[2025] UKUT 041 (AAC)

The allegation against the Appellant is that she breached the terms of a safeguarding suspension by ringing FOA, a staff member at the workplace, on Friday 30 October 2020 and then attending her place of work on 31 October 2020. As a matter of fact, the Appellant has always accepted that she did these two things. However, the question then arises as to whether these actions were a breach of her “terms of a safeguarding suspension”.

The terms of AA’s suspension were set out in the suspension letter dated 30 October 2020 and handed to the Appellant on the same date. It was clear from the suspension letter that the Appellant was prohibited from doing the following things:

The Appellant accepts having contacted FOA by telephone on 30 October 2020. Was he “anyone connected with the investigation”? As a matter of fact, he was not. All the evidence suggests that he only became involved in the investigation after the cashbooks went missing on 31 October 2020. He had not been interviewed or spoken to by the employer in respect of the investigation into the financial abuse of AO. He had not made a statement in relation to the financial abuse investigation. It was accepted by Ms Elliot, on behalf of the DBS, that FOA was not involved in the investigation.

In the view of the tribunal, it does not matter that the Appellant accepts contacting him without knowing if he was involved in the investigation as it is a matter of fact that he was not involved in the investigation. The suspension letter did not state that the Appellant was not to contact “any member of staff”. It did not state that she was “not to attend your place of work”. Had FOA been connected with the investigation into the financial abuse of AO, then AA would certainly have been in breach of her suspension, but as a matter of fact he was not. It can not therefore be said that the Appellant, by contacting FOA by telephone on 30 October, a person who was not connected with the investigation, is a breach of the terms of the suspension as set out in the letter. We find that the DBS made an error of fact in this regard.

The Appellant also accepts that she was with FOA on 31 October 2020 when she attended the workplace. We agree that this amounts to “contact”. There is no evidence to suggest that when AA and FOA were together, she “influenced” FOA in any way regarding the investigation. There was no indication from the evidence that there was any discussion about the investigation at all. From the statement of FOA himself, the only thing that was said by the Appellant was to encourage him not to say that she had been to the workplace. Given that we have upheld the DBS’ finding that the Appellant had taken and attempted to destroy the cashbooks, we find that any suggestion of her saying this to FOA was not in relation to a fear of being found to have breached her suspension, but rather due to a fear of being found to have tampered with the cashbook evidence. There is no evidence to suggest that the Appellant discussed “this matter” with FOA, who we agree is “an employee”.

We find, as a matter of fact, that the Appellant did not breach the terms of her suspension, as set out in the suspension letter dated 30 October 2020, which she received on the same date. Following a precise interpretation of the terms of the suspension in that letter, the Appellant did not breach any of the instructions given to her. We reject the Respondent’s suggestion that because she contacted FOA when she did not know whether he was involved in the investigation, she had breached her suspension. We also reject the submission that she breached the terms of her suspension as she should have known that attending her place of work would have done so. This is not what the terms of her suspension set out. Quite simply, the Appellant has not breached the terms of the suspension letter as set out by the employer. We find that the DBS has materially erred in fact in relation to Allegation 3.