CL-2024-000457, 000458, 000459 - [2025] EWHC 1803 (Comm)
Commercial Court

CL-2024-000457, 000458, 000459 - [2025] EWHC 1803 (Comm)

Fecha: 17-Jul-2025

Furthermore, although the present case disproves, with respect, Jacobs J’s claim in MUR Shipping v RTI (paragraph 22 above), at [49], that it is “ invariably the case ” that the respondent to an appli

A10.

Furthermore, although the present case disproves, with respect, Jacobs J’s claim in MUR Shipping v RTI (paragraph 22 above), at [49], that it is “invariably the case” that the respondent to an application for leave to appeal under s.69 will oppose the application, it is certainly not the norm for leave to be unopposed. I consider it reasonable to infer, absent any indication to the contrary, that the respondent in MRI Trading will have opposed the application for leave to appeal and that Eder J will not have had in mind the atypical case of non-opposition. Likewise Hamblen J (as he was then) in Cottonex Anstalt (paragraph 22 above again), who also expressed himself, obiter, in unqualified terms, saying at [41] that “If a respondent wishes to contend that the award should be upheld on other grounds, it should do so at the permission to appeal stage, as required by PD 62 para 12.6” (emphasis added). That was obiter because Hamblen J dismissed the relevant contentions as inadmissible since they either sought to go behind a finding of fact in the award or required findings of fact not sought from the arbitrators (ibid at [34]-[40]). Again there is no reason to suppose that Hamblen J had in mind the unusual case of a respondent not opposing the leave to appeal application but participating in the appeal after leave had been granted.