Upper Tribunal Administrative Appeals Chamber

[2025] UKUT 365 (AAC)

Fecha: 01-Oct-2025

REASONS FOR DECISION

REASONS FOR DECISION

Introduction

The appellant is a former professional footballer who has been diagnosed with probable Alzheimer’s Dementia and probable Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (“CTE”), which he contends were caused by accidents arising out of and in the course of his employment so as to entitle him to Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit (IIDB) under the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 (“the SSCBA 1992”). The Secretary of State, and the First-tier Tribunal, accepted that the appellant had suffered ten specific, documented accidents during matches that took place between 1971 and 1983, but concluded that these had not caused his degenerative brain condition so that he was not entitled to IIDB.

The appellant’s grounds of appeal set out a number of arguments. I granted permission to appeal on an unlimited basis, but in doing so indicated that the appellant’s arguments should be grouped and the appeal focused on three grounds as follows:

Ground 1 - Perverse and/or inadequately reasoned conclusion that the 10 specific documented accidents were not an ‘effective cause’ of the injury, in particular bearing in mind that they were sufficiently serious incidents to be documented, whereas the other similar accidents/incidents/activities that the Tribunal concluded did cumulatively constitute an ‘effective cause’ of the injury had not been serious enough to document;

Ground 2 - Failure to address / give reasons for concluding that the other ‘undocumented’ incidents that the Tribunal concluded were an effective cause of the injury were in law “process” rather than part of a series of “accidents” together with the 10 specific accidents identified in the claims;

Ground 3 - Perverse and/or inadequately reasoned reliance on family history of cognitive impairment as indicating that ‘constitutional causes’ were the other major effective cause of the appellant’s injury, when (on the face of it) the fact that only the appellant’s brothers (who were also professional footballers) and not his parents had been affected would tend to strengthen the appellant’s case that the injury was caused by football-related factors rather than ‘constitutional causes’.

In responding to the appeal, the Secretary of State indicated he did not resist the appeal on Ground 2, and invited the Upper Tribunal to dispose of the appeal on that basis, but the appellant wished to pursue all grounds and it seemed to me that all the grounds needed to be addressed in order to avoid (if possible) the case needing to return to the Upper Tribunal for a second time. This would also enable the Upper Tribunal to consider the issues of principle that arise in this appeal, which may be relevant to other cases involving professional sportspeople.