PART G: APPLYING REGULATION 269 [348]-[411]
PART G: APPLYING REGULATION 269 [348]-[411]
XLIII: The burden of proof [348]-[359]
It was common ground that, in general terms, the burden of proof was on the Banks and Tecnimont to show that the Bonds were frozen under Article 2(1) and/or that payment under them was prohibited under Article 2(2): Celestial Aviation Services Ltd v UniCredit Bank AG [2024] EWCA Civ 628, at [121]-[124]. There are three qualifications to this.
First, the incidence of the burden of proof was explained by Snowden LJ in Brendon International Ltd v Water Plus Limited[2024] EWCA Civ 220 at [50]:
“[50] The general rule in civil litigation is that they who assert must prove. So, where a given allegation, whether affirmative or negative, forms an essential part of a party’s case, the burden of proving such allegation to the civil standard of proof rests on that party at all times. …”
This is why, in general terms, the burden is on the Banks to show that it would be illegal for them to pay under the Bonds, this being the positive case they have asserted in response to the Claimants’ claims for payment. However, it follows in just the same way that, in so far as the Claimants have made positive assertions in their statements of case, the burden is on them to prove those assertions, in so far as they need to do so.
Second, as noted in Section XXXI above, if it is established that an entity is under the control of a designated person, then there is a rebuttable presumption that the control extends to all the entity’s assets. It was common ground that the burden of rebutting the presumption would fall on the Claimants.
Third, in the light of my conclusion in Section XXXVI above, the burden on the Banks and Tecnimont is not to prove ownership or control as such. It is sufficient for them to show a determination of ownership or control by the relevant NCA.
As regards the standard, the relevant elements of Article 2, including as to ownership or control, must be proved on the ordinary civil standard of balance of probabilities. This is not disturbed by Article 10(2), which provides that a person bound by Regulation 269 is not liable for breaches of any prohibition therein, including Article 2, unless they “know” or “had reasonable cause to suspect” the same: see Vneshprombank LLC v Bedzhamov [2024] EWHC 1048 (Ch), at [71]-[72].
Tecnimont sought to go further, suggesting that assets must be frozen under Article 2(1), not only if they are in fact owned or controlled by the designated person, but also if there are merely reasonable grounds to believe this. In support of this submission, they cited the Consolidated FAQ document at p. 29 (in the answer to Question 5 in Section B, Individual Financial Measures).
I regard this as a mis-reading. Unlike the 2020 Opinion and the 2021 Opinion, which provide answers to questions from NCAs, the Consolidated FAQ document is intended to assist “economic operators” – i.e., EU businesses such as the Banks in this case. The text on the first page explains that the purpose of the document is “to facilitate economic operators’ compliance with the restrictive measures”. In other words: to help such parties avoid falling foul of the EU sanctions and so getting into trouble.
The passage relied on by Tecnimont begins by stating, uncontroversially, that Article 2(1) “requires the freezing of all assets currently belonging to, or held, owned or controlled by listed persons.” On its face, this means, in fact belonging to, or held, owned or controlled by.
The next sentence reads:
“If, at the time of the assessment, there are reasonable grounds to believe that certain assets “belong to” or are “controlled by” the listed person, even if they are nominally owned by someone else, then these assets must be frozen under Article 2(1).”
This is what Tecnimont relies on. However, I understand this not as a statement of the law as it must be applied by a court (or by an NCA making the relevant determination for the purposes of the law of the relevant member state), but as advice to economic operators about what they should do. If they have reasonable grounds to believe that the assets are owned or controlled by the designated person, they should treat them as frozen, at least pending a determination by the NCA (to whom they have to report). If it turns out that their reasonable belief was correct, they will have done the right thing. If not, they will have a defence under Article 10 to any claim. This is the prudent course, which avoids the risk of either (i) committing a criminal offence or (ii) liability in damages.
Tecnimont suggested that Cockerill J mischaracterised the standard of proof in Vneshprombank LLC v Bedzhamov. In my judgment, she was right. Article 2(1) applies only to assets that in fact belong to or are held, owned or controlled by a designated person, at the relevant time. Reasonable belief on the part of the economic operator is not sufficient.
