 2(1) and the Assignment [400]
- XLVIII: Article 2(2) and payment to EuroChem NW2 [401]-[403]
- XLIX: Article 2(2) and payment to EuroChem AG [404]-[408]
- L: The pending applications to the DGT and the CSF [409]-[411]
- PART H: REGULATION 833 [412]-[473]
- LII: Are the claims “in connection with” the Contracts? [416]-[429]
- LIII: Are the claims by or on behalf of a Russian entity? [430]-[433]
- LIV: Conclusion on Regulation 833 [434]-[435]
- PART I: THE RULE IN RALLI BROTHERS [436]-[473]
- LVI: The rule in Ralli Brothers [438]-[440]
- LVII: The place of performance under the Bonds [441]-[461]
- LVIII: Licence applications and Article 7 [462]-[465]
- LIX: Public policy [466]-[470]
- LX: Implied term [471]-[472]
- LXI: Conclusion on the rule in Ralli Brothers [473]
- PART J: OTHER ARGUMENTS [474]-[494]
- LXIII: The Bonds’ expiry dates [476]-[478]
- LXIV: Validity of the Assignment [479]-[482]
- LXV: The Assignment and Article 9 [483]-[486]
- LXVI: The sanctioned Russian banks [487]-[491]
- LXVII: ING’s Part 20 claim against Tecnimont [492]-[494]
- Conclusions
![CL-2022-000456 - [2025] EWHC 1938 (Comm)](https://backend.juristeca.com/files/emisores/logo_WAai98v.png)