[2025] UKUT 262 (AAC)

Case No. UA-2024-000980-CIC

R(on the application of the CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION AUTHORITY)

Applicant

-and-

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL (SOCIAL ENTITLEMENT CHAMBER)

Respondent

-and-

GE

Interested Party

Before: Upper Tribunal Judge Wright

Representation:

Appellant: Louis Browne KC and David Illingworth of counsel, instructed by CICA

Respondent: Not represented

Interested party George Molyneaux of counsel, instructed by the Free Representation Unit

On appeal from:

Tribunal: First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber)

Tribunal Case No: 1698-1445-9671-4403

Decision date: 4 March 2024 (written reasons 13 June 2024)

SUMMARY OF DECISION

This decision is about the basis on which the person who has been attacked by a dog may (or may not) qualify for an award under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2012.

To be eligible for an award under the 2012 Scheme the person has to have sustained “a criminal injury which is directly attributable to their being a direct victim of a crime of violence”. A “crime of violence” is defined (for the first time) in the 2012 Scheme as being a crime which involves, inter alia, a physical attack or any other attack or omission of a violent nature which causes physical injury to a person. However, such an act or omission will not amount to a crime of violence unless it is done either intentionally or recklessly. But even if the dog attack does qualify on this basis as a crime of violence, it will not be considered to have been a crime of violence under the 2012 Scheme if the injury resulted from an animal attack, unless the animal was used with intent to cause injury to a person.

This decision decides, first, that the FTT erred in law in deciding that a crime under section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 could constitute a crime of violence under the 2012 Scheme. This is because section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 has created an offence of strict liability and as such does not involve any act (or omission) done either intentionally or recklessly. Secondly, even if the relevant crime could have been one committed under section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (which the FTT did not address), the FTT further erred in law in failing to provide an adequate explanation on the evidence as to why the dog had been used with intent to cause injury to a person.

KEYWORD NAME (Keyword Number) 70 (Criminal injuries compensation); 70.3 (other)

Please note the Summary of Decision is included for the convenience of readers. It does not form part of the decision. The Decision and Reasons of the judges follow.

DECISION