PART F: THE NCAS [306]-[347]
PART F: THE NCAS [306]-[347]
XXXVI: The role of NCAs [306]-[311]
The implementation of Regulation 269 and its enforcement is delegated to the EU member states, under Article 15. In this regard, each member state appoints its own NCA. Under the provisions of Regulation 269, such NCAs have the function, at the domestic level in each member state, of making decisions in respect of derogation (under Articles 2a and 4 to 6b) and the release of frozen funds and economic resources (under Articles 6d and 6e), and of receiving and disseminating information about listed persons and frozen funds and economic resources (under Articles 7, 8 and 9).
The enforcement powers that NCAs receive at the domestic level mean that they are able to determine, for the purposes of the Regulation qua the national law of each member state, that particular assets are frozen under Article 2(1) or that funds/economic resources should not be made available under Article 2(2). Because such a determination is inevitably likely to depend on issues of ownership and control, that means that those issues are in fact determined by NCAs, for the purposes of the law of the relevant member state.
This is recognised by the 2020 Opinion and the 2021 Opinion:
The 2020 Opinion sets out the criteria for assessing control, and then says that NCAs are competent to determine control (p. 3):
“The NCA is competent to determine, in light of the above clarifications, taking into account all the elements at its disposal and the specific circumstances of the case, whether the designated person has control over the Entity.”
A little later, it then acknowledges the legal status of such a determination by an NCA, and for this reason recommends that such determinations be published (p. 4):
“In order to ensure legal certainty, the NCAs should publish their conclusions on the relationship of control between designated persons and controlled entities. This will allow economic operators to become aware of the determinations made by the NCA and, consequently, to comply with the freezing obligations under Article 2(1) of the Regulation. In order to avoid over-compliance, the NCAs could also publicly indicate the assets of these entities that they have determined are not controlled by the designated persons and therefore do not need to be frozen, if any.”
It next states that such a determination means that the assets of the entity must be frozen under Article 2(1) (which had been referred to at the beginning of the relevant passage) (p. 4):
“In light of the foregoing, if the designated person is determined to have control over the Entity, the Commission takes the view that the assets of the Entity must be frozen. The Entity may obtain the lifting of the freeze on some or all of its assets by showing that they are in fact not “controlled” by the designated person. The way to do so depends on national procedures. NCAs should make the conclusions regarding the existence of such control public.”
Thus, it is for the NCA to determine control, in which case an asset-freeze must follow. If the relevant entity wishes to have the freeze lifted, it must apply to have it lifted in the relevant member state, in accordance with the procedures in that member state. In practice, such an application is likely to involve the NCA.
The 2021 Opinion contained a similar explanation, but this time stated that only the NCAs (and not the Commission) can make the relevant determination (p. 3):
“The NCA is competent to factually determine whether the elements that it has identified as linking the designated person to Entity A amount to meeting any of these criteria or others which may prove that the designated person has control over Entity A. This determination should be made in light of the above clarifications, taking into account all the elements at the NCA’s disposal and the specific circumstances of the case. The Commission is not empowered to make this factual determination on behalf of the NCAs.”
The 2021 Opinion then proceeds to consider whether Article 2(2) prohibits payments to an EU subsidiary of Entity A, if the relevant NCA’s factual assessment is that the designated person controls Entity A. It concludes:
“… the Commission takes the view thatmaking payments to an EU Subsidiary controlled by Entity A amounts to making them available to the latter. To the extent Entity A is controlled by the designated person, the payments can be considered as made indirectly available to the designated person. Such payments are therefore prohibited, unless authorised by the NCA pursuant to one of the derogations provided for in the Regulation, or unless it is reasonably determined, on a case-by-case basis using a risk-based approach, taking into account all of the relevant circumstances, that the funds will not be used by or be for the benefit of the designated person. EU banks must apply the appropriate due diligence procedures to avoid that a payment made to a certain non-designated entity results in the indirect making available of funds to a designated person.”
The Claimants suggested that the meaning of the penultimate sentence is that payment is prohibited unless (i) authorised by the NCA pursuant to a derogation under the Regulation or (ii) the paying party makes its own determination that the funds will not be used by or be for the payment of the designated person. It seems much more likely from the context that the 2020 Opinion anticipated that such a case-by-case determination would be made by the NCA, as the domestic enforcement body in the relevant member state. This is primarily because it would be surprising if the presumption that follows under Article 2(2) from the NCA’s determination that an entity/subsidiary in the member state is controlled by a designated person could be displaced by a decision by the very person whose action in paying would otherwise be a criminal offence under the domestic law of that state, rather than by the body whose role is to enforce that law. However, it is also because it must be borne in mind that the 2020 Opinion and the 2021 Opinion both responded to questions from NCAs. They are all about what NCAs can, cannot, should and should not do, in the course of enforcing Regulation 269.
Two decisions of the General Court confirm that issues of ownership and control fall to be determined by NCAs:
In Andrey Melnichenko v Council T-1114/23 (ECLI:EU:T:2024:599), the Court stated at [26]:
“The question whether EuroChem is controlled by the applicant within the meaning of Article 2 of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Article 2 of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, does not form part of the subject matter of the case, since the examination of that question falls, in particular, to the competent authorities of the Member States when they are called upon to rule on whether or not to order the freezing of that company’s funds and economic resources.”
In EuroChem v Council T-1111/23, the Court stated at [56]:
“… the fact that a legal person or an entity is owned, held or controlled by a person whose name is included on the lists at issue must be established, in the case of the freezing of funds and economic resources, by the authorities of the Member States…”
I therefore accept the case of the Banks and Tecnimont that the decision of an NCA (i) that specific assets, or the assets of a specific entity, are frozen, or (ii) that a specific entity is owned or controlled by a designated person, is determinative, at least for the purposes of the domestic law of the relevant member state.
