CL-2024-000457, 000458, 000459 - [2025] EWHC 1803 (Comm)
Commercial Court

CL-2024-000457, 000458, 000459 - [2025] EWHC 1803 (Comm)

Fecha: 17-Jul-2025

I respectfully disagree with the reasons Males J gave for his ‘doubly obiter ” view, to the extent that it concerned the meaning of ‘irrespective of delivery’

B56.

I respectfully disagree with the reasons Males J gave for his ‘doubly obiter” view, to the extent that it concerned the meaning of ‘irrespective of delivery’:

(i)

Males J cited, and would have differed from, Benjamin’s submission (at the time, 9th Ed. at 16-027) that “the better view is that a day can be ‘certain’ under s 49(2) only if it is fixed in advance by the contract in such a way that it can be determined independently of the action of either party or any third party”. (The 12th Ed., still at 16-027, is expressed differently, but that is because of Readie Construction and CE Energy, the cases that Mr Nolan KC’s argument called into question and invited me not to follow.)

(ii)

Differing from Benjamin’s then view as to ‘day certain’ did not justify a conclusion that the price was payable ‘irrespective of delivery’ within s.49(2). Males J cited Stein Forbes and Colley v Overseas Exporters, but did not identify that (unlike Shell-Mex and Henderson and Keay, which he also cited)they were decisions about that requirement, holding that the payment obligation must not be conditional on the performance by the seller of its delivery obligation, and not about the requirement of a ‘day certain’, as interpreted in Shell-Mex.

B57.

Nothing was said, obiter, about the meaning or effect of s.49 in the Court of Appeal in The Res Cogitans (per Moore-Bick, Longmore and McCombe LJJ, [2016] AC 1034 at 1039 to 1051).