The local authority’s delay in forwarding the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
The local authority’s delay in forwarding the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
In broad terms, a HB claimant is required to lodge any notice of appeal with the relevant council no later than one month after the date of the decision under challenge (Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008 (SI 2008/2685) rule 23(2)). Rule 24(1A) then provides as follows (emphasis added):
(1A) Where a decision maker receives a notice of appeal from an appellant under rule 23(2), the decision maker must send or deliver a response to the Tribunal so that it is received as soon as reasonably practicable after the decision maker received the notice of appeal.
The notion of what is “as soon as reasonably practicable” is not further defined by the legislation, although an Ombudsman’s decision suggests that councils should have a target of forwarding HB appeals to the FTT within 28 days. In MB v Wychavon DC (HB) [2013] UKUT 67 (AAC) the delay by the council in preparing the response to the appeal had been either about six months or approximately one year (the facts were unclear). Against that background, Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Mark observed as follows:
It would appear from the tribunal file that the case was not referred to tribunal until 21 November 2011, there being a note on the notification of appeal form “We believe this appeal has been submitted in July but no trace has been made.” According to the claimant in his submissions to the First-tier Tribunal, during the period of delay Wychavon continually stated to him that they could take as long as they liked in submitting the appeal and that their internal resources were such that they had to externally source the preparation of the tribunal application. Whatever the truth of this, and Wychavon has not had the opportunity to respond to this claim, the delay by Wychavon in notifying the appeal to the tribunal was wholly unacceptable. I also note from the bundle of documents submitted by the claimant to the tribunal at the tribunal hearing that the reference to the tribunal only occurred after intervention by the claimant’s MP in November 2011.
There is no excuse whatsoever for such delay by Wychavon. Claimants can suffer severe hardship if a claim for benefit is refused. The duty to initiate the appeal proceedings that might lead to the amelioration of that hardship is placed on the council whose decision is being appealed. Independently of any special provision in the regulations, there is a duty on them to act with reasonable speed in forwarding notification of the appeal to the tribunal. They cannot simply do it as and when they please and while some allowance may be made for temporary staff shortages or similar problems, a delay even from late December to July would be unacceptable, let alone one until the following November which is then only remedied after the local MP has intervened.
The Local Government Ombudsman has made it clear in Complaint No 01/C/13400 against Scarborough BC that authorities should aim to refer all appeals to HMCTS within 28 days. As I also pointed out in CH/3497/2005, a claimant is entitled under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights to have his or her appeal heard within a reasonable time, and this could be particularly important in housing benefit cases where a delay could cost a tenant his home. It is unlawful for a local authority or any other public authority to act (which includes a failure to act) in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right (Human Rights Act 1998, s.6(1), (6)). The conduct of Wychavon in this case was wholly unacceptable and inconsistent with the proper conduct of this appeal.
In addition, it appears to me that taking the administrative step normally required to commence proceedings before the tribunal is a duty of the relevant council which now falls within regulation 2(4) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (SEC) Rules 2008 which provides that parties must help the tribunal to further the overriding objective and co-operate with the tribunal generally. The overriding objective is defined in regulation 2(1) as dealing with cases fairly and justly and regulation 2(2) provides that this includes ensuring so far as practicable that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings and avoiding delay so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues. A failure for almost a year to take the simple administrative step needed to commence the proceedings, the tribunal already having jurisdiction (R(H) 1/07) clearly prevented the claimant from participating in the proceedings during that time and caused serious delay which was not compatible with the proper consideration of the issues.
In the present case the FTT asked the LA’s presenting officer for an explanation for the very long delay; “His response was that it was due to lack of staff and other more pressing tasks such as Valuation Tribunal deadlines” (statement of reasons (“SoR”), paragraph [14]). Words (almost) fail me. If the delay of six months or a year by Wychavon in MB v Wychavon DC (HB) was, as Judge Mark understandably found, “wholly unacceptable and inconsistent with the proper conduct of this appeal” then the present case is off the scale in terms of unacceptability. To say that a five-year delay was egregious – shockingly or extraordinarily bad – does not begin to do justice to the LA’s handling of the matter. On the face of it there has been a plain and very serious breach of the claimant’s ECHR Article 6 rights. The LA’s conduct is tantamount to an abuse of process. It is also such that any request it may make for a discretion to be exercised in its favour is likely to be viewed with some scepticism. The notion that a party should come to court with clean hands is not confined to the former courts of Equity. It is against that context that I consider the LA’s application for an oral hearing and for an extension of time.
- Heading
- Introduction
- The background to the local authority’s application for permission to appeal
- The local authority’s delay in forwarding the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
- The local authority’s application for an oral hearing
- The local authority’s application for an extension of time
- The LA’s application for permission to appeal
- Conclusions
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