CL-2024-000457, 000458, 000459 - [2025] EWHC 1803 (Comm)
Commercial Court

CL-2024-000457, 000458, 000459 - [2025] EWHC 1803 (Comm)

Fecha: 17-Jul-2025

Conclusions

B67.

In written reply submissions, the buyer conceded that the seller could maintain its claim for the price (and it seems, more particularly, that property had passed, [113]). It requested only a decision that the seller was entitled to the price and nothing else, [26], which Tan AR declined to consider on the ground that the only application before the court was for judgment on the price claim, [114].

B68.

Tan AR’s discussion of the bases upon which the seller put the claim to the price was therefore academic. As regards s.49(2), at [62], he disagreed with what had been the submission for the buyer, in line with the orthodox understanding under English law, that since by the contract payment followed, and required, a presentation of documents, i.e. delivery, s.49(2) did not apply. Tan AR suggested at [61] that the argument read ‘irrespective of delivery’ as requiring “that the time for payment stipulated in the agreement cannot depend on the occurrence of delivery”. I do not think that is correct. The orthodox English law view, and the argument put that had become academic, was that ‘irrespective of delivery’ required the performance of the seller’s obligation to deliver not to be a precedent or concurrent condition of the buyer’s obligation to pay the price. Tan AR said that in his view, [62], “the phrase “irrespective of delivery” means that the time for payment may be, but need not be contingent on delivery or the time for delivery. Accordingly, a term requiring payment at a time that is ascertainable with reference to delivery or the time for delivery is capable of falling within the scope of s.49(2)” (original emphasis). I do not consider that to be a coherent reading of s.49(2), and in my view Tan AR’s analysis proceeded upon a misapprehension that payability ‘irrespective of delivery’ is about timing rather than about (un)conditionality of obligations.

B69.

I do not consider that Mitsubishi Corp v Kyen Resources can be regarded as even weak persuasive authority as to the meaning and effect of s.49(2) of the Act under English law; and I note also that Tan AR concluded in any event (at [87], [92]) that property had passed, as conceded by the buyer, so that s.49(1) applied (meaning, I think, that s.49(2) was irrelevant, not (as Tan AR said at [92]) that the seller could maintain its claim under either sub-section).