XLV: Article 2(1) and the Bonds [370]-[378]
XLV: Article 2(1) and the Bonds [370]-[378]
The Bonds fall within the definition of “funds” in Article 1(g)(v), and in any event fall within the definition of “economic resources”.
Subject to the Assignment, the Bonds are funds/economic resources that belong to or are owned, held or controlled by EuroChem NW2. EuroChem NW2 is contractual counterparty and named Beneficiary. It is the direct owner of the bundle of rights and obligations bound up in the Bonds, which it and only it can exercise.
EuroChem NW2 itself belongs to or is owned, held or controlled by Mr Melnichenko.
This has been determined by a number of NCAs, in particular the DGT and the CSF.
It is also the conclusion that I have reached, for the reasons set out in Sections XVIII, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIV, XXXII, XXXIV and XXXV above.
It follows that the Bonds are subject to the asset-freezing provided for in Article 2(1) – whether “freezing of funds”, defined in Article 1(f) or “freezing of economic resources” defined in Article 1(e).
On the basis that the Bonds are “funds”, so that the relevant definition is that in Article 1(f), it follows that the relevant NCAs, and the Banks, must prevent:
“… any move, transfer, alteration, use of, access to, or dealing with funds in any way that would result in any change in their volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, character, destination or any other change that would enable the funds to be used…”
Each of EuroChem NW2’s demands under the Bonds was a “use” and/or an “access to” and/or a “dealing with” the relevant Bonds, on the part of EuroChem NW2. In any event, for the Banks to proceed on the basis of any of the demands would have been an “alteration” and/or “use of” and/or “dealing with” the Bonds. It follows that Article 2(1), by freezing the Bonds, prevented the Banks from proceeding on the basis of the demands.
Above all, it prevented the Banks from paying pursuant to the demands, or even agreeing to do so. It is difficult to conceive a more dramatic “alteration” to the Bonds than paying under them. Payment would extinguish all the primary rights and obligations that the Bonds comprise. It would also be a “use of” the Bonds or a “dealing with” them.
Furthermore, the Claimants’ focus only on the act of payment is not, in my view, appropriate. Even acting on a valid demand by receiving the demand, accepting it and agreeing to pay, must, in my view, be prohibited by Article 2(1) and the definition of “freezing of funds”. This is thrown into very sharp relief by the Assignment, in this case, which is carefully drafted not as an assignment of the Bonds, but as an assignment of their “proceeds”. Proceeds come into existence as the result of a process. Before a demand is made by EuroChem NW2, then honoured by the Bank, there are no “proceeds”.
Furthermore, it is important that, by the combination of Article 1(g)(v) and Article 1(f), performance bonds have been deliberately included as funds that must be frozen. These provisions have to be interpreted purposively. Freezing a performance bond must mean prohibiting the course of events that would normally be followed in relation to a performance bond if it were not frozen – i.e., for the beneficiary to make a valid demand, and for the bank to honour it.
- Heading
- PART A: INTRODUCTION AND PARTIES [1]-[22]
- II: The Claimants [11]-[17]
- III: The Banks and Tecnimont [18]-[20]
- IV: The new Kingisepp plant [21]-[22]
- PART B: THE BONDS AND EUROCHEM NW2’S DEMANDS [23]-[45]
- VI: Designation under Regulation 269 [29]-[33]
- VII: Termination of the Contracts [34]-[37]
- VIII: EuroChem NW2’s demands on the Bonds [38]-[40]
- IX: Rejection of the demands [41]-[45]
- PART C: THE ISSUES AND THE WITNESSES [46]-[98]
- XI: The Claimants’ EuroChem AG witnesses [59]-[66]
- Mr Valters and Mr Solzhenitsyn
- Mr Hechler
- Mr Collishe
- Ms Basyrova
- XII: The Claimants’ EuroChem NW2 witness [67]-[73]
- XIII: The Claimants’ Trust witnesses [74]-[94]
- Mr Fokin
- Mr Noble
- XIV: The Banks’ witnesses [95]-[98]
- PART D: THE FACTS RE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL [99]-[211]
- The Trusts above EuroChem AG
- The structure from EuroChem AG downwards
- XVI: The ownership structure after sanctions [110]-[123]
- Changes at the level of EuroChem AG
- Changes in directorships
- XVII: Other group structural changes [124]-[144]
- The “Future of EuroChem” memorandum
- The transfers to MCC EuroChem
- The UAE trading cluster
- Changes within EuroChem AG and the EU subsidiaries
- XVIII: Mr Melnichenko’s involvement before March 2022 [145]-[151]
- XIX: The Claimants’ first pleading point [152]-[154]
- XX: The date of the Deed of Retirement [155]-[165]
- XXI: The role of Mrs Melnichenko [166]-[175]
- XXII: Mr Melnichenko’s involvement after March 2022 (1) [176]-[187]
- XXIII: The Claimants’ second pleading point [188]-[197]
- XXIV: Mr Melnichenko’s involvement after March 2022 (2) [198]-[204]
- XXV: The Assignment [205]-[211]
- PART E: REGULATION 269 [212]-[305]
- XXVII: The supplementary EU materials [220]-[225]
- XXVIII: Decisions of the CJEU [226]-[229]
- XXIX: How to interpret Regulation 269 [230]-[240]
- XXX: Article 2(1) [241]-[248]
- XXXI: Article 2(2) [249]-[259]
- XXXII: “Ownership” [260]-[278]
- XXXIII: The Claimants’ third pleading point [279]-[282]
- XXXIV: The MP Bank v Pugachev point [283]-[293]
- XXXV: “Control” [294]-[305]
- PART F: THE NCAS [306]-[347]
- XXXVII: Firewalls and the NCAs [312]-[313]
- XXXVIII: The French NCA: the DGT [314]-[326]
- XXXIX: The Italian NCA: the CSF [327]-[332]
- XL: The Swiss NCA: the SECO [333]-[337]
- XLI: The Cypriot NCA: the SEOK [338]-[341]
- XLII: The Dutch NCA: the BTI [342]-[347]
- PART G: APPLYING REGULATION 269 [348]-[411]
- XLIV: Inferences [360]-[369]
- XLV: Article 2(1) and the Bonds [370]-[378]
- XLVI: The LIA v Maud point [379]-[399]
- XLVII: Article 2(1) and the Assignment [400]
- XLVIII: Article 2(2) and payment to EuroChem NW2 [401]-[403]
- XLIX: Article 2(2) and payment to EuroChem AG [404]-[408]
- L: The pending applications to the DGT and the CSF [409]-[411]
- PART H: REGULATION 833 [412]-[473]
- LII: Are the claims “in connection with” the Contracts? [416]-[429]
- LIII: Are the claims by or on behalf of a Russian entity? [430]-[433]
- LIV: Conclusion on Regulation 833 [434]-[435]
- PART I: THE RULE IN RALLI BROTHERS [436]-[473]
- LVI: The rule in Ralli Brothers [438]-[440]
- LVII: The place of performance under the Bonds [441]-[461]
- LVIII: Licence applications and Article 7 [462]-[465]
- LIX: Public policy [466]-[470]
- LX: Implied term [471]-[472]
- LXI: Conclusion on the rule in Ralli Brothers [473]
- PART J: OTHER ARGUMENTS [474]-[494]
- LXIII: The Bonds’ expiry dates [476]-[478]
- LXIV: Validity of the Assignment [479]-[482]
- LXV: The Assignment and Article 9 [483]-[486]
- LXVI: The sanctioned Russian banks [487]-[491]
- LXVII: ING’s Part 20 claim against Tecnimont [492]-[494]
- Conclusions
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