[2024] UKUT 430 (AAC)

I will apply the approach in Martland and BB rather than Norwich and Peterborough Building Society, although I would not expect the two approaches typically to yield a different result,

As to seriousness and significance of breach, any failure to the file a document in accordance with the timescales set out in the Rules is serious. . The delay is quite lengthy, being around one and a half times longer than the period allowed to lodge the appeal. It is not egregious, but nor is it trivial. The significance is perhaps not quite so great as in Martland, where the late document conferred jurisdiction on the Tribunal. Here permission had been granted and what was delayed was the particularisation of grounds for the Upper Tribunal. The delay is unlikely to have had any impact on whether the appeal can be conducted fairly (there is no question of evidence going stale, for instance). Overall and reminding myself that compliance is to be expected as the starting point BPP Holdings v Commissioners for HM Revenue and Customs [2016] EWCA Civ 121 I regard the breach as moderately serious

The reason given for the delay is default on the part of the appellant’s legal representative, who appears to have gone absent from work without making arrangements for her files to be progressed. The appellant does appear to have chased reasonably diligently which is a point In her favour. The appellant did not have her head in the sand. She had (not unreasonably) put her trust in advisors who let her down. Once she realised they were unreliable she filed her UT1 within just over two weeks. Default on the part of advisors is not always a good reason but it is significant that the appellant had chased and had been assured that papers would be filed. I regard this as a potentially a good reason for some delay, although not for the full seven weeks. The last two weeks of delay I regard as being without good reason.

As to all the circumstances of the case, I note that the underlying appeal appears strong. It is supported by the first respondent. I also note that in child support cases the case does not only concern the position of the parties: the underlying dispute concerns the payment of support for children. The children have an interest in seeing that that support is correctly calculated. That consideration justifies a somewhat more benevolent approach. I also note there is no prejudice to the first respondent (who supports the extension of time and the appeal). The second respondent is prejudiced to the extent that if I grant the extension of time he will be subject to an appeal that would otherwise not exist, but no more than that. This is not a case where delay impacts on my ability to deal with the case justly, or where he is likely to have made any change in his position on the understanding that no appeal would be forthcoming. Lastly if I do not grant an extension the appellant will suffer the significant prejudice of being shut out of an appeal for which she has already been given permission.

Weighing all of these factors I am satisfied that despite there being a moderately serious breach which is in part without good reason it is appropriate to grant the necessary extension of time and to admit the appeal.