[2025] UKUT 020 (AAC)
Upper Tribunal Administrative Appeals Chamber

[2025] UKUT 020 (AAC)

Fecha: 20-Dic-2024

Determination of the appeal on the basis of materiality

Determination of the appeal on the basis of materiality

60.

Having admitted the fresh evidence served by the Respondent, it is unnecessary to determine Grounds 1 or 2. This is because I am satisfied that the FTT cannot have erred materially in deciding the outcome of the Appellant’s appeal and the period of his award of PIP as ending on 28 July 2022.

61.

The FTT was correct in finding that the Appellant’s second claim to PIP was subsequently refused by the Respondent which made a decision ending the Appellant’s entitlement to PIP from 29 July 2022. This is the case irrespective of whether there was sufficient evidence before the FTT on which to find this in March 2023 and irrespective of whether the second claim was validly made or properly completed on 29 July 2022 and properly refused on 25 September 2022.

62.

Therefore: it no longer matters whether there was sufficient evidence before the FTT relating to a second claim being made on 29 July 2022 and refused on (Ground 1). Likewise, it no longer matters whether or not the FTT erred in deciding there was a second valid claim made on 29 July 2022, whether or not it was completed or defective, or whether there was a valid negative decision or determination in respect of that claim on 25 September 2022 (Ground 2).

63.

This is because there was a completed claim to PIP made by the Appellant in November 2023 made in respect of the second claim initiated by telephone on 29 July 2022 and the Respondent has treated that claim as being made on 29 July 2022. Thereafter it is beyond dispute that there is a decision of the Respondent in February 2024 refusing the Appellant entitlement to any award of PIP from 29 July 2022.

64.

As a consequence, the principle explained in GG applies:

15…. But where a decision has already been made on a later period section 17(1) along with the common-sense principle that there cannot be two or more overlapping decisions concerning the same period, operates to limit the period over which a decision-making body has jurisdiction.

16.

So, it follows that where the F-tT is adjudicating upon an earlier decision concerning a claim for benefit and the Secretary of State has made a later decision on a later claim for the same benefit (as here), then, perhaps absent something wholly exceptional, the period over which the F-tT has jurisdiction is only up to the date immediately prior to the second decision.”

65.

For the sake of clarity, the final phrase of paragraph 16 of GG might read as follows with square brackets inserted by way of amendment:

16.

So, it follows that where the F-tT is adjudicating upon an earlier decision concerning a claim for benefit and the Secretary of State has made a later decision on a later claim for the same benefit (as here), then, perhaps absent something wholly exceptional, the period over which the F-tT has jurisdiction is only up to the date immediately prior to the [date of effect of the] second decision.”

66.

The principle is that ‘there cannot be two or more overlapping decisions concerning the same period’ so in this case the FTT jurisdiction in respect of the first PIP claim is only up to the date immediately prior to the date of effect of the negative decision in respect of the second PIP claim (ie. up to the day before the date of the second PIP claim being made).

67.

Therefore, there was no material error in the FTT deciding that the Appellant’s entitlement to PIP on the first claim made in April 2021 must end on 28 July 2022 because there had been a negative determination on a second claim for PIP that the Appellant was not entitled to PIP from 29 July 2022. Whether or not there was such a decision on the second claim at the time of the hearing before the FTT in March 2023, it is clear that there has now been a negative decision in respect of the Appellant’s PIP entitlement from 29 July 2022.

68.

The Appellant is not significantly prejudiced by this decision because he has a full right of appeal against the Respondent’s decision of February 2024 in respect of his entitlement to PIP from 29 July 2022. That appeal will be heard and decided by the FTT.

69.

Therefore, this appeal must be dismissed.

70.

It follows that I will not determine Grounds 1 and 2 as these may be important points of law with significant ramifications and implications in other cases. This is particularly so in relation to Ground 2 on the proper construction of Regulation 11(4) because the Appellant’s interpretation might lead to claimants only being entitled to the award of PIP from the date that written evidence is provided in support of a telephone claim rather than the date of the initial telephone call.

71.

I will avoid expressing any view upon the parties’ submissions and the obiter observations on the construction of Regulation 11(4) in GG. I reserve any judgment for this to be decided on appeals where these points may be determinative of the outcome of the case and where both parties are represented so that competing submissions can be fully considered.