[2025] UKUT 171 (AAC)

Applying the holistic assessment I am required to perform, I am satisfied that a PMP exercises a disciplinary function regarding conduct matters, on behalf of a chief officer. The function relates to the chief officer’s role to decide whether to retain police officers in his or her force, and if so, on which terms. The PMP does this in a position analogous to an agent acting on behalf of a principal within a disciplinary regime, the purpose of which to maintain public confidence in, and the reputation of, the police service, to uphold high standards in policing and to deter misconduct, and to protect the public. The PMP is making the disciplinary decision that the chief officer, as quasi-employer, would otherwise make.

A PMP has the public interest of protecting the independence of police officers in carrying out their duties. A PMP has to act judicially, in the sense that it has to act fairly to all parties and apply an impartial and independent mind to the tasks it has to carry out. Article 6 of the ECHR applies to its proceedings.

The legislation governing PMPs gives it a suite of powers that have been adjusted over time, without giving clear mechanisms for enforcing its orders. Its procedures have also been adjusted over time, in response to perceived overly lenient outcomes, to restore the ability to decide who is dismissed, to chief officers of police forces. The justification for these adjustments is that the chief officer who must account for the standards and conduct of the officers under their direction and control, should not be held to account for them without being able to determine who to recruit and who to dismiss.

Based on the holistic assessment set out at paragraphs 176 to 178 above, I am satisfied that a PMP acts in the public interest and has to act judicially when it does so, but it does not exercise the judicial power of the state. I have therefore decided that it does not satisfy the definition of a court for the purpose of section 32(4)(a) of FOIA.

On this basis, and, given the Second Respondent relied on other exemptions not considered by the FTT, the matter needs to be remitted to a new FTT to consider whether the other exemptions of section 31(1)(g) or 40 of FOIA apply. My directions include for the FTT to approach the appeal on the basis that a PMP is not a court for the purpose of section 32 of FOIA.

I therefore allow the Appellant’s appeal, and I direct for this appeal to be remitted to a fresh FTT to determine.