The New Evidence
The New Evidence
On 26 September 2023, shortly before the hearing, Clifford Chance, who were acting pro bono on behalf of the parents, sought to adduce fresh evidence in the form of a witness statement of even date from T’s father,pursuant to Rule 15(2)(a) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (“the 2008 Rules”).
T’s parents submitted that, pursuant to rule 15(2)(a), the Tribunal could admit further evidence whether or not it was available to a previous decision maker or would be admissible in a civil trial in the UK. They wished to introduce the witness statement to correct an error in the decision of the Tribunal, namely that T did not meet the definition of being ordinarily resident in the Council’s area. That error failed to take account of the fact that their absence from the Council’s area was as part of a naval deployment, how the residency of the family of naval personnel on deployment was treated by the Navy and UK authorities and, consequently, how that understanding of their residency was relied upon by T’s parents themselves. The Council’s case was that T was not resident in its area and that error was of material importance to the case. Evidence on that point was therefore clearly material to the proper determination of the case, which required a determination of ordinary residence as it pertained to T’s parents, as naval personnel. (In fact, to be strictly accurate, the question or ordinary residence was not raised in the decision of the Tribunal under appeal, but in the grant of permission to appeal by Judge Ozen.) They submitted that the case was likely to be of importance and interest to other service personnel families and to local authorities with duties towards children and young people of such families. As such, a case with such importance should not be decided without reference to facts which were material to the Tribunal's determination. They submitted that they did not have the benefit of legal advice in front of the Tribunal at first instance and had only been in receipt of legal advice on a pro bono basis relatively recently. The application was therefore being made at the earliest opportunity. Whilst material to the matters in front of the Upper Tribunal, the factual information contained within the witness statement was straightforward and factual and its admission would not prejudice the Council. It would, however, significantly prejudice T’s parents and any other service personnel families who might be impacted by the determination of the Upper Tribunal in this case, should the evidence not be admitted and duly considered.
What T’s father said in that statement was that
“A. Reasons for the Witness Statement
6. On 14 June 2023, [Judge] Ozen … issued a decision which granted Hampshire County Council (the "LA") permission to appeal the FTT Decision to the Upper Tribunal (the "PTA Decision").
7. In paragraph 14 of the PTA Decision, Judge Ozen concluded that "from the evidence available to [her], it does not appear that the [Respondents] retained an address in the LA’s area." The Judge noted that it therefore appears that T does not meet the definition of being ordinarily resident in the LA’s area.
8. I am submitting this witness statement to respectfully correct Judge Ozen's inaccurate statement that my family and I did not retain an address in Hampshire. This topic did not come up during the conduct of the proceedings in front of the FTT and it didn't occur to me to raise it.
9. After I became aware of the inaccurate statement in the PTA Decision dated 14 June 2023, I worked with the National Autistic Society to seek pro bono legal advice from solicitors at CC and a barrister from Matrix Chambers in relation to the appeal.
10. Due to their limited availability, it has taken a number of months to identify counsel who would be available to provide legal advice and attend the upcoming appeal hearing, and who can advise on the legal issues, including the significance of the "ordinary resident" test. Upon receiving advice, the privilege over which is not waived, I submit a witness statement addressing this discrete issue, which I have endeavoured to do promptly and without delay.
B. History of Residence in Hampshire
History of residence
[Note: I have significantly redacted the next few paragraphs, not out of any disrespect for T’s father’s significant and longstanding naval service, but to minimise the risk of T being identified]
11. I … have been employed by the Royal Navy since February 2006.
12. I was born and raised in my family's home in Hampshire. My dad was also in the Navy, based in Portsmouth, and my mum was from Hampshire as well so I describe myself as "Hampshire born and bred". After joining the Navy in 2006, I was based in [Scotland and Plymouth] but maintained a residential address at my parents’ house [in] Fareham, Hampshire. Hampshire has always been 'home' to me.
13. In July 2012, my now wife … and I purchased a freehold property [in] Southsea, Portsmouth. After we married in 2013, [we] continued to live at this address.
14. In August 2014, we purchased a freehold property [also in] Fareham. We moved into the property immediately after and lived there until my deployment to Dubai.
15. T was born in 2015 and has lived [at our home] since birth. He attended [C] Primary School in Fareham from September 2019 to July 2021. He was issued an EHCP by the LA in October 2019, and received full educational support from the LA.
