[2025] UKUT 262 (AAC)

Given the terms of the 2012 Scheme set out above, the following are required for a person to be eligible for an award if the injury or injuries for which they are claiming was caused by (that is, “resulted from”) an animal attack.

It would seem clear (Footnote: ¹), therefore, that even if a crime has been committed and that crime meets the definition of a “crime of violence” in paragraphs 1-3 of Annex B in the 2012 Scheme, and even if that ‘crime of violence’ directly caused the person a “criminal injury” as defined in the 2012 Scheme, that crime of violence is removed from counting as a “crime of violence” (pursuant to paragraph 4(1)(c) in Annex B) if the injury resulted from an animal attack. The only exception to this animal attack rule is where the animal was used with intent to cause injury (to a person). If the animal was not so used, no compensation is payable under the 2012 Scheme for the injury or injuries caused by the animal in the attack.

It was put to me by CICA in argument that rule 4(1)(c) in Annex B is separate from paragraph 2 in Annex B and creates a separate eligibility rule. I do not think that that is the correct approach, not least because it would undermine CICA’s first ground for judicial review, and it may be that it was this approach which led the FTT into error in terms of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. Consistently with the structure of Annex B, it seems to me that the better approach for the claims officer or the FTT is to determine the following and in this order:

This approach enables the more general and always applicable question to be asked (if there was a crime) - was there a crime of violence? – before giving consideration to the particular exclusions found in paragraph 4(1) in Annex B. The approach also accords with the structure and language of Annex B, as paragraph 4(1) is about excluding (subject to the individual exceptions written into subparagraphs (a)-(c) in paragraph 4(1)) injuries resulting from that which has already been identified as a crime of violence under paragraph 4(2) (and 3, if applicable).

These general observation accord, in my view, with Part 2 of the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice’s Consultation Paper “Getting it right for victims and witnesses” (CP3/2012, January 2012). Relevant paragraphs from that Consultation Paper read as follows:

“174.

The Government’s proposals for reform are set out in the coming pages. A high level summary of those proposals, which we believe are consistent with the principles set out above and our financial objectives, is as follows:

Eligibility

We propose that eligibility to claim from the Scheme should be tightly drawn so as to restrict awards to blameless victims of crime who fully co-operate with the criminal justice process, and close bereaved relatives of victims who die as a result of their injuries. Applicants should have a connection to the UK which is more than temporary….

The Scope of the Scheme

176.

Most payments under the Scheme are made to victims of “crimes of violence”. This term has featured in successive Schemes and, though not having a definitive legal meaning, is generally well-understood. In most cases it is clear whether or not an applicant has been the victim of a crime of violence but there are difficult cases where the position may be less clear.

178.

The main purpose of the Scheme is to provide payments to those who suffer serious physical or mental injury as the direct result of deliberate violent crime, including sexual offences, of which they are the innocent victim. This purpose underpins all of our proposals, and it reflects the current Scheme.

179.

The terms of the Scheme and all the relevant circumstances must be considered in each case. Our policy in relation to the scope of the Scheme also includes these principles:

 A crime of violence will generally involve a direct, hostile, physical attack, against a person rather than property, which immediately causes mental or physical injury.

 The fact that a person’s actions are technically capable of being a crime – even a crime giving rise in some way to injury – does not mean the crime will definitely be a crime of violence. All the relevant circumstances must be considered.

 The greater the chance a person’s actions will lead to very serious injury, and the more obvious this should have been to the offender, the more likely it is that something technically capable of being a crime will be a crime of violence for the purpose of the Scheme. But the mere fact that there was some possibility of some harm will not of itself mean that there was necessarily a crime of violence.

 The threat of an attack is capable of being a crime of violence if it would place a reasonable person in fear of an immediate physical attack, and the victim was in fact in such fear. An offence committed from a distance (e.g. harassment by telephone or electronically) will not normally be a crime of violence, unless there are direct threats which put the recipient in fear of immediate physical harm.

A crime must normally have been committed

180.

Payments under the revised Scheme may be made whether or not anyone has been convicted of the offence from which the injury arose This reflects the current Scheme under which a claims officer will assess whether the facts are established on the balance of probabilities. But it will be a very rare case indeed where a payment is made in relation to circumstances which did not amount to a criminal offence for technical legal reasons.

Express exclusions

185.

There are a number of circumstances which, though technically involving the commission of a criminal offence, should in the Government’s view, never be capable of being a crime of violence for the purposes of the Scheme. Under the current and former Schemes it is not always clear whether these situations are ‘crimes of violence’. We intend to make it clear these cases are outside the scope of the revised Scheme, because as a matter of public policy we do not consider that it is consistent with the main purpose of the Scheme set out at paragraph 178 to use taxpayers’ money to compensate under the CICS in these cases.

186.

The kinds of circumstances we intend to exclude are:

….

•

Where a person has been the victim of an animal attack, unless the animal itself was used deliberately to inflict an injury on that person. This is a tightening of current policy under which claims have in some cases been considered from applicants attacked by dangerous dogs not kept under proper control.”

The Government‘s Response to the views gathered under the above Consultation Paper is titled “Getting it right for victims and witnesses: the Government response”(Cm 8397, July 2012). Paragraph 160 of that Response reads:

“160.

We have considered all of the responses and acknowledge the complexity of defining a crime of violence. We believe that eligibility should be tightly defined and should not allow for payments to be made outside the core purpose of the Scheme, which is to make awards to those who suffer serious physical or mental injury as the direct result of deliberate violent crime. We have considered again injuries resulting from a trespass on the railway, those injured or killed in road accidents and those injured as a result of an animal attack (unless the animal was used with intent to cause injury), but we believe that these cases involve injuries sustained in incidents outside the core purpose of the Scheme and that the proper redress in these circumstances would be found

elsewhere – through an insurance claim, a compensation order as a result of criminal proceedings or a civil claim.”

The 2012 Scheme followed on, and resulted from, the above consultation exercise. In these circumstances, in my judgement it is appropriate to take account of the above Consultation Paper and the Government’s Response to it as part of the context for the changes made in the 2012 Scheme and the mischief which they were seeking to remedy in relation to animal attacks: per paragraph [8] of R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] UKHL 13; [2003] 2 AC 687.

The converse outcome of the effect of Annex B to the 2012 Scheme to that set out in paragraph 32 above is that even if the animal attacked the person and was used with intent to cause injury to a person, and even if it caused a person a “criminal injury”, compensation will not be payable under the 2012 Scheme either (i) if no crime was committed, or (ii) if a crime was committed, it did not amount to a “crime of violence” as defined in paragraph 2 of Annex B to the 2012 Scheme.

Thus two key issues arise in animal attack cases (assuming a criminal injury as defined in the 2012 Scheme has been caused) in deciding whether eligibility is made out under the 2012 Scheme. First, was a “crime of violence” committed? This includes whether a crime was committed as a “crime of violence “ is “a crime which involves..”: per paragraph 2 in Annex B. Second, even if a crime of violence was committed, was the animal used with intent to cause injury to a person. I approach the four grounds for judicial review with these two points firmly in mind.