CL-2024-000457, 000458, 000459 - [2025] EWHC 1803 (Comm)
Commercial Court

CL-2024-000457, 000458, 000459 - [2025] EWHC 1803 (Comm)

Fecha: 17-Jul-2025

Case Law on s.49(2)

Case Law on s.49(2)

64.

Apart from Readie Construction and CE Energy, upon which Mr Debattista principally relied, the cases cited by the parties on the meaning and effect of s.49(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 or 1979 were, in chronological order of decision:

(i)

Polenghi Bros v Dried Milk Co, Ltd (1904) 10 Com Cas 42.

(ii)

Workman Clark & Co, Ltd v Lloyd Brazileño [1908] 1 KB 968.

(iii)

Stein Forbes & Co v County Tailoring Co (1916) 115 L.T. 215.

(iv)

Martin et al. v Hogan (1917) 24 CLR 234.

(v)

Colley v Overseas Exporters [1921] 3 KB 302.

(vi)

Muller Maclean & Co v Leslie & Anderson (1921) 8 Ll. L. Rep. 328.

(vii)

A.A. Nortier & Co v Wm. Maclean, Sons & Co (1921) 9 Ll. L. Rep. 192.

(viii)

Shell-Mex, Ltd v Elton Cop Dyeing Co, Ltd (1928) 34 Com Cas 39.

(ix)

Henderson and Keay Ltd v A. M. Carmichael Ltd 1956 S.L.T. (Notes) 58.

(x)

White and Carter (Councils) Ltd v McGregor [1962] AC 413.

(xi)

Tradax v Goldschmidt [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 604.

(xii)

Otis Vehicle Rentals Ltd (formerly Brandrick Hire (Birmingham) Ltd) v Cicely Commercials Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1064.

(xiii)

Caterpillar, supra.

(xiv)

The Res Cogitans, supra (in the Supreme Court) and per Males J at first instance, [2015] EWHC 2022 (Comm).

(xv)

Garmin Australasia Pty Ltd v B & K Holdings (Qld) Pty Ltd [2018] QCA 353.

(xvi)

Mitsubishi Corp RTM International Pte Ltd v Kyen Resources Pte Ltd [2019] SGHCR 6.

65.

To do justice to the parties’ arguments, and in particular to Mr Nolan KC’s submission that, if required, I should refuse to follow Readie Construction and CE Energy, the prior cases need to be considered quite fully. I have done so in Appendix B below rather than lengthen the main body of this judgment. My conclusions are summarised in paragraphs 66 to 68 below.

66.

Firstly, I agree with Mr Nolan KC’s submission (paragraph 16(i) above), that on the statutory language, and as a matter of long-standing authority, the price under an f.o.b. contract requiring payment against shipping documents is not a price payable ‘irrespective of delivery’, within the meaning of s.49(2) of the Sale of Goods Act.

(i)

As regards language, that is the ordinary sense of the statutory requirement, which connotes independence of the payment obligation from performance of the delivery obligation. That sense is reinforced when regard is had to the known origins of the sub-section.

(ii)

As regards authority, it was decided by Stein Forbes and Muller Maclean, and not doubted in the century following, that (a) for a price to be payable ‘irrespective of delivery’ within the meaning of s.49(2), the contract must provide for payment not to be conditional upon the prior or simultaneous performance of the seller’s delivery obligation, and (b) a c.i.f. or f.o.b. contract providing that the price is payable against shipping documents by which the seller reserves the right to dispose of the goods as shipped is not such a contract. That understanding of s.49(2) was taken to be correct by the Court of Appeal in Caterpillar, supra, and has been considered established and uncontroversial.

(iii)

In particular, therefore, I reject Mr Debattista’s submission about the effect of the prior case law, quoted in paragraph 57 above.

67.

Secondly, one consequence of that interpretation of s.49(2) is that where the obligation to pay the price is conditional upon prior or simultaneous delivery, and delivery has in fact occurred, but the contract provides for property in the goods not to pass until payment, the remedy of an action for the price is not available to the seller under the Sale of Goods Act: s.49(1) will not apply because property has not passed; s.49(2) will not apply because the contract did not provide for the price to be payable irrespective of delivery. A clear example of that in the case law is Tradax v Goldschmidt. The seller’s only remedy under the Act, if the buyer wrongfully fails to pay in such a case, even though the goods have been delivered, is a claim for damages, but that is not an unjust result precisely because the goods remain the seller’s goods. I am unclear whether what Lord Mance, JSC, said in The Res Cogitans, obiter, at [50], fits entirely with this orthodox understanding, but neither do I think it gives any real support for the seller’s argument on the meaning of s.49(2).

68.

Thirdly, if s.49(2) applies, nonetheless there can be no judgment or final award of arbitration for the price of goods not delivered under the contract unless at the date of judgment or award the seller remains willing and able to deliver (Benjamin, 16-001 at n.9). The buyer in this case did not raise any such defence in the arbitration, so it would not have been open to it to appeal against the Awards by reference to it.

69.

Subject, then, to Readie Construction and CE Energy, I would follow Stein Forbes and Muller Maclean in holding that in English law:

(i)

under a contract for the sale of goods a price is payable ‘irrespective of delivery’ within s.49(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 only where the performance by the seller of its obligation to deliver the goods is not a condition precedent to or concurrent condition of the buyer’s obligation to pay the price; and

(ii)

therefore, under an f.o.b. contract providing for payment by ‘cash against documents’ where the documents include bills of lading by the terms and holding of which the seller reserves a right of disposal, the price is not payable ‘irrespective of delivery’, so that, as Sassoon puts it (paragraph 53 above), s.49(2) does not avail the seller.

70.

In that regard, I would consider Stein Forbes and Muller Maclean to be correctly decided, and certainly I would see no reason to consider them bad law or not to follow them.

71.

On that view of the law, with respect, the Board of Appeal misdirected themselves as to the correct interpretation of s.49(2), and on their findings of fact the seller’s price claim in each arbitration was bad in law and should have failed.