The “Future of EuroChem” memorandum
The “Future of EuroChem” memorandum
First, considerable attention was paid by the Banks to a memorandum entitled “The Future of EuroChem”. It was co-written by a number of senior managers, including Mr Hechler (who, however, maintained in evidence that he had limited involvement and remembered very little about it). It was undated, but it was circulated by an email of 14 March 2022 to a number of others within the group, notably board members including the then-CEO, Mr Rashevsky.
The Future of EuroChem memorandum proposed dividing the group into three clusters, each with independent management and ownership, but with internal agreements to preserve existing synergies so far as possible. The three clusters proposed were: (i) a Russian/CIS cluster, based in Moscow; (ii) an international business cluster, based in Switzerland; and (iii) an international trading cluster, which could be based in various possible locations where there were no sanctions affecting business with Russia, including the UAE. The international trading cluster would enable the Russian cluster and the international business cluster to do business with each other, via the intermediary trading companies in this third cluster.
The document deprecated the fact that sanctions had been imposed (repeatedly referring to them as “nonsense”). It referred to the need to preserve and realise value for “the historic owner”, while recognising that business continuation would be “in the form timing and shape as per shareholder’s desires”. It ended stating that the senior management team had a duty to oppose the value-destruction resulting from sanctions, “… jointly with the Shareholders”. Mr Hechler was ambivalent as to whether these were references to Mr Melnichenko – he initially accepted this, at least in relation to “the historic owner”, then changed his mind. However, I have no doubt that they did indeed relate to Mr Melnichenko. Those writing the document intended to appeal to him, through Mr Rashevsky.
Mr Rashevsky responded to the email that sent him the Future of EuroChem memorandum, by an email saying that the memorandum would be discussed with the Chairman (Mr Brikho) and “representatives of shareholders”. There was no disclosure of such discussions, however, and Mr Hechler said he did not know what, if anything, had come of the proposals in the memorandum.
I find this remarkable. Even if the changes being proposed had not been adopted in any form, they must at least have been discussed, both at board level (as Mr Hechler accepted) and with “representatives of shareholders” (as Mr Rashevsky had promised). However, they were adopted, at least in large measure. This means that the discussions must have been extensive and detailed. In all the circumstances, it is both surprising and disappointing that no disclosure has been forthcoming; in particular, as regards discussions with the “shareholders” or their “representatives”. Identifying the relevant individuals who took part in these discussions, and assessing their capacity to influence decision-making, would have gone to the heart of some of the fundamental issues in the case.
- Heading
- PART A: INTRODUCTION AND PARTIES [1]-[22]
- II: The Claimants [11]-[17]
- III: The Banks and Tecnimont [18]-[20]
- IV: The new Kingisepp plant [21]-[22]
- PART B: THE BONDS AND EUROCHEM NW2’S DEMANDS [23]-[45]
- VI: Designation under Regulation 269 [29]-[33]
- VII: Termination of the Contracts [34]-[37]
- VIII: EuroChem NW2’s demands on the Bonds [38]-[40]
- IX: Rejection of the demands [41]-[45]
- PART C: THE ISSUES AND THE WITNESSES [46]-[98]
- XI: The Claimants’ EuroChem AG witnesses [59]-[66]
- Mr Valters and Mr Solzhenitsyn
- Mr Hechler
- Mr Collishe
- Ms Basyrova
- XII: The Claimants’ EuroChem NW2 witness [67]-[73]
- XIII: The Claimants’ Trust witnesses [74]-[94]
- Mr Fokin
- Mr Noble
- XIV: The Banks’ witnesses [95]-[98]
- PART D: THE FACTS RE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL [99]-[211]
- The Trusts above EuroChem AG
- The structure from EuroChem AG downwards
- XVI: The ownership structure after sanctions [110]-[123]
- Changes at the level of EuroChem AG
- Changes in directorships
- XVII: Other group structural changes [124]-[144]
- The “Future of EuroChem” memorandum
- The transfers to MCC EuroChem
- The UAE trading cluster
- Changes within EuroChem AG and the EU subsidiaries
- XVIII: Mr Melnichenko’s involvement before March 2022 [145]-[151]
- XIX: The Claimants’ first pleading point [152]-[154]
- XX: The date of the Deed of Retirement [155]-[165]
- XXI: The role of Mrs Melnichenko [166]-[175]
- XXII: Mr Melnichenko’s involvement after March 2022 (1) [176]-[187]
- XXIII: The Claimants’ second pleading point [188]-[197]
- XXIV: Mr Melnichenko’s involvement after March 2022 (2) [198]-[204]
- XXV: The Assignment [205]-[211]
- PART E: REGULATION 269 [212]-[305]
- XXVII: The supplementary EU materials [220]-[225]
- XXVIII: Decisions of the CJEU [226]-[229]
- XXIX: How to interpret Regulation 269 [230]-[240]
- XXX: Article 2(1) [241]-[248]
- XXXI: Article 2(2) [249]-[259]
- XXXII: “Ownership” [260]-[278]
- XXXIII: The Claimants’ third pleading point [279]-[282]
- XXXIV: The MP Bank v Pugachev point [283]-[293]
- XXXV: “Control” [294]-[305]
- PART F: THE NCAS [306]-[347]
- XXXVII: Firewalls and the NCAs [312]-[313]
- XXXVIII: The French NCA: the DGT [314]-[326]
- XXXIX: The Italian NCA: the CSF [327]-[332]
- XL: The Swiss NCA: the SECO [333]-[337]
- XLI: The Cypriot NCA: the SEOK [338]-[341]
- XLII: The Dutch NCA: the BTI [342]-[347]
- PART G: APPLYING REGULATION 269 [348]-[411]
- XLIV: Inferences [360]-[369]
- XLV: Article 2(1) and the Bonds [370]-[378]
- XLVI: The LIA v Maud point [379]-[399]
- XLVII: Article 2(1) and the Assignment [400]
- XLVIII: Article 2(2) and payment to EuroChem NW2 [401]-[403]
- XLIX: Article 2(2) and payment to EuroChem AG [404]-[408]
- L: The pending applications to the DGT and the CSF [409]-[411]
- PART H: REGULATION 833 [412]-[473]
- LII: Are the claims “in connection with” the Contracts? [416]-[429]
- LIII: Are the claims by or on behalf of a Russian entity? [430]-[433]
- LIV: Conclusion on Regulation 833 [434]-[435]
- PART I: THE RULE IN RALLI BROTHERS [436]-[473]
- LVI: The rule in Ralli Brothers [438]-[440]
- LVII: The place of performance under the Bonds [441]-[461]
- LVIII: Licence applications and Article 7 [462]-[465]
- LIX: Public policy [466]-[470]
- LX: Implied term [471]-[472]
- LXI: Conclusion on the rule in Ralli Brothers [473]
- PART J: OTHER ARGUMENTS [474]-[494]
- LXIII: The Bonds’ expiry dates [476]-[478]
- LXIV: Validity of the Assignment [479]-[482]
- LXV: The Assignment and Article 9 [483]-[486]
- LXVI: The sanctioned Russian banks [487]-[491]
- LXVII: ING’s Part 20 claim against Tecnimont [492]-[494]
- Conclusions
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