[2025] UKUT 17 (AAC)

Given the content of the exchange of messages was agreed by both parties, subject to the exceptions referred to at paragraph 21 above, the Appellant’s credibility was a key issue in the proceedings. Considering the Appellant’s evidence in the context of the evidence in the appeal as a whole, we found a number of aspects of his evidence problematic.

We considered there were a number of statements from “L” in the message chain above which would, in our view (and taking into account the experience which the specialist members bring to the panel), raise a real concern in terms of “L’s” age. These include: the specific references to his mum and stepdad; the implication he lives at home with them, reference to his little sister and the fact he will only agree to meet JA when his parents are not in the house. None of this exchange is disputed by the Appellant. There is no reference to “L” driving at any stage. This information is not disputed by the Appellant. Put another way, we are satisfied that there is information contained in the exchange which is clearly suggestive of “L” being under 18 and nothing to suggest he is over 18.

There are also a number of inconsistencies in the Appellant’s evidence. We referred to his evidence regarding safeguarding training in online safety for children. As referred to at paragraph 24 above JA initially said this was not included in his training but subsequently changed his evidence to say the training probably had included online safety for young people. The implication is that when the training was received (circa 2016) children's online safety was not as significant a concern as it is currently. In our view, this is unlikely. JA also received safeguarding training in relation to his work at CE school which was also in our view highly likely to contain an online safety element. This was not referred to by JA in his evidence.

Given the significant amount of safeguarding training JA had received and his security-type role involving checking young people’s ages and his own evidence that he was “quite good” at spotting underage people, we find it surprising that JA was not concerned as to “L’s” age given the messages sent by him, the training JA had received and the fact his job involved the specific consideration of young people's ages on a regular basis.

We found his evidence, that because he too lived at home with his parents, he did not find anything concerning regarding L’s age in the messages, not to be credible.

In our judgment, there is sufficient information provided by “L” in the message chain referred to at paragraphs 19 and 20 above to, at the very least raise, a serious concern regarding his age. Given the Appellant had received significant safeguarding training, was a qualified youth worker and worked in an environment where making assessments (albeit visual) of peoples’ ages was part and parcel of his job, we did not accept the Appellant’s evidence on this point.

We also have concerns regarding other aspects of the Appellant’s evidence. He claimed when approached by CIM at the petrol station (where he drove to meet “L”) he was fearful he was being car-jacked, and he describes this at paragraph 22 of his statement of truth as “incredibly traumatic”. He also states these cars “chased him across Birmingham.” It is somewhat surprising in our view, given this concern, that he did not report the incident to the police.

Given a key issue in these proceedings was whether the Appellant believed “L” to be 15 we also found the Appellant’s evidence regarding the information on “L’s” age on Grindr to be less than credible. In his evidence in chief, he initially said the photo of “L” was topless and it said age 18 beside the photograph. He then changed his evidence to say he was “unaware” of his age and “did not know if his age was there (on Grindr) or not" but that he assumed he was 18 as only those over 18 should sign up to the app. He continued “I would say he looked 18” (in the photo).

We have two concerns regarding this part of JA’s evidence. Firstly, he changed his evidence significantly on what is the key issue in the case, i.e. his belief as to “L’s” age, specifically regarding what information on “L’s” age he had seen on Grindr. Secondly, given the Appellant's training, experience and security-type role, which involves identifying young people under 18 trying to pass themselves as 18 by checking their identification, we do not consider it is at all likely that JA honestly believed everyone on Grindr was entirely candid about their age and everyone who used the app was therefore over 18.

We found JA’s evidence in response to the question why he had not contacted “L” afterwards less than credible. He stated this was because the “battery died” on his phone. We do not find this believable. The Appellant is clearly sufficiently technologically competent to use and download apps. Charging a mobile phone is a relatively quick process. We did not accept his evidence on this point. We also note during examination in chief when referring to the disputed message ’Im 15 and I’m in Birmingham” the Appellant initially stated he could not remember that message but subsequently changed his evidence to “it didn't happen”. This is a significant change and, in our view, undermines the Appellant’s credibility on this key issue. We also note Mr Serr’s point that the modus operandi of an organisation such as CIM involves making it obvious the “decoy” is underage otherwise it would be a pointless exercise.

The credibility of the Appellant is a significant issue in this appeal given the first DBS finding we are considering relates to hisbelief that “L” was 15. We are mindful therefore that we must assess JA’s credibility by considering the consistency and plausibility of his evidence and its alignment with the other evidence in the appeal as a whole.

We have had the opportunity to hear and assess the Appellant’s evidence at first hand with the benefit of the specialist panel members and the knowledge and experience they bring to the jurisdiction. Put simply we do not accept significant (and key) parts of the appellant's evidence as credible.

We are satisfied that JA believed “L” to be 15 years old on the balance of probabilities. The finding contains no mistake of fact. There is no dispute that the finding amounts to relevant conduct because if JA’s conduct was repeated in relation to children, it would cause harm (whether sexual, emotional or psychological) or a risk of harm to them. We are therefore satisfied that there was no mistake of fact or law in the DBS’s first finding of relevant conduct.