Analysis
Analysis
The fundamental difficulty with the Tribunal’s approach in this case was that it sought to interpret regulation 19 of the UC Regulations 2013, and in particular the concept of entitlement to benefit, in isolation from the overall architecture of the Universal Credit scheme. This is best understood by going back to first principles.
The starting point is section 3(1) of the Welfare Reform Act 2012 (“the 212 Act”). This provides that a single claimant “is entitled to universal credit” if they meet the basic conditions (as set out in section 4) and the financial conditions for a single claimant (as set out in section 5). The claimant in the present case met those conditions and so on the face of it was entitled to UC. However, nothing is that straightforward.
This is because what section 3 of the 2012 Act appears to give with one hand section 6 of the same Act threatens to take away with the other hand. In particular, section 6(1)(a) expressly provides that “Entitlement to universal credit does not arise – (a) in prescribed circumstances (even though the requirements in section 3 are met)”. “Prescribed” means, as is usually the case in social security law, specified or provided for in regulations (section 40 of the 2012 Act). Part 2 of the UC Regulations 2013 is relevant here as it carries the heading “Entitlement”. The introductory regulation 7(c) at the start of Part 2 explains that amongst other matters Part 2 contains provisions about “cases where no entitlement to universal credit arises even if the basic conditions and the financial conditions are met” (echoing the language of section 6(1)(a) of the 2012 Act). Regulation 19 is one of the provisions that falls within Part 2 of the UC Regulations 2013.
Returning to the primary legislation, section 7 of the 2012 Act provides that Universal Credit is payable in respect of a “complete assessment period” (subs.(1)) and also explains the concept of a “period of entitlement” (subs.(4)):
Basis of awards
7.– (1) Universal credit is payable in respect of each complete assessment period within a period of entitlement.
In this Part an “assessment period” is a period of a prescribed duration.
Regulations may make provision—
about when an assessment period is to start;
for universal credit to be payable in respect of a period shorter than an assessment period;
about the amount payable in respect of a period shorter than an assessment period.
In subsection (1) “period of entitlement” means a period during which entitlement to universal credit subsists.
Thus, the “period of entitlement” is the total period during which entitlement to Universal Credit subsists. Regulation 21(1) of the UC Regulations 2013, made pursuant to section 7(2) of the 2012 Act, then further provides that an “assessment period” is “a period of one month beginning with the first date of entitlement and each subsequent period of one month during which entitlement subsists.” It follows that in order to be paid UC in respect of an assessment period, a claimant needs to be entitled to the benefit throughout that assessment period. Entitlement must subsist throughout, or the period in question is not an assessment period as so defined.
In the present claimant’s case, the date of claim was 17 August 2021. The first assessment period was accordingly the period of one month from 17 August 2021 to 16 September 2021. However, the claimant was not entitled throughout this assessment period – in other words, his entitlement did not subsist – because on 11 September 2021 he became a prisoner. As such, then by virtue of regulation 19(1)(b) entitlement to Universal Credit “does not arise” unless regulation 19(1)(b) were to be disapplied by regulation 19(2).
There are two limbs to the ‘escape clause’ in regulation 19(2), which applies in the first six months of imprisonment. The claimant satisfied one of these conditions but not the other. First, he had “not been sentenced to a term in custody that is expected to extend beyond that 6 months” (regulation 19(2)(b)). Secondly, however, he did not satisfy regulation 19(2)(a), namely:
the person was entitled to universal credit as a single person immediately before becoming a prisoner, and the calculation of their award included an amount for the housing costs element.
The requirement in regulation 19(2)(a) that the claimant “was entitled to universal credit as a single person immediately before becoming a prisoner” must mean in the immediately preceding assessment period. This interpretation is supported by the further condition that “the calculation of their award included an amount for the housing costs element”. The use of the past tense demonstrates that the claimant must have already had one prior complete assessment period. It is axiomatic within the Universal Credit scheme that entitlement can be determined only at the point of assessment, which is at the conclusion of any assessment period (section 7(1) of the 2012 Act and regulation 21(1) of the UC Regulations 2013). There is no scope for a notional assessment of entitlement midway through the first assessment period as contemplated by the Tribunal.
