XXIV: Mr Melnichenko’s involvement after March 2022 (2) [198]-[204]
XXIV: Mr Melnichenko’s involvement after March 2022 (2) [198]-[204]
I therefore come back to the question of Mr Melnichenko’s involvement in the business affairs of the EuroChem entities in Russia, for which the head Russian holding company was MCC EuroChem, after March 2022.
As noted, I received no direct evidence about this. Indeed, I know nothing about the corporate governance of MCC EuroChem, save that Mr Shiryaev was the General Director for some time, and save that, more recently, the General Director has been Mr Vanyushin. Mr Fenwick KC said that he was unable to tell me who the directors of MCC EuroChem were or are. I know that decisions that affect EuroChem NW2 are made at the level of MCC EuroChem, because Mr Beloborodov confirmed this. However, I received no evidence that demonstrates how such decisions are made, or by whom. Even Mr Beloborodov did not appear to know.
In the absence of direct evidence, the Banks and Tecnimont relied on a series of comments and indications, generally published by various media outlets, suggesting that Mr Melnichenko was and is still the ultimate beneficial owner of the EuroChem group. For example, in an interview on a US talk-show on 3 July 2024, Mr Melnichenko was asked if he owned EuroChem (“one of the world’s biggest fertilizer companies”) and said “… it’s a little more complicated but yes...” On 7 July 2022, a German news weekly quoted him as referring to EuroChem and SUEK as “my companies”. The Banks also referred to a press release, issued in March 2025 by Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, stating that the university had commenced a partnership with EuroChem, with the “direct participation” of Mr Melnichenko. I do not consider it safe to place more than minimal reliance on such informal utterances, given in contexts in which forensic precision is not a priority.
Although not highlighted for this purpose by the Banks or Tecnimont, I am much more impressed by the terms of Mr Melnichenko’s continued designation in the list at Annex I to Regulation 269, set out in Section VI above. I have in mind, in particular, the references to his being among the leading Russian businesspersons who participated in the congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, in March 2023; and to his having participated in the congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, in April 2024.
I should make it clear what I do not take from the designation, as well as what I do. I have no regard to the fact that the designation states that Mr Melnichenko “continues to control major fertiliser producer EuroChem Group”: that is an issue that I have to decide; the opinion of the European Council is not material to my decision (as already noted in Section VI). I also have no regard to the political context of these meetings or the fact that President Putin was also present: Mr Melnichenko’s political views and affiliations are not relevant.
What is significant is the simple fact that Mr Melnichenko is said to have attended these events. I recognise that the references in Annex I are only hearsay evidence of this, but at a purely factual level, and in relation to primary facts of this kind, I consider it likely that what is said by the European Council in Annex I is correct. Accepting, therefore, that on the balance of probabilities it is likely that Mr Melnichenko attended the events in March 2023 and April 2024, I regard this as important.
Mr Melnichenko will not have been invited to attend, and will not have attended, in the capacity of a wealthy former businessman who has no current involvement in any of EuroChem’s affairs and is merely enjoying a quiet retirement in Dubai. He will have been invited to attend, and will in fact have attended, because on the relevant dates he still remained “among the leading Russian businesspersons” and therefore qualifies as a member of “the congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs”. It is said that, at the March 2023 event, President Putin urged those present to “put patriotism before profit”. Mr Melnichenko was there because he is someone who is in a position to do this, by controlling or at least influencing the affairs of profitable Russian business enterprises – i.e., the EuroChem and SUEK interests in Russia.
