The Statutory Framework
The Statutory Framework
S.1 of FOIA affords the right to request from a public authority whether or not information of a description specified in the request is held by the authority and, if it is held, to have that information communicated to him. That s.1 right is subject to the provisions, in particular, of s.2: s.1(2).
The Appellant is designated a public authority by paragraph 61 of Schedule 1 to FOIA.
S.2(2) provides the general exception to the right to have the requested information communicated:
“In respect of any information which is exempt information by virtue of any provision of Part II, section 1(1)(b) does not apply if or to the extent that—
(a) the information is exempt information by virtue of a provision conferring absolute exemption, or
(b) in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information”.
S.2(3) lists those provisions of Part II (“and no others”) which confer absolute exemption.
S.42 falls within Part II. It is headed “Legal professional privilege” and provides an exemption in the following terms:
“(1) Information in respect of which a claim to legal professional privilege or, in Scotland, to confidentiality of communications could be maintained in legal proceedings is exempt information.
(2) The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, compliance with section 1(1)(a) would involve the disclosure of any information (whether or not already recorded) in respect of which such a claim could be maintained in legal proceedings”.
S.42 is not listed in s.2(3) as a provision conferring absolute exemption. It is, accordingly, a qualified exemption subject to the public interest balancing exercise mandated by s.2(2)(b).
Part IV of FOIA is headed “Enforcement”. S.50 provides for the right of a requestor to complain to the IC about the handling of his request by the public authority and for the duty on the IC to determine that complaint. S.50 provides:
“(1) Any person (in this section referred to as “the complainant”) may apply to the Commissioner for a decision whether, in any specified respect, a request for information made by the complainant to a public authority has been dealt with in accordance with the requirements of Part I.
(2) On receiving an application under this section, the Commissioner shall make a decision unless it appears to him—
(a) that the complainant has not exhausted any complaints procedure which is provided by the public authority in conformity with the code of practice under section 45,
(b) that there has been undue delay in making the application,
(c) that the application is frivolous or vexatious, or
(d) that the application has been withdrawn or abandoned.
(3) Where the Commissioner has received an application under this section, he shall either—
(a) notify the complainant that he has not made any decision under this section as a result of the application and of his grounds for not doing so, or
(b) serve notice of his decision (in this Act referred to as a “decision notice”) on the complainant and the public authority.
(4) Where the Commissioner decides that a public authority—
(a) has failed to communicate information, or to provide confirmation or denial, in a case where it is required to do so by section 1(1), or
(b) has failed to comply with any of the requirements of sections 11 and 17,
the decision notice must specify the steps which must be taken by the authority for complying with that requirement and the period within which they must be taken”.
S.57(1) provides for the right of appeal to the Tribunal against a decision notice issued under s.50. It is well-established that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction on such an appeal is, by the terms of s.58, a full merits appeal which may consider any issue of fact or law, including ones which were not raised with the IC when determining the s.50 complaint.
Part IV also provides certain powers to the IC to further his enforcement functions. S.52 permits him to issue an enforcement notice to a public authority which has failed to comply with a requirement of Part I.
S.51 provides the IC with a power to issue an information notice in the following terms:
If the Commissioner—
has received an application under section 50, or
reasonably requires any information—
for the purpose of determining whether a public authority has complied or is complying with any of the requirements of Part I, or
for the purpose of determining whether the practice of a public authority in relation to the exercise of its functions under this Act conforms with that proposed in the codes of practice under sections 45 and 46,
he may serve the authority with a notice (in this Act referred to as “an information notice”) requiring it, within such time as is specified in the notice, to furnish the Commissioner, in such form as may be so specified, with such information relating to application, to compliance with Part I or to conformity with the code of practice as specified.
An information notice must contain—
in a case falling within subsection (1)(a), a statement that the Commissioner has received an application under section 50, or
in a case falling within subsection (1)(b), a statement—
that the Commissioner regards the specified information as relevant for either of the purposes referred to in subsection (1)(b), and
of his reasons for regarding that information as relevant for that purpose.
An information notice must also contain particulars of the right of appeal conferred by section 57.
The time specified in an information notice must not expire before the end of the period within which an appeal can be brought against the notice and, if such an appeal is brought, the information need not be furnished pending the determination or withdrawal of the appeal.
