[2024] UKUT 449 (AAC)
Upper Tribunal Administrative Appeals Chamber

[2024] UKUT 449 (AAC)

Fecha: 15-May-2023

This ground of appeal is successful Ground 2

49)

This ground of appeal is successful.

Ground 2

The Ground: Misapplication of section of the 20 Equality Act 2010.

50)

The part of section 20 of the Equality Act 2010 relevant to this appeal provides a requirement on a person for whom the duty to make a reasonable adjustment is imposed:

“. . . where a provision, criterion or practice of A's puts a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled, to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid the disadvantage”.

51)

The Appellant argues that the Tribunal did not make a clear decision on the applicable provision, criterion or practice (“PCP”) from which the analysis of whether a reasonable adjustment duty has been breached could flow. It is also argued that there was no engagement with the expert evidence of Dr Hymans and the Tribunal failed to address the anticipatory and continuing nature of the reasonable adjustment duty. Therefore the finding that the Responsible Body left it too late to refer the Appellant for an ECHNA is not a defence, but confirms a breach of the anticipatory duty of section 20. Finally the Appellant argues that the Tribunal conflated an EHC Needs Assessment with obtaining an EHC Plan and had been inaccurate with the timescale.

52)

The Respondent argues that the Tribunal’s approach to the PCP was shaped by the Appellant’s own approach to it during the course of the initial hearing and the Tribunal was entitled to hold the Appellant to the pleaded case. The Tribunal was also entitled to reject the evidence of Dr Hymans when considering the reasonableness of any adjustment. Finally DJ’s conduct escalated so suddenly over the first term of available study that it was not possible to put in place mid to long-term strategies such as seeking an EHC Needs Assessment.

53)

On the face of it there appeared to be a lack of clarity over the precise PCP adopted by the Tribunal and whether it was only the requirement to enter into the agreement, as set out in the Tribunal’s conclusions at paragraph 37, or the requirement to comply with some or all of the terms of the agreement.

54)

However, I am persuaded that the Tribunal was addressing the practice of implementing performance agreements, as explained by the Respondent, which encompasses both entering into the agreement and its performance.