Status and comparators
Status and comparators
MJ’s previous written submissions identified two alternative statuses. The Secretary of State has taken no point on the status issue and MJ does not address it further. There is plainly a relevant status (and cf. JA at [71]-[90)].
As to comparator 1, a person who is not already a carer, but has an award superseded to receive the LCWRA element, MJ drew attention to the fact that bespoke protection is now available, in regulation 55(5) of the 2014 Regulations, for a person who moves from having LCW to LCWRA, so that the transitional protection is not wiped out at a stroke. The Secretary of State’s own material expressly accepts that this protection is necessary, to avoid an overall reduction in entitlement in UC when needs change.
An example under comparator 2 is a person who is receiving the TE and the LCWRA (prior to the conversion date), who subsequently becomes a carer. Crucially, she does not see any reduction in her UC award (and her TE remains intact) as a result of the combination of being a carer and having LCWRA. That completely disposes of the point made by the Secretary of State. Moreover, there is nothing remotely “vague” about that as a comparator. On the contrary, it shows the patently unjustifiable differential treatment to which MJ is subject.
These are the Secretary of State’s benefit rules and she ought to be well aware of the different scenarios which might arise in practice, not least given that she has both a public law obligation to ensure consistent treatment amongst claimants, and is also subject to the public sector equality duty in s.149 of the Equality Act 2010. The fact that she has not identified a single alternative scenario where a transitionally protected claimant receives less UC as a result of a change in circumstances which increases her needs (still less sought to justify this situation) is telling in itself. It shows that MJ’s situation is an outlier. The Tribunal is clearly not assisted by the Secretary of State’s failure to explain any of this.
Ambit
There is no issue about ambit. MJ’s claim is clearly within the ambit of Article 14 and Article 1 Protocol 1.
- Heading
- Section 1
- The Issues
- Background
- MJ’s Entitlements to UC before and after the erosion decision
- Standard allowance £324.84
- Standard allowance £324.84
- The Decision of the Tribunal
- The Statutory Framework
- The Secretary of State’s Submissions
- the effect of the addition of the LCWRA element was to erode the TSDPE to nil if the only issue were the application of the erosion principle to the TSDPE upon the addition of LCWRA to MJ’s UC award, she would receive £68.51 per month more in UC (see
- The Justification for Regulation 29(4) of the 2013 Regulations
- Conclusion
- MJ’s Submissions
- the Administrative Court in R(TP & AR) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (“ TP3 ”) , per Holgate J, as he then was, at e.g. [74], [162]-[163], [166]-[168], [222]-[224]. Pertinently to this ap
- Status and comparators
- Analogous position
- Justification
- Remedy
- Analysis
- Ambit and Status
- Comparators
- Justification
- Policy background What is being done and why?
- This means, that under a strict reading of regulation 55, the claimant’s TE should be reduced by the full amount of the Limited Capability for Work and Work-related Activity (LCWRA) (not the differenc
- As a result, these regulations amend the 2014 Regulations to put it beyond doubt that the treatment of the LCWRA as a relevant increase is an exception to the general rule regarding amounts awarded fo
- the policy identified in TP1 at [64] that the view of the decision maker that it is desirable to encourage people to act as carers is hardly consistent with deciding that a carer whose needs increase
- just as in TP1 at [82-88] there is no material before me to indicate that the issue of the loss of benefit for someone in MJ’s position was considered before the making of the relevant regulations eit
- the point made in TP2 at [48-52] applies with equal force in the present case. The claim in this case is not directed to any general proposition that Article 14 requires transitional protection to be
- as Swift J found in TP2 at [64], the requirement of justification brings with it the burden of explanation. Overall, I am not satisfied that the Secretary of State has identified any reason which explain
- as in TP2 at [65], it may be that the shortfall to MJ and those in her situation is small in absolute terms (£100 per month), but the difference in real terms is very significant indeed. She is a care
- the argument that it is inherent in the UC scheme that there will be winners and losers or that the erosion principle applies to all claimants across the board fails, just as it did in in TP (CA) at [
- as explained in TP (CA) at [158], citing Lord Bingham of Cornhill in A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 AC 68 at [68]
- as the Court of Appeal explained in TD at [54]
- JA
- Remedy
- Conclusions
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