An authority shall not be required by virtue of this section to furnish the Commissioner with any information in respect of—
any communication between a professional legal adviser and his client in connection with the giving of legal advice to the client with respect to his obligations, liabilities or rights under this Act, or
any communication between a professional legal adviser and his client, or between such an adviser or his client and any other person, made in connection with or in contemplation of proceedings under or arising out of this Act (including proceedings before the Tribunal) and for the purposes of such proceedings.
In subsection (5) references to the client of a professional legal adviser include references to any person representing such a client.
The Commissioner may cancel an information notice by written notice to the authority on which it was served.
In this section “information” includes unrecorded information”.
An information notice may itself be appealed to the Tribunal, just as a s.50 decision notice may be: s.57(2). The Tribunal’s jurisdiction under s.58 is the same full merits appeal.
By s.55 and Schedule 3, the IC is granted powers of entry and inspection, including upon application for a warrant. Such a warrant may be obtained where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the public authority has failed or is failing to comply with the requirements of Part I, a decision notice issued under s.50, or an information notice issued under s.51: paragraph 1(1). Paragraph 9 of Schedule 3 provides for an exemption in the same terms as that in s.51(5).
Any information which has been obtained by the IC must not be disclosed by any member of his staff without lawful authority, on pain of committing a criminal offence: s.132 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“the DPA”).
The IC is also afforded various regulatory powers in Part 6 of the DPA. Analogously with the terms of s.51 of FOIA, those powers contain very specific exceptions for particular kinds of LPP material, but not for LPP material more generally. Accordingly:
the information notice power in s.142 is subject to the restrictions in s.143. These include, at (3)-(5), “a communication which is made … in connection with the giving of legal advice to the client with respect to obligations, liabilities or rights under the data protection legislation”.
the assessment notice power in s.146 is subject to a similar restriction in s.147(2)-(4).
- Heading
- Section 1
- The Background
- The Information Notice
- The Statutory Framework
- The Decision of the Tribunal
- The Application and Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
- The Grounds of Appeal
- The Appellant’s Submissions
- if, however, he is undertaking a Part I Enquiry commenced by Trigger A, then he has “…an overall entitlement to require the production of LPP Material” (see [59])
- the public interest test which PSNI comes under a duty to apply under s.42 when considering a request for disclosure of LPP, is more accurately characterised as a weighting exercise, rather than a bal
- suppose further that, as in the judgment at [72], the IC, in the course of his Trigger B Part I Enquiry, was not satisfied that s.42 was actually engaged. In such circumstances, it would be for the IC
- it was never argued on behalf of the PSNI that the Tribunal could not (if so required in a particular case) see LPP Material: the PSNI’s case was and is that the IC is not empowered under the Act to s
- in Wiseman v HMRC [2022] UKFTT 00075 (TC) the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) was considering a notice which HMRC had issued to Mr Wiseman under paragraph 1 of Schedule 36 to the Finance Act 2008
- LPP is a fundamental right ( R v Derby Magistrates Court, B v Auckland ) any question of LPP being overridden by implication is to be tested by absolute necessity ( R (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax & anr [2002] UKHL 2
- it must be demonstrably necessary for at least an important aspect of the legislation ( R (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd ) ) the principle of legality is important in this connection ( R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [2001] 2 AC
- the more fundamental the right, the less likely it will be left to implication ( SLCC v Murray at [33])
- The IC’s Submissions
- The Application of the FOIA Regime
- where the public authority had, on the facts, waived LPP by analysing public statements against the content of the legal advice: Kirkaldie v Information Commissioner & Thanet District Council (EA/2006
- where legal advice from some 14 years earlier was still being used as the basis for a highly contested and doubtful use of public money, the public interest favoured disclosure: Mersey Tunnel Users As
- where legal advice has been used to formulate a policy of general application affecting a category of persons’ access to legal redress, such that transparency justified disclosure of the underlying ad
- where further the detailed exercise of review of information said to engage s.42 was carried out in All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition v Information Commissioner & Foreign and Co
- The Factual Context to the Notice
- The Appeal
- in fact, the particular terms of s.51(5) serve a readily understandable legislative purpose: they provide an exception from the general power in s.51 to require the provision of LPP material where tha
- Discussion
- That situation stands in contrast to that set out in s.51(1) (b). In contrast, the IC is there exercising regulatory functions outside of the scope of an individual case, in a more thematic or systemi
- Conclusions
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