Relevant law
Relevant law
I have set out much of the relevant law already, but I set all of it out here for completeness.
Section 1 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995 (“the Act”) provides the foundation for what is now the 2012 Scheme. It provides insofar as is relevant, as follows:
“The Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme.
1:-(1) The Secretary of State shall make arrangements for the payment of compensation to, or in respect of, persons who have sustained one or more criminal injuries.
(2) Any such arrangements shall include the making of a scheme providing, in particular, for—
(a) the circumstances in which awards may be made; and
(b) the categories of person to whom awards may be made.
(3)The scheme shall be known as the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme.”
The focus of the Act is therefore on criminal injuries, and by section 1(4) of the Act it is provided that “criminal injury” has “such meaning as may be specified”.
That specification is provided, at least in part, in Annex A to the 2012 Scheme, which provides that ““criminal injury” means an injury which appears in Part A or B of the tariff in Annex E”. This therefore deals with the injuries which may count as a ‘criminal injury’ for the purposes of the 2012 Scheme.
However, eligibility under the Scheme also has to be established. The vires for this is provided for in section 1(2) of the Act, including “the circumstances in which awards may be made” and “the categories of person to whom awards may be made”.
Paragraph 4 of the 2012 Scheme appears under the heading “Eligibility: injuries for which an award may be made”, and provides:
“4. A person may be eligible for an award under this Scheme if they sustain a criminal injury which is directly attributable to their being a direct victim of a crime of violence committed in a relevant place.
The meaning of “crime of violence” is explained in Annex B.”
On the face of it, this appears to cover both a circumstance in which, and the category of person to whom, an award may be made.
What paragraph 4 make clear, and is not disputed, is that eligibility is dependent on the person sustaining a ‘criminal injury’ which is (directly) attributable to the person having been a (direct) victim of a ‘crime of violence’. Moreover, what is meant by ‘crime of violence’ is set out in Annex B to the 2012 Scheme.
Given its central importance to the arguments on this judicial review, I set out Annex B to the 2012 Scheme in full.
“1. This Annex applies in deciding whether a crime of violence has been committed for the purposes of this Scheme. Where a claims officer is satisfied that a crime has been committed it is still necessary for that crime to constitute a crime of violence in accordance with this Annex.
2. (1) Subject to paragraph 3, a “crime of violence” is a crime which involves:
(a) a physical attack;
(b) any other act or omission of a violent nature which causes physical
injury to a person;
(c) a threat against a person, causing fear of immediate violence in
circumstances which would cause a person of reasonable firmness to be put in such fear;
(d) a sexual assault to which a person did not in fact consent; or
(e) arson or fire-raising.
(2) An act or omission under sub-paragraph (1) will not constitute a crime of
violence unless it is done either intentionally or recklessly.
3. In exceptional cases, an act may be treated as a crime of violence where the
assailant:
(a) is not capable of forming the necessary mental element due to insanity; or
(b) is a child below the age of criminal responsibility who in fact understood the consequences of their actions.
4. (1) A crime of violence will not be considered to have been committed for the purposes of this Scheme if, in particular, an injury:
(a) resulted from suicide or attempted suicide, unless the suicidal person
acted with intent to cause injury to another person;
(b) resulted from the use of a vehicle, unless the vehicle was used with
intent to cause injury to a person;
(c) resulted from an animal attack, unless the animal was used with intent to cause injury to a person;
(d) was sustained in the usual course of sporting or other activity to which a person consented by taking part in the activity; or
(e) was sustained in utero as a result of harmful substances willingly
ingested by the mother during pregnancy, with intent to cause, or being
reckless as to, injury to the foetus.
(2) In this paragraph, “vehicle” means any device which can be used to transport persons, animals or goods, whether by land, water or air.”
- Heading
- I grant the application for judicial review of the decision of the Social Entitlement Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal of 4 March 2024 under the tribunal case reference 1698-1445-9671-4403 The Upper Tribunal’s order is
- REASONS FOR DECISION
- Relevant factual background
- The FTT’s decision
- The grounds on which permission to seek a judicial review was granted
- The parties’ skeleton arguments
- Interested party
- Relevant law
- Analysis and conclusion
- General observations
- Ground 1 - Dangerous Dogs Act 1991
- Ground 2 - Failure to have regard to paragraph 2 in Annex B
- Ground 3 – Distinction between intent and recklessness
- FTT’s decision was irrational or inadequately reasoned
- Conclusions
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