[2025] UKUT 117 (AAC)

Appeal No. UA-2023-001952-V

RULE 14 Order

Pursuant to rule 14(1) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, it is prohibited for any person to disclose or publish any matter likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant, her former partners or her children. This order does not apply to any person exercising statutory (including judicial) functions where knowledge of the matter is reasonably necessary for the proper exercise of the functions.

Any breach of this order is liable to be treated as a contempt of court and may be punishable by imprisonment, fine or other sanctions under section 25 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. The maximum punishment that may be imposed is a sentence of two years’ imprisonment or an unlimited fine.

Between:

LJCB

Appellant

- v -

DISCLOSURE AND BARRING SERVICE

Respondent

Before: Upper Tribunal Judge Stout

Tribunal Member Hutchinson

Tribunal Member Tynan

Hearing date(s): 12 March 2025

Mode of hearing: By video

Representation:

Appellant: No appearance or representation

Respondent: Ashley Serr (counsel)

On appeal from:

DBS Decision Ref: 00996054937

Decision Date: 15 September 2023

SUMMARY OF DECISION

SAFEGUARDING OF VULNERABLE GROUPS (65)

The Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) included the appellant on the adults’ barred list pursuant to paragraph 9 of Schedule 3 to the Safeguarding of Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 (SVGA 2006) because she had had two of her own children removed from her care by the Family Court. The Upper Tribunal concludes that the only lawful decision on the evidence was that the appellant should not be included in the barred list and directs her removal. The Upper Tribunal held that DBS made a mistake of law in concluding that the appellant had engaged in “relevant conduct”. “Conduct” refers to behaviour or actions, not to human features such as personality traits, learning difficulties, medical conditions, or to other people’s concerns or opinions; nor does it refer to what may have been done to that person in the past (by their own parents or abusive partners) that might render them more or less likely to conduct themselves inappropriately towards others in future. In this case, the only potential “relevant conduct” of the appellant was her failure to leave her abusive ex-partner in order to care for her first child on her own. The Upper Tribunal held that that was not conduct that was capable of being repeated against a vulnerable adult so as to constitute relevant conduct within the meaning of paragraph 10(1)(b) of Schedule 3 to the SVGA 2006. Further, or alternatively, it was disproportionate to bar the appellant because the risk she poses as a result of her history of relationships with abusive partners is a risk that only arises in personal and family contexts, which (by virtue of section 58 of the SVGA 2006) are not regulated activities. There was therefore no rational connection between the objective of the barring scheme and the barring decision in this case; the risk she posed could be addressed by less intrusive measures; and barring the appellant struck the wrong balance between her private rights and the objectives of the barring scheme.

Please note the Summary of Decision is included for the convenience of readers. It does not form part of the decision. The Decision and Reasons of the Tribunal follow.

DECISION