FL-2024-000016 - [2025] EWHC 1903 (Comm)
Commercial Court

FL-2024-000016 - [2025] EWHC 1903 (Comm)

Fecha: 25-Jul-2025

Application for Permission to make Summary Judgment Application

Application for Permission to make Summary Judgment Application

12.

A claimant may not seek summary judgment until the defendant has served an Acknowledgment of Service or a Defence unless the court gives permission (CPR r. 24.4(1)(a)). A party seeking such permission may apply for it at the same time as seeking summary judgment, and that is what Dexia did in this case.

13.

The principles applicable to whether permission should be granted were identified in EU v Syrian Arab Republic [2018] EWHC 1712 (Comm) at [61], as follows (most citations omitted):

‘(1) The purposes of the rule are to ensure that no application for summary judgment is made before a defendant has had an opportunity to participate in the proceedings …; and to protect a defendant who wishes to challenge the Court’s jurisdiction from having to engage on the merits pending such application …

(2)

Generally permission should be granted only where the Court is satisfied that the claim has been validly served and that the Court has jurisdiction to hear it … As was said in Citicorp Trustee Company Limited v Al Sanea, once those conditions are met there is generally no reason why the Court should prevent a claimant with a legitimate claim from seeking summary judgment.

(3)

The fact that a summary judgment may be more readily enforced in other jurisdictions than a default judgment is a proper reason for seeking permission under CPR 24.4(1)….’

14.

As I indicated at the hearing on 11 July 2025, I am satisfied that the present is an appropriate case in which Dexia should have permission to make a summary judgment application notwithstanding that no Acknowledgement of Service or Defence has been served. I am satisfied, in particular, that Torino has been served with the proceedings and that the English court has jurisdiction. As I have already said, I am also satisfied that Torino is aware of these proceedings, but has deliberately chosen not to participate in them. Furthermore, in light of the commencement and nature of the Italian Proceedings, Dexia has a legitimate interest in seeking a judgment on the merits on the jurisdiction issue, and it is legitimate for it to seek that that judgment should be summary rather than default with a view to its being more readily enforceable.

15.

For those reasons I gave Dexia permission to bring its summary judgment application.