- Heading
- PART A: INTRODUCTION AND PARTIES [1]-[22]
- II: The Claimants [11]-[17]
- III: The Banks and Tecnimont [18]-[20]
- IV: The new Kingisepp plant [21]-[22]
- PART B: THE BONDS AND EUROCHEM NW2’S DEMANDS [23]-[45]
- VI: Designation under Regulation 269 [29]-[33]
- VII: Termination of the Contracts [34]-[37]
- VIII: EuroChem NW2’s demands on the Bonds [38]-[40]
- IX: Rejection of the demands [41]-[45]
- PART C: THE ISSUES AND THE WITNESSES [46]-[98]
- XI: The Claimants’ EuroChem AG witnesses [59]-[66]
- Mr Valters and Mr Solzhenitsyn
- Mr Hechler
- Mr Collishe
- Ms Basyrova
- XII: The Claimants’ EuroChem NW2 witness [67]-[73]
- XIII: The Claimants’ Trust witnesses [74]-[94]
- Mr Fokin
- Mr Noble
- XIV: The Banks’ witnesses [95]-[98]
- PART D: THE FACTS RE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL [99]-[211]
- The Trusts above EuroChem AG
- The structure from EuroChem AG downwards
- XVI: The ownership structure after sanctions [110]-[123]
- Changes at the level of EuroChem AG
- Changes in directorships
- XVII: Other group structural changes [124]-[144]
- The “Future of EuroChem” memorandum
- The transfers to MCC EuroChem
- The UAE trading cluster
- Changes within EuroChem AG and the EU subsidiaries
- XVIII: Mr Melnichenko’s involvement before March 2022 [145]-[151]
- XIX: The Claimants’ first pleading point [152]-[154]
- XX: The date of the Deed of Retirement [155]-[165]
- XXI: The role of Mrs Melnichenko [166]-[175]
- XXII: Mr Melnichenko’s involvement after March 2022 (1) [176]-[187]
- XXIII: The Claimants’ second pleading point [188]-[197]
- XXIV: Mr Melnichenko’s involvement after March 2022 (2) [198]-[204]
- XXV: The Assignment [205]-[211]
- PART E: REGULATION 269 [212]-[305]
- XXVII: The supplementary EU materials [220]-[225]
- XXVIII: Decisions of the CJEU [226]-[229]
- XXIX: How to interpret Regulation 269 [230]-[240]
- XXX: Article 2(1) [241]-[248]
- XXXI: Article 2(2) [249]-[259]
- XXXII: “Ownership” [260]-[278]
- XXXIII: The Claimants’ third pleading point [279]-[282]
- XXXIV: The MP Bank v Pugachev point [283]-[293]
- XXXV: “Control” [294]-[305]
- PART F: THE NCAS [306]-[347]
- XXXVII: Firewalls and the NCAs [312]-[313]
- XXXVIII: The French NCA: the DGT [314]-[326]
- XXXIX: The Italian NCA: the CSF [327]-[332]
- XL: The Swiss NCA: the SECO [333]-[337]
- XLI: The Cypriot NCA: the SEOK [338]-[341]
- XLII: The Dutch NCA: the BTI [342]-[347]
- PART G: APPLYING REGULATION 269 [348]-[411]
- XLIV: Inferences [360]-[369]
- XLV: Article 2(1) and the Bonds [370]-[378]
- XLVI: The LIA v Maud point [379]-[399]
- XLVII: Article 2(1) and the Assignment [400]
- XLVIII: Article 2(2) and payment to EuroChem NW2 [401]-[403]
- XLIX: Article 2(2) and payment to EuroChem AG [404]-[408]
- L: The pending applications to the DGT and the CSF [409]-[411]
- PART H: REGULATION 833 [412]-[473]
- LII: Are the claims “in connection with” the Contracts? [416]-[429]
- LIII: Are the claims by or on behalf of a Russian entity? [430]-[433]
- LIV: Conclusion on Regulation 833 [434]-[435]
- PART I: THE RULE IN RALLI BROTHERS [436]-[473]
- LVI: The rule in Ralli Brothers [438]-[440]
- LVII: The place of performance under the Bonds [441]-[461]
- LVIII: Licence applications and Article 7 [462]-[465]
- LIX: Public policy [466]-[470]
- LX: Implied term [471]-[472]
- LXI: Conclusion on the rule in Ralli Brothers [473]
- PART J: OTHER ARGUMENTS [474]-[494]
- LXIII: The Bonds’ expiry dates [476]-[478]
- LXIV: Validity of the Assignment [479]-[482]
- LXV: The Assignment and Article 9 [483]-[486]
- LXVI: The sanctioned Russian banks [487]-[491]
- LXVII: ING’s Part 20 claim against Tecnimont [492]-[494]
- Conclusions
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