[2025] UKUT 365 (AAC)
Upper Tribunal Administrative Appeals Chamber

[2025] UKUT 365 (AAC)

Fecha: 01-Oct-2025

Ground 3 - Perverse and/or inadequately reasoned reliance on family history of cognitive impairment

Ground 3 - Perverse and/or inadequately reasoned reliance on family history of cognitive impairment

The parties’ submissions

101.

The appellant submits that the First-tier Tribunal’s conclusion that the appellant’s probable Alzheimer’s disease was likely to have constitutional causes because he has a “family history” of dementia/cognitive impairment was perverse and/or inadequately reasoned. The appellant points out that on the evidence before the Tribunal the only evidence of family history was his two older brothers, both of whom were also professional footballers, and both of whom have died after suffering from dementia/cognitive impairment. The First-tier Tribunal did not have before it any evidence that any other members of the appellant’s family have suffered dementia/cognitive impairment. His parents had not, his five other siblings have not. Neither his parents or his five other siblings were professional footballers. The appellant submits that, in the light of that evidence, the Tribunal could not reasonably infer that there was a family history of dementia/cognitive impairment attributable to Alzheimer’s rather than to football-related injuries.

102.

The Secretary of State submits that the Tribunal’s conclusion was open to it on the evidence. The Tribunal was right to take into account that Alzheimer’s has multiple contributory causes, one of which is family history. There was no evidence before the Tribunal that the two brothers’ dementia had been caused by football. The Tribunal did not leave out of account the fact that other family members who had not been professional footballers had not suffered from dementia. It had alluded to this at [15] of the decision. The Secretary of State submits that correlation is not causation and it was open to the Tribunal to conclude that family history was a likely factor in the appellant’s probable Alzheimer’s diagnosis.