Deployment
16. My deployment to Dubai, UAE started in July 2021 and was expected to last 3 years.
17. Whilst I have always been based in the Portsmouth area in Hampshire, I have gone on 3 deployments (Bahrain in 2018, Scotland in 2006, Plymouth in 2008 and various 6 months deployments on ships). These were on my own without my family accompanying me. In my experience this is really common for servicemen in the Navy, more so than for the other armed forces, and the Navy provided practical and financial support for me to return back to Hampshire during those times. For example, during my deployments to Scotland and Plymouth, I would commute back from the Naval base to my residential address in Portsmouth every weekend to see my family. In the Navy, this is called "weekending", a recognised form of commuting between a naval base and home, and the Navy paid for my transportation costs of commuting back home. I've seen some recent reports on how common maintaining your home residence and "weekending" is in the Navy [this was a reference to the report at
https://nff.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/NFF_KCMHR_Full_Report.pdf]
Presumption of return to Hampshire
18. We went to Dubai with a very clear understanding that Hampshire remained home and we would be returning to Hampshire after the end of the deployment, because it is the only place my family has lived in and is where we intend to continue to live upon return. This is clear from the following:
18.1 We retained ownership of [our house in Fareham] and secured a tenancy contract for [it] for a term of 12 months, with a 3-month notice period. The tenancy started a few weeks before our departure to Dubai, but we remained in Hampshire until we left for Dubai, staying at my parents’ house [in] Fareham. The lease was renewed in 2022.
19. The Navy also shared the same understanding that my family and I would return to Hampshire. The Navy offers all personnel on deployment a "get you home" allowance. My family and I were offered one free round-trip flight each from Dubai to London every year so we could visit our family in Hampshire.
20. Hypothetically, in the case of any emergency requiring deployed personnel to vacate the country they are deployed to, the Navy would be responsible for providing us with suitable temporary accommodation while we find more permanent housing for relocation. The Navy would have to move us back to our place of work or where our family networks are. For us, that is and has always been Portsmouth. It is very clear that the Navy agrees.
Return to the UK
21. We returned to the UK on 16 July 2023, following a shortening of my deployment in Dubai.
21.1 In early summer 2023, I was informed by the Navy of the possibility that I would complete the deployment early and return to the UK. Around the same time, the lease was up for renewal on our Hampshire property. As the end date of my deployment had not been confirmed, we were not sure if we would remain in for another year or return early. Therefore: (a) We applied to schools in both Dubai and Hampshire for T (b) We renewed the tenancy of [our home] property for 12 months to make sure that it was rented out if we were not going to come back early. It is due to expire in July 2024.
22. Ultimately we did return early and our house will not be available until at least next summer. The Navy therefore arranged military service accommodation in our home area, [elsewhere in Fareham], which is a rental property arranged by the Navy. We plan to stay here for at least the upcoming school year because it would be good for T not to move around too much. We want T to have some stability and predictability in his routines. We expect to move back to [our own house] at some point in the future.
23. It has been confirmed that my current role with the Navy will be based in Hampshire for at least the next 2 years. At the end of my current role in two years, I get a degree of choice in what role I go into and I hope to stay near Portsmouth. Even if I am based out of Hampshire in the future, my wife, T and our other children would remain living in our house.
C. Status of Residence during Overseas Naval Deployment
24. Whilst I maintained my property back in Hampshire, during our time in Dubai the Navy provided housing and education for the family, which I understand to be normal procedure for all military family deployments overseas. During this time each family member held British Diplomatic passports and we were the umbrella of the FCDO during this time on post, this was on behalf of the Royal Navy, whilst we were in the UAE. In the British Embassy there were UK based staff (diplomats) and locally employed staff. As UK-Based staff, I was a British taxpayer whilst overseas and under the rules and regulations of the UK.
25. During the deployment, [my wife], T and I all had British diplomatic passports. We lived in Navy-assigned housing in Dubai and were treated as staff based in the UK Embassy. I was a "crown servant" and, for tax and benefit purposes, I remained a tax resident in the UK and was employed and paid by the Crown. We continued to be paid UK benefits and disability allowance for T as all military personnel deployed overseas and their accompanying immediate family members remain UK residents. Particularly in relation to the support available for T, understanding that this was the position was important to me when deciding if I was going to take my family with me to Dubai.”
The Council opposed the introduction of the new evidence.
