Interpretation Four: claim not in the required manner (version 2)
Interpretation Four: claim not in the required manner (version 2)
There is an alternative possible variant of the approach which purports to disallow a new claim as not being made in the required manner. As noted in relation to Interpretation Three above, section 1(1)(a) of the Social Security Administration Act (SSAA) 1992 provides that a person shall not be entitled to benefit unless “he makes a claim for it in the manner … prescribed in relation to that benefit by regulations”. This requirement was considered by Upper Tribunal Judge Perez in ED v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2020] UKUT 352 (AAC) (‘ED v SSWP’), a case in which the claimant made a series of claims for benefit using a false (and indeed wholly fictitious) identity, which only came to light sometime later.
In discussing section 1(1)(a) of the SSAA 1992, Judge Perez suggested that as a general principle:
It seems to me that, whether a person is asked on a paper form, by telephone or online (“electronically”) to supply the name and date of birth of the person making the claim and in respect of whom the claim is made, that must be a requirement to supply the real name and real date of birth…
It might therefore be argued on this basis that a claimant’s failure to provide their real name on a benefit claim might constitute a failure to make “a claim for it in the manner … prescribed” and as such result in a disallowance. There are, however, at least three potential difficulties with such an analysis.
The first is that there are important differences on the facts as between the instant appeal and ED v SSWP. In the latter case it was (albeit belatedly) known that the claimant was not the (fictitious) person who she claimed to be. In contrast, in PHC’s case there was no evidence at all suggesting the claimant was someone else – at most it was a case of an alleged failure to provide supporting evidence to confirm her identity. There was no suggestion she was concealing her true identity and as such no basis for drawing an adverse inference to the effect that she was someone other than who she said she was. Furthermore, PHC’s case was about a new claim for benefit whereas ED v SSWP was about a revision of an award made on an existing claim.
The second difficulty is that Judge Perez’s observations in ED v SSWP on section 1(1)(a) as a ground for disallowance were somewhat tentative and were not strictly necessary for her decision. Primarily the judge relied upon section 1(1) of the SSAA 1992 (irrespective of section 1(1)(a)) or in the alternative section 1(1A) and 1(1B) (on which see further below) as the basis for finding that the claimant was not entitled to benefit. Notably counsel for the Secretary of State in that case did not seek to mount an argument for disallowance based exclusively on section 1(1)(a) (see paragraph 36) and Judge Perez was careful not to express a definitive view in the absence of full argument on the point (see paragraph 40).
That leads neatly to the third difficulty with this potential approach based on the claim not being in a required manner. The absence of full argument on the point in ED v SSWP meant that Judge Perez’s attention was not drawn to the decision of Commissioner Howell QC in CIS/51/2007, a case in which a claim had been rejected because the claimant had failed to provide proof of identity. That authority does not support the proposition that a claim form is only properly completed if the answers are accurate and truthful. As Commissioner Howell explained:
As a matter of language it seems to me indifferent whether one expresses that by saying he had not shown he had a “valid claim” to each benefit being sought, or that his claims failed to show he qualified for entitlement and so they were disallowed. For all practical purposes it comes to the same thing. This is however an area where it is well to be careful of the language one uses, because it is easy enough to muddle up (a) the requirements for making a claim under the regulations (which are purely a matter of form and procedure), and (b) the obvious and universal necessity for any person making such a claim to substantiate it by showing he meets the qualifying conditions for entitlement (which is a matter of fact and evidence). To complete the prescribed form giving a name, address and national insurance number complies with (a); to show that the name, address and number given are genuinely those of the person submitting the claim form is within (b)…
Accordingly, I agree with Ms Cowan’s submission that:
26 … the requirements that make up a prescribed manner of claiming merely require the claimant to set out in a particular way the case for benefit he wishes to make. Once that has been done, a claim in the prescribed manner is made, and the truthfulness and merits of the case that has been presented are separately and subsequently considered as part of an outcome decision as to the claimant’s entitlement to benefit under the claim. In my submission, this approach is more consistent not just with well-established conceptions of decision making but also with the existence of a condition of entitlement (in sections 1(1A)-(1B) of the Administration Act) that quite obviously has to do with the claimant’s identity.
Those ‘well-established conceptions of decision making’ in the arena of benefits adjudication include the principles laid down in Kerr v Department for Social Development [2004] UKHL 23, not least Baroness Hale’s statement, following her review of the authorities, that:
What emerges from all this is a co-operative process of investigation in which both the claimant and the department play their part. The department is the one which knows what questions it needs to ask and what information it needs to have in order to determine whether the conditions of entitlement have been met. The claimant is the one who generally speaking can and must supply that information. But where the information is available to the department rather than the claimant, then the department must take the necessary steps to enable it to be traced.
I therefore agree with Ms Cowan’s submission that the idea that the factual accuracy of a claimant’s statement of their identity is relevant to whether a claim has been made in the prescribed manner for the purposes of section 1(1)(a) of the SSAA 1992 is fatally problematic. But that still leaves section 1(1A) and 1(1B) to be considered.
- Heading
- The decision of the Upper Tribunal is to allow the appeal. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal made on 14 September 2022 under number SC154/22/01415 was made in error of law. Under section 12(2)(a
- Introduction
- The Appellant’s request for an oral hearing of her Upper Tribunal appeal
- The background
- A summary of the proceedings in the Upper Tribunal
- Making sense of ‘case closure’ in cases where identity is in issue
- Interpretation One: suspension and termination
- Interpretation Two: disallowance as penalty for failing to comply with a request for evidence
- Interpretation Three: claim not in the required manner (version 1)
- Interpretation Four: claim not in the required manner (version 2)
- Interpretation Five: disallowance under SSAA 1992 sections 1(1A) and 1(1B)
- The First-tier Tribunal’s decision in the present appeal
- The approach that the new First-tier Tribunal should take
- The evidence relating to the National Insurance number (NiNo)
- Conclusions
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