[2023] UKUT 239 (AAC)

The Applicant also contends that it remains an open question as to whether victims of CSA should be considered “blameless victims” generally and that A & B does not provide the answer to this question. Again, it is submitted that this might give rise to a difference in treatment (or a failure to treat the Applicant differently in the context of the second limb of stage 3 (see paragraph 14 above) between the Applicant and other (blameworthy) victims which amounts to unlawful discrimination for the purposes of Article 14 of the ECHR.

The Applicant’s counsel placed reliance at the FtT and before me on the proposition that she was a blameless victim in the context of CSA. Counsel for the Applicant relied on the concept of the “blameless victim” in the context of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme (‘CICS’). This is referred to at para 207 of the Consultation Document Getting it right for victims and witnesses (2012).

“The Scheme is a taxpayer funded expression of public sympathy and it is reasonable there should be strict criteria around who is deemed “blameless” for the purpose of determining who should receive a share of its limited funds. We consider that, in principle, awards should only be made to those who have themselves obeyed the law and not cost society money through their offending behaviour”.

Lord Lloyd-Jones refers specifically to blameless victims at paragraph 70 of A&B where it is noted that CICS is a scheme which is intended to aid blameless victims of crime in their recovery. The appellants in that case argued that there was a need to afford more generous treatment to victims of trafficking in relation to the exclusionary rule because of their status and vulnerability. It was not accepted by the Supreme Court that victims of trafficking generally should be given preferential treatment over other victims [71].In the circumstances of this case, where it has not been accepted the applicant was a nexus offender, I do not consider this affords a basis on which to distinguish the decision of the Supreme Court in A&B.

The FtT did not find there was a direct causal link between the applicant’s status as a victim and her offending and she was not therefore a nexus offender.I have found there to be no error of law in that finding for the reasons set out above.

For the same reasons, the argument in relation the Applicant being a blameless victim must fail because it does not arise on the facts. The Applicant had an unspent conviction at the time of her application for compensation to the Scheme which the FtT did not consider she had established was directly causally linked to her status as a victim of CSA. As such, given she had engaged with the criminal justice system as a result of her own offending, she could not come within the definition of “blameless victim” as referred to at paragraph 45 above. The FtT was entitled to conclude that it was unable to find that the Applicant committed the offence which invoked the exclusionary rule as a result of or in connection with her being a victim of CSA (for which she sought compensation). As such there can be no requirement the Applicant as a victim of CSA with unspent convictions be treated differently from victims of other types of crimes with unspent convictions. The Applicant’s case based on Article 14 read with 3 and 8 , ground two, fails at this stage.

On the alternative ground it was accepted by the Interested Parties the scheme treats persons with unspent convictions differently from those without unspent convictions. This will only amount to unlawful discrimination if it cannot be justified.