The Claimants’ case was, to the contrary, that such a decision by an NCA is not determinative; in which case the relevant matter – here, in essence, ownership or control by Mr Melnichenko or by Mrs Melnichenko – must be proved in the trial of this action and decided by me. My conclusion in favour of the Banks and Tecnimont on this point means that, if it can be shown that the relevant matter has been decided by the relevant NCA, then that is the end of it, and it is not necessary for me to decide ownership or control. However, in case I may be wrong about the role of NCAs, in this judgment I have nevertheless made clear my own decision, in the light of the facts set out in Part D above and my conclusions as to the meaning of “ownership” and “control” in Sections XXXII, XXXIV and XXXV above.
- Heading
- PART A: INTRODUCTION AND PARTIES [1]-[22]
- II: The Claimants [11]-[17]
- III: The Banks and Tecnimont [18]-[20]
- IV: The new Kingisepp plant [21]-[22]
- PART B: THE BONDS AND EUROCHEM NW2’S DEMANDS [23]-[45]
- VI: Designation under Regulation 269 [29]-[33]
- VII: Termination of the Contracts [34]-[37]
- VIII: EuroChem NW2’s demands on the Bonds [38]-[40]
- IX: Rejection of the demands [41]-[45]
- PART C: THE ISSUES AND THE WITNESSES [46]-[98]
- XI: The Claimants’ EuroChem AG witnesses [59]-[66]
- Mr Valters and Mr Solzhenitsyn
- Mr Hechler
- Mr Collishe
- Ms Basyrova
- XII: The Claimants’ EuroChem NW2 witness [67]-[73]
- XIII: The Claimants’ Trust witnesses [74]-[94]
- Mr Fokin
- Mr Noble
- XIV: The Banks’ witnesses [95]-[98]
- PART D: THE FACTS RE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL [99]-[211]
- The Trusts above EuroChem AG
- The structure from EuroChem AG downwards
- XVI: The ownership structure after sanctions [110]-[123]
- Changes at the level of EuroChem AG
- Changes in directorships
- XVII: Other group structural changes [124]-[144]
- The “Future of EuroChem” memorandum
- The transfers to MCC EuroChem
- The UAE trading cluster
- Changes within EuroChem AG and the EU subsidiaries
- XVIII: Mr Melnichenko’s involvement before March 2022 [145]-[151]
- XIX: The Claimants’ first pleading point [152]-[154]
- XX: The date of the Deed of Retirement [155]-[165]
- XXI: The role of Mrs Melnichenko [166]-[175]
- XXII: Mr Melnichenko’s involvement after March 2022 (1) [176]-[187]
- XXIII: The Claimants’ second pleading point [188]-[197]
- XXIV: Mr Melnichenko’s involvement after March 2022 (2) [198]-[204]
- XXV: The Assignment [205]-[211]
- PART E: REGULATION 269 [212]-[305]
- XXVII: The supplementary EU materials [220]-[225]
- XXVIII: Decisions of the CJEU [226]-[229]
- XXIX: How to interpret Regulation 269 [230]-[240]
- XXX: Article 2(1) [241]-[248]
- XXXI: Article 2(2) [249]-[259]
- XXXII: “Ownership” [260]-[278]
- XXXIII: The Claimants’ third pleading point [279]-[282]
- XXXIV: The MP Bank v Pugachev point [283]-[293]
- XXXV: “Control” [294]-[305]
- PART F: THE NCAS [306]-[347]
- XXXVII: Firewalls and the NCAs [312]-[313]
- XXXVIII: The French NCA: the DGT [314]-[326]
- XXXIX: The Italian NCA: the CSF [327]-[332]
- XL: The Swiss NCA: the SECO [333]-[337]
- XLI: The Cypriot NCA: the SEOK [338]-[341]
- XLII: The Dutch NCA: the BTI [342]-[347]
- PART G: APPLYING REGULATION 269 [348]-[411]
- XLIV: Inferences [360]-[369]
- XLV: Article 2(1) and the Bonds [370]-[378]
- XLVI: The LIA v Maud point [379]-[399]
- XLVII: Article 2(1) and the Assignment [400]
- XLVIII: Article 2(2) and payment to EuroChem NW2 [401]-[403]
- XLIX: Article 2(2) and payment to EuroChem AG [404]-[408]
- L: The pending applications to the DGT and the CSF [409]-[411]
- PART H: REGULATION 833 [412]-[473]
- LII: Are the claims “in connection with” the Contracts? [416]-[429]
- LIII: Are the claims by or on behalf of a Russian entity? [430]-[433]
- LIV: Conclusion on Regulation 833 [434]-[435]
- PART I: THE RULE IN RALLI BROTHERS [436]-[473]
- LVI: The rule in Ralli Brothers [438]-[440]
- LVII: The place of performance under the Bonds [441]-[461]
- LVIII: Licence applications and Article 7 [462]-[465]
- LIX: Public policy [466]-[470]
- LX: Implied term [471]-[472]
- LXI: Conclusion on the rule in Ralli Brothers [473]
- PART J: OTHER ARGUMENTS [474]-[494]
- LXIII: The Bonds’ expiry dates [476]-[478]
- LXIV: Validity of the Assignment [479]-[482]
- LXV: The Assignment and Article 9 [483]-[486]
- LXVI: The sanctioned Russian banks [487]-[491]
- LXVII: ING’s Part 20 claim against Tecnimont [492]-[494]
- Conclusions
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