- Heading
- PART A: INTRODUCTION AND PARTIES [1]-[22]
- II: The Claimants [11]-[17]
- III: The Banks and Tecnimont [18]-[20]
- IV: The new Kingisepp plant [21]-[22]
- PART B: THE BONDS AND EUROCHEM NW2’S DEMANDS [23]-[45]
- VI: Designation under Regulation 269 [29]-[33]
- VII: Termination of the Contracts [34]-[37]
- VIII: EuroChem NW2’s demands on the Bonds [38]-[40]
- IX: Rejection of the demands [41]-[45]
- PART C: THE ISSUES AND THE WITNESSES [46]-[98]
- XI: The Claimants’ EuroChem AG witnesses [59]-[66]
- Mr Valters and Mr Solzhenitsyn
- Mr Hechler
- Mr Collishe
- Ms Basyrova
- XII: The Claimants’ EuroChem NW2 witness [67]-[73]
- XIII: The Claimants’ Trust witnesses [74]-[94]
- Mr Fokin
- Mr Noble
- XIV: The Banks’ witnesses [95]-[98]
- PART D: THE FACTS RE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL [99]-[211]
- The Trusts above EuroChem AG
- The structure from EuroChem AG downwards
- XVI: The ownership structure after sanctions [110]-[123]
- Changes at the level of EuroChem AG
- Changes in directorships
- XVII: Other group structural changes [124]-[144]
- The “Future of EuroChem” memorandum
- The transfers to MCC EuroChem
- The UAE trading cluster
- Changes within EuroChem AG and the EU subsidiaries
- XVIII: Mr Melnichenko’s involvement before March 2022 [145]-[151]
- XIX: The Claimants’ first pleading point [152]-[154]
- XX: The date of the Deed of Retirement [155]-[165]
- XXI: The role of Mrs Melnichenko [166]-[175]
- XXII: Mr Melnichenko’s involvement after March 2022 (1) [176]-[187]
- XXIII: The Claimants’ second pleading point [188]-[197]
- XXIV: Mr Melnichenko’s involvement after March 2022 (2) [198]-[204]
- XXV: The Assignment [205]-[211]
- PART E: REGULATION 269 [212]-[305]
- XXVII: The supplementary EU materials [220]-[225]
- XXVIII: Decisions of the CJEU [226]-[229]
- XXIX: How to interpret Regulation 269 [230]-[240]
- XXX: Article 2(1) [241]-[248]
- XXXI: Article 2(2) [249]-[259]
- XXXII: “Ownership” [260]-[278]
- XXXIII: The Claimants’ third pleading point [279]-[282]
- XXXIV: The MP Bank v Pugachev point [283]-[293]
- XXXV: “Control” [294]-[305]
- PART F: THE NCAS [306]-[347]
- XXXVII: Firewalls and the NCAs [312]-[313]
- XXXVIII: The French NCA: the DGT [314]-[326]
- XXXIX: The Italian NCA: the CSF [327]-[332]
- XL: The Swiss NCA: the SECO [333]-[337]
- XLI: The Cypriot NCA: the SEOK [338]-[341]
- XLII: The Dutch NCA: the BTI [342]-[347]
- PART G: APPLYING REGULATION 269 [348]-[411]
- XLIV: Inferences [360]-[369]
- XLV: Article 2(1) and the Bonds [370]-[378]
- XLVI: The LIA v Maud point [379]-[399]
- XLVII: Article 2(1) and the Assignment [400]
- XLVIII: Article 2(2) and payment to EuroChem NW2 [401]-[403]
- XLIX: Article 2(2) and payment to EuroChem AG [404]-[408]
- L: The pending applications to the DGT and the CSF [409]-[411]
- PART H: REGULATION 833 [412]-[473]
- LII: Are the claims “in connection with” the Contracts? [416]-[429]
- LIII: Are the claims by or on behalf of a Russian entity? [430]-[433]
- LIV: Conclusion on Regulation 833 [434]-[435]
- PART I: THE RULE IN RALLI BROTHERS [436]-[473]
- LVI: The rule in Ralli Brothers [438]-[440]
- LVII: The place of performance under the Bonds [441]-[461]
- LVIII: Licence applications and Article 7 [462]-[465]
- LIX: Public policy [466]-[470]
- LX: Implied term [471]-[472]
- LXI: Conclusion on the rule in Ralli Brothers [473]
- PART J: OTHER ARGUMENTS [474]-[494]
- LXIII: The Bonds’ expiry dates [476]-[478]
- LXIV: Validity of the Assignment [479]-[482]
- LXV: The Assignment and Article 9 [483]-[486]
- LXVI: The sanctioned Russian banks [487]-[491]
- LXVII: ING’s Part 20 claim against Tecnimont [492]-[494]
- Conclusions
![CL-2022-000456 - [2025] EWHC 1938 (Comm)](https://backend.juristeca.com/files/emisores/logo_WAai98v.png)