However, at the outset of the hearing, I told the parties that in my view, given that both sides sought to have the appeal heard as in essence a test case with wider ramifications for the families of service personnel and local authorities, the additional evidence should be admitted since otherwise the case might have to be decided only on the narrow point on which the Tribunal below determined the appeal, namely the Council’s admitted failure to apply regulation 31 of the 2014 Regulations properly. In particular, what lay at the heart of the appeal was the question of whether the responsibility for the maintenance of an EHCP under s.24 of the 2014 Act if the child or young person “is in the authority’s area” and the question of whether an authority might cease to maintain an EHCP under s.45 if “the authority is no longer responsible for that child or young person” was governed by a test of ordinary or habitual residence or some other test. To determine what was being treated by both sides as a test case without the admission of obviously relevant evidence which bore on the subject of ordinary or habitual residence would have defeated the very object of the exercise since the Tribunal below had not heard any oral evidence and had not made any determination as to the question of residence.
On that basis, after a short adjournment to take instructions, Mr Line, albeit with some reluctance, agreed that the further witness statement from T’s father should be admitted and I have proceeded and determined the appeal on that basis. For the avoidance of doubt I make clear that I admit the witness statement of T’s father pursuant to rule 15(2)(a) of the 2008 Rules in accordance with the overriding objective.
The Council’s Submissions
In his submissions on behalf of the Council, Mr Line made four preliminary points:
- Heading
- Introduction
- Background
- The Tribunal’s Decision
- Permission to Appeal
- Ground 1: the Tribunal erred by concluding that the Council was not entitled to cease to maintain T’s EHC Plan. T was no longer in the Council’s area; therefore the decision to cease to maintain was c
- The Legislative Framework
- “ Interpretation
- The SEND Code Of Practice
- The Armed Forces Covenant: the Council
- The Factual Background
- The Extent of the Issue
- The New Evidence
- the s.42(2) duty had been described as absolute and non-delegable: R(M) v Harrow LBC [1997] ELR 62, R(N) v North Tyneside BC [2010] EWCA Civ 135 at [27], R(ZK) v Redbridge LBC [2020] EWCA Civ 1597 at
- regulation 2(4) of the 1996 Regulations was clear that the definition in regulation 2(2) was confined to the application of the 1996 Regulations and had no bearing on the question of which local autho
- the role of the Tribunal in an appeal was to stand in the local authority’s shoes as at the date of the hearing. It performed an inquisitorial function and remade the decision, as opposed to performin
- The First Ground of Appeal
- The Second Ground of Appeal
- The Third Ground of Appeal
- as per Ground 4, the Tribunal erroneously concluded that an EHCP could be paused or frozen The Fourth Ground of Appeal
- Judge Ozen considered that it was relevant to ask whether the Council remained responsible for T during his time in Dubai. She cited the 1996 Regulations as being relevant to that question, a position
- in any event, in R(G) it was held that it was for a local authority to determine whether an individual lived in its area (for the purposes of a provision in the predecessor legislation which was equiv
- the parents relied on s.42(5) of the 2014 Act , but the Council did not make any decision as to the school in Dubai being a suitable alternative arrangement. The decision to move to Dubai and find an
- Disposal
- at the time of the hearing, and when permission to appeal was granted, T was still in Dubai
- S.45 of the 2014 Act (“the statutory procedure issue”)
- The legislative provisions governing an authority’s decision to cease maintaining an EHCP
- The decision below
- “the process of consulting the child and obtaining their views is integral to the decision-making processes of the local authority” under s.45(1) , see R(Milburn) at [45] upon the presentation of an in-time appeal, the ceasing decision was suspended
- S.24 of the 2014 Act (“the local authority area issue”)
- Purported jurisdictional issue
- R(G) was not authority for the proposition that the question whether a child lived in a local authority’s area could only be challenged by judicial review. That case simply stated that the question wa
- the Tribunal plainly was empowered to determine whether a child was or was not in the local authority’s area as part of its jurisdiction under the 2014 Act . That was a necessary and natural corollary
- Ordinary residence test
- the regulation determined residence expressly according to a test of ordinary residence. That was consistent with the other legal provisions set out above. It was further evidence that s.24 imposed a
- the residence of a child would almost always be aligned with the residence of his primary carer (save for some very narrow exceptional circumstances). It would be illogical for the question of residen
- Temporary absence
- the only place where T and his family had lived was Hampshire: “ We went to Dubai with a very clear understanding that Hampshire remained home and we would be returning to Hampshire after the end of t
- the Navy acknowledged that T’s home and family remained in Hampshire: “ The Navy also shared the same understanding that my family and I would return to Hampshire. The Navy offers all personnel on dep