It follows that on the facts the claimant’s situation did not satisfy the requirements of regulation 19(2)(a). The determination of his entitlement took place on 20 September 2021 at the conclusion of the first assessment period. By then he was not entitled – or to use the statutory formulation, entitlement did not arise – because entitlement did not subsist by virtue of regulation 19(1)(b) and that provision had not been disapplied by regulation 19(2).
There is one final matter I should mention. In reviewing the case I was troubled by the apparent differential treatment of those claimants who become short-term prisoners who are incarcerated in their first assessment period and those imprisoned in their second or later assessment period. In case management directions I accordingly posed the following questions seeking clarification from the Secretary of State’s representative:
Is it the Secretary of State’s case that [the claimant] would have been able to claim the benefit of regulation 19(2) if he had become a prisoner in the second assessment period rather than the first assessment period? If that is indeed the Secretary of State’s case, what is the justification for the difference in treatment between the two cases?
Ms Mannion’s submission on behalf of the Secretary of State deals with those questions in the following way (with a footnote omitted; AP = assessment period and HCE = housing costs element):
Had this matter concerned an existing UC beneficiary who became a prisoner in AP2, the situation would have been different. Such an individual would have been entitled to UC immediately before, demonstrated by their having reached the end of an AP, had their entitlement assessed and become the beneficiary of a calculated award which had included HCE (i.e. for AP1). They would have been able to benefit from the reg.19(2) disapplication. However, this is not the case where there is no pre-existing period during which entitlement has subsisted (as confirmed by an end of period assessment).
More generally, support for this approach is found in the overall structure of UC which is a payment made in arrears, depending on calculations made by reference to the circumstances at the conclusion of any complete AP. Ascertaining whether or not eligibility arises by reference to a complete unit of time (an AP) has an inherent logic and is administratively efficient. It allows the decision maker to properly assess circumstances such as total financial eligibility, and means the events of a single day do not garner disproportionate weight. The particular length of the unit (an AP being a month) was a proper legislative choice.
Regulation 19(2) operates to prevent beneficiaries of UC (i.e. those whose situation has been assessed and their eligibility confirmed, demonstrated by their already having been awarded UC including a HSE) from becoming homeless during and/or by reason of a short term of imprisonment. However, where an individual is not receiving such support prior to their imprisonment, it is quite a different circumstance for that individual to begin receiving HSE payments from the state once they have become a prisoner. In a stark example (were eligibility not established by reference to the whole AP) a person awaiting sentence might claim UC with the intention of securing the HCE of a UC award solely to secure a property during a period of imprisonment. Such a person should be expected to support their housing position through other means (such as earnings or savings). To treat a new or impending prisoner in the same way as an existing UC beneficiary flies in the face of the general prohibition for prisoners at reg.19(1)(b).
It is accepted that this operates as a bright line which might produce harsh outcomes in some cases, such as this one. The risk of harsh outcomes when operating a complex welfare system is a factor well recognised by the Court of Appeal, which has made clear that the court should avoid finding some feature of the system irrational merely because it produced harsh results for in some individuals cases: see Pantellerisco v SSWP [2021] EWCA Civ 1454, [2021] PTSR 1922 at §§56-59; Johnson v SSWP at [2020] EWCA Civ 778, [2020] PTSR 1872 at §113. Welfare support is finite, and the current rules operate to provide ongoing protection to existing UC claimants rather than to extend housing support to those about to be or recently imprisoned.
I note that if the architects of the Universal Credit scheme had set the length of an assessment period as being one week rather than one month (and all other statutory conditions of entitlement had remained the same), then the claimant would not have been in this position. In that scenario he would have been able to keep his accommodation as he would have become a prisoner in what would have been the fourth weekly assessment period. However, that was not the legislative choice adopted by Parliament. I simply add that it will be no consolation to the claimant that the court recognises the risk of harsh outcomes when operating a complex welfare system.
- Heading
- The decision of the Upper Tribunal is to allow the Secretary of State’s appeal. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal made on 3 August 2022 under number SC285/22/00888 was made in error of law. Unde
- The issue that arises on this appeal to the Upper Tribunal
- Some preliminaries
- The chronology of this case
- Regulation 19 of the Universal Credit Regulations 2013
- The decisions by the Secretary of State’s decision-maker
- The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
- Analysis
- Disposal
- Conclusions
![[2023] UKUT 274 (AAC)](https://backend.juristeca.com/files/emisores/logo_3a2BKne.png)