Conclusions
Conclusions
The central question for us was whether the DBS made a mistake of fact in their decision to place FKF on the Vulnerable Adult and Children’s Barred Lists. We have had the benefit of hearing from FKF and have listened carefully to all her evidence. We understand her heartfelt desire to challenge and overturn the decision of the Family Court which concluded that she had inflicted injury on her son and had delayed in seeking medical evidence for him because she is so desperate to have her children returned to her. But that is not the function of this tribunal – we have to consider whether the DBS made any mistakes of fact in their decision-making process. They relied on the findings of the Family Court so is there any evidence before us which suggests that they were wrong to do so or which they overlooked or misunderstood which might have made a difference.
FKF says the Family Court and the DBS were wrong not to place weight on the view of Dr Fowler that the injury may have been self-inflicted because she was the only medical practitioner who actually examined VFF and she thought they may have been accidental. But this is not a case where there are conflicting medical expert views – Dr Fowler considered the possibility that the injuries may have been accidental and initially kept an open mind but, having looked at all the evidence and discussed it with two colleagues the stated view was that it was a non-accidental injury. That was similarly the conclusion of the Paediatrician instructed in the Family Court Proceedings. FKF has not produced any further medical evidence which casts any doubt on that central conclusion.
FKF’s own evidence to us was not always entirely consistent and whilst she maintained that she did not injure her son, as she did throughout the police process and the Family Court proceedings, there has been nothing in her evidence which suggested that the findings relied upon by the DBS were unsound. She suggested that her children’s evidence supported her but, sadly, it did not. Both children gave different versions of what might have caused the injury to VFF. VFF himself reported being hurt by his mother on other occasions. The NSPCC report, whilst supportive of her parenting in 2020 in challenging circumstances, did not go to the central incident in this case.
The findings of the Family Court were clear and based on the evidence before it after a 5-day hearing. The injuries to VFF were clearly serious and if not self-inflicted then there was no suggestion by FKF of another perpetrator. So, although the police did not conclude there was sufficient evidence that she was responsible for the injuries to justify prosecuting that is not the test which the Family Court or the DBS had to apply. They made decisions about whether it was more likely that not that FKF caused the injuries. There is no evidence before us to suggest that the Family Court were wrong to make that decision or that the DBS were wrong to rely on that decision.
We therefore conclude that the DBS did not make any mistakes of fact. We have then considered the issue of proportionality and whether there was a risk which transferred to vulnerable adults. The DBS concluded that FKF had injured her own child and that injury was significant and she had delayed in seeking medical help. So, whilst there was no other evidence of causing harm previously to her own or other children or to any vulnerable adults, we conclude that the DBS were entitled to consider her a risk to both children and vulnerable adults because there was a risk of repetition particularly given the level of harm caused.
We have also considered whether the decision was proportionate. FKF is working full-time in non-regulated activity and has not given any evidence of particular hardship. We accept she is no longer able to work in a care home as an administrator and has not been able to work as a driving instructor but she is in a permanent role as a receptionist. The decision has clearly affected her personal wellbeing, she does not understand why she is considered a risk to children and vulnerable adults and she displayed considerable distress during the course of the hearing about the findings. Whilst not wanting in any way to minimise her distress it stems primarily from the findings of the Family Court and the decision made about taking her children into care. The decision of the DBS was a proportionate one in the circumstances as it balanced the potential risk against the impact of barring on FKF from working with children and vulnerable adults.
It is for all the reasons above that we dismiss this appeal.
The Tribunal acknowledges that this decision will be very hard for FKF who has seen these proceedings as a route to challenging the outcome of the Family Court, which it is not. She became, understandably, very distressed at the conclusion of the hearing and we were all concerned for her wellbeing. We would urge her, as we did in the hearing, to seek professional support when she receives this decision and to seek legal advice about her routes to any challenge of the current situation with her access to her children.
Judge Fiona Monk
Chamber President of the WPAFCC
Sitting as a judge of the Upper Tribunal
Upper Tribunal Member Graham
Upper Tribunal Member Hutchinson
Approved for issue on 17 March 2025
- Heading
- The decision of the Upper Tribunal is to dismiss the appeal
- or any information that would be likely to lead to the identification of any of them
- Legal Framework
- The basis for a “relevant conduct” barring decision
- Rights of appeal
- Caselaw
- [55]. The Upper Tribunal also made findings of fact and made comments on other matters. Section 4(7) of the Act provides that where the Upper Tribunal remits a matter to the DBS it "may set out any fi
- There is no limit to the form that a mistake of fact may take. It may consist of an incorrect finding, an incomplete finding, or an omission. It may relate to anything that may properly be the subject
- And at
- And they concluded as follows Drawing the various strands together, we conclude as follows
- Thus, the fundamental point relevant to this case is that unlike in an appeal under section 11 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 , it is not necessary for the Upper Tribunal to find an
- “We have considered all the information we hold and are satisfied of the following
- seek timely and necessary medical treatment for him and further
- On 18/4/24 the Respondent sent a Final Decision letter to FKF setting out the Barring Decision [373-377]
- Conclusions
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