- T’s family and social network was in Hampshire: “ Hypothetically, in the case of any emergency requiring deployed personnel to vacate the country they are deployed to, the Navy would be responsible fo
- the Navy recognised that T’s home area was Hampshire and had arranged for replacement accommodation there for him on return from Dubai: “ Ultimately we did return early and our house will not be avail
- The Second Ground of Appeal
- the judgment below had to be considered holistically: it was clear that the Tribunal considered all the documentation before it and turned its mind to questions of law and fact. It formed its own view
- The Third Ground of Appeal
- The Fourth Ground of Appeal
- Finding of prejudice was permissible
- the Council asserted that “ Contrary to the Tribunal’s analysis, it is not ‘unfair’ that individuals in the latter scenario lose their right to an EHC Plan – that is just a consequence of them moving
- the Council asserted that the “ Tribunal appears to have assumed that transferring an EHC Plan under regulation 15 procedure guarantees continuity of provision in the terms of the inherited EHC Plan ”
- Pause of EHCP
- the Code of Practice provided, inter alia, that local authorities should ensure that their provision did not disadvantage children because of their parents’ lifestyle, including deployment and to cons
- the Armed Forces Covenant contained in the 2006 Act required the local authority, when exercising that discretionary power, to have due regard to the unique obligations of, and sacrifices made by, the armed forces
- s.45(1) bestowed a discretion on a local authority to cease to maintain an EHCP: “a local authority may cease to maintain an EHC plan for a child”. That was also, apparently, the view of the Secretary
- the question before the Tribunal was whether the Council came to the correct conclusion that “T is no longer in full-time education or training in England from September 2021. Accordingly, T’s Educati
- the Council precluded itself from answering the question of suitable alternative provision by (i) contravening regulation 31 of the 1996 Regulations by failing to consult with the parents and (ii) by
- The 1996 Regulations/The Belonging Regulations
- the effect of the amendment effected by the insertion of regulation 2(4) in light of that background the statement in paragraph 2.4 of the consultation paper to the effect that “The forthcoming Children, Skills and Learning Bill will address the mean
- the position given that that legislative amendment was apparently not made good the DCFS 2009 “Guidance on Looked After Children with Special Educational Needs placed out-of-authority”
- The Council’s Further Submissions
- in R(L) the Court at paragraph 17 expressly found that regulation 7 of the Belonging Regulations applied on the facts. (Footnote: 1 ) However, in the present case, the parents were not able properly t
- the decision was inconsistent with R(G) , a later authority. It was evident from the judgment in R(G) that the High Court heard full argument about ordinary/habitual residence principles and cited rel
- the Belonging Regulations had been amended since the decision in R(L) by insertion of regulation 2(4). The case of R(G) considered the Belonging Regulations in their amended form, which was another re
- The 2009 consultation paper
- the intention, but in any event certainly the form , of the amendment to the Belonging Regulations implemented through regulation 2(4) was completely at odds with that approach The effect of the amendment effected by the insertion of regulation 2(4)
- The statement in paragraph 2.4 of the consultation paper
- The DCFS 2009 Guidance
- Conclusion
- The Parents’ Submissions
- s.24(1) of the 2014 Act should be interpreted as denoting a test of ordinary residence the judgment in R(L) was no longer good law. The legal effect of regulation 2(4) of the Belonging Regulations was simply that they did not dictate the meaning of s
- Submissions
- guidance from a public authority about the interpretation to be given to a statutory term might be persuasive authority: Hyman and another v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2022] EWCA Civ 185 , [20
- The Parents’ Further Submissions
- The Council’s Further Submissions
- there was no reference to the Belonging Regulations – supporting the Council’s position that they were irrelevant
- the Department supported the Council’s contention that the decision to cease to maintain was discretionary and could arise in situations where a family moved abroad (page 4 of the Guidance). Consisten
- it did not consult with T’s parents as required by regulation 31(1)(b)
- disagreement resolution services; and advice and information about matters relating to the special educational needs of children and young people; and
- Jurisdiction
- R(G)
- The Belonging Regulations
- the intention, but in any event certainly the form , of the amendment to the Belonging Regulations implemented through regulation 2(4) was completely at odds with that approach
- A Child “in the Authority’s Area”
- R(Stewart)
- The Armed Forces Act 2006
- https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9072/CBP-9072.pdf .)
- Application of the Ordinary/Habitual Residence Test
- The Second Ground of Appeal
- The Third Ground of Appeal
- The Fourth Ground of Appeal
- Conclusions
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