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Appeal No. UA-2024-000830-GDPA
Between:
DR MICHAEL GUY SMITH
Appellant
- v -
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER
Respondent
Before: Upper Tribunal Judge Stout
Hearing date(s): 2 December 2024
Mode of hearing: By video
Representation:
Appellant: In person
Respondent: Eric Metcalfe (counsel)
On appeal from:
Tribunal: First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights)
Tribunal Case No: [2024] UKFTT 00266 (GRC)
Decision Date: 2 April 2024
SUMMARY OF DECISION
DATA PROTECTION (93.9)
The First-tier Tribunal (FtT) dismissed the appellant’s application for an order under section 166 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018) that the Information Commissioner should take further “appropriate steps” to respond to his complaint that the ICO (i.e. the Information Commissioner in his capacity as data controller) had failed to comply with the UK General Data Protection Regulation (UK GDPR). The Upper Tribunal (UT) considers in detail the effect of the case law in section 166 cases and decides to dismiss the appeal, holding:-
(1) Insofar as they differ, the approach of the Upper Tribunal in Killock and Veale v Information Commissioner [2021] UKUT 299 (AAC), [2022] AACR 4 is to be preferred to that of the High Court in R (Delo) v Information Commissioner [2023] 1 WLR 1327. This is consistent with the Court of Appeal decision in Delo [2024] 1 WLR 263.
(2) Applying Killock and Veale, the FtT’s decision should have contained an explicit direction that it needed to consider for itself, applying an objective test, whether it was appropriate for the Commissioner to take further steps to respond to the appellant’s complaint. However, in practice that was the approach the FtT had taken and there was no material error of law.
(3) In applying that objective test, the FtT had rightly given weight to the view of the Commissioner who, as the expert regulator, is entitled to respect as to the nature and extent of the investigation (if any) that is appropriate in a particular case.
(4) In the absence of evidence of actual bias (or other improper conduct) by the Commissioner, the FtT should in principle afford the Commissioner the same respect in cases where the Commissioner is investigating his own actions as ICO as the FtT does when the Commissioner is investigating the actions of third party data controllers.
(5) The appellant’s argument that a different approach is required because the Commissioner may be ‘apparently biased’ in such cases did not succeed.
(6) The FtT had not erred in law in concluding that there had been no actual bias or improper conduct by the Commissioner in this case.
(7) It was unnecessary to decide whether the duty of candour applied to the Commissioner when responding to a section 166 application as (whether it did or not) the FtT had not erred in proceeding without ordering further disclosure or witness statements.
(8) The FtT had not erred in concluding that the appellant had been properly informed of the outcome of his complaint.
(9) There had been no material unfairness as a result of any failure to comply with the overriding objective.
(10) The FtT had provided adequate reasons for its decision.
(11) It had emerged as a result of the appeal to the UT that there were shortcomings in the Commissioner’s handling of the appellant’s complaints about the ICO, in particular that one of the appellant’s emails had been overlooked. If the appellant had put his section 166 application differently, it would have been open to the First-tier Tribunal to make an order under section 166 that the Commissioner respond to that email. However, as it was, the appellant’s application focused on the merits of the Commissioner’s decision in the appellant’s case and thus should have been pursued by way of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. The shortcomings identified therefore had no material impact on the outcome of the present appeal.
(12) The Upper Tribunal directed that the decision be placed before the Commissioner personally to consider the Tribunal’s observations in relation to the shortcomings identified.
Please note the Summary of Decision is included for the convenience of readers. It does not form part of the decision. The Decision and Reasons of the judge follow.
DECISION AND DIRECTION
The decision of the Upper Tribunal is to dismiss the appeal. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve an error of law.
I direct that a copy of this decision be placed before the Information Commissioner personally, perhaps following a review by an appropriate member of his senior management team, so that he may give particular consideration to the matters dealt with at paragraphs 125-136.
REASONS FOR DECISION
- Heading
- (As amended under Rule 42) Introduction
- Background
- The proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal
- The First-tier Tribunal’s decision
- The law
- Case law in relation to section 166 of the DPA 2018
- The Upper Tribunal’s jurisdiction on appeal
- The parties’ submissions
- Ground 2: The Tribunal erred by ruling that the Commissioner was not biased and by reaching the wrong conclusions about the Commissioner’s motives, and their consequences
- Analysis and conclusions: (i) the apparent bias argument
- My concerns about the Tribunal’s self-directions as to the law
- The approach the First-tier Tribunal should take to section 166 applications where the Commissioner has been asked to investigate a complaint against the ICO
- The First-tier Tribunal’s decision in this case
- Ground 3 : The Tribunal erred by failing to uphold the duty of candour
- Analysis and conclusions
- Ground 4: The First-tier Tribunal erred in relation to what was the outcome of the appellant’s complaints
- Analysis and conclusion
- Ground 5: The First-tier Tribunal failed to uphold the overriding objective
- Ground 1: The First-tier Tribunal has provided inadequate reasons for its decision
- The shortcomings in the Commissioner’s handling of the complaints and why they do not mean this appeal succeeds
- Conclusions
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