Additional Reason 1
Additional Reason 1
Clearview’s Additional Reason 1 raises the issue whether Article 3(2)(b) can apply to the processing of a person where that person carries out no behavioural monitoring but their processing is “related to” behavioural monitoring carried out by another person.
Additional Reason 1 can only assist Clearview if we are wrong to have allowed Ground 3 (i.e. we are wrong to have found that Clearview itself engaged in behavioural monitoring).
We have already explained our construction of Article 3(2)(b) in [242] to [255] above.
The FTT gave the words “related to” as they apply to Article 3(2)(b) an expansive meaning, deciding that “nothing within [the GDPR] prevents the processing of data by a controller being “related to” the monitoring of behaviour by another distinct controller” (see [138] of the FTT decision).
The FTT’s reasoning at [138] of its decision indicates that it was under a misapprehension about the facts of Soriano (wrongly believing it to have concerned separate parties conducting the processing and the monitoring). Further, we are not persuaded by the FTT’s reasoning that if Clearview’s narrow interpretation of “related to” were to apply, it would be easy for a party to circumvent Article 3 by delegating its processing and monitoring activities to separate persons to avoid coming within the scope of regulation, because such circumstances would give rise to an agency relationship.
However, while we do not agree with all of the FTT’s reasons for its conclusion at [138] of its decision, we agree with its identification of the “mischief” at which the provision was targeted: it is “the monitoring”, rather than who is doing the monitoring (reflected in the reference to “the monitoring” rather than “their monitoring” in both Recital 24 and in Article 3(2)(b) itself). We agree with the FTT’s conclusion that Article 3(2)(b) applies to processing by one party which itself carries out no behavioural monitoring, provided that its processing is related to behavioural monitoring carried out by another party. We confirm the FTT’s conclusion, albeit for the different reasons explained more fully at [242] to [255] aboveand we therefore dismiss Additional Reason 1.
- Heading
- The decision of the Upper Tribunal is to allow the appeal The decision of the First-tier Tribunal made on 17 October 2023 was materially in error of law. It is SET ASIDE under section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (“TCEA
- REASONS FOR DECISION
- Introduction
- The decision under appeal
- A summary of the relevant factual background
- The FTT’s decision
- The FTT’s findings of fact
- The FTT’s conclusions
- The issues in this appeal
- Appeal ground 1
- Appeal ground 2
- Appeal ground 4
- Additional Reason 1
- The scope of the appeal - admitting the additional reasons arguments for consideration
- Permitting Privacy International to intervene in the appeal
- Permitting Clearview to rely on a written reply to Privacy International’s skeleton argument
- Reliance on the evidence filed by Privacy International
- Reliance on legal arguments not raised before the FTT
- Legal framework
- Relevant legislative provisions
- The GDPR
- The UK GDPR
- “Article 2 This Regulation applies to the automated or structured processing of personal data, including
- 1A. This Regulation also applies to the manual unstructured processing of personal data held by an FOI public authority This Regulation does not apply to
- “Article 3
- The 95 Directive
- The Law Enforcement Directive
- State immunity and foreign act of state
- Material scope: the caselaw
- Territorial scope: the caselaw
- The Travaux in respect of the GDPR
- The EDPB Guidelines
- Data subjects in the Union
- The burden of proof in appeals against ICO Notices
- Analysis
- The parties’ positions on material scope in brief
- What the FTT decided in relation to Article 2(2)(a)
- General approach to construction of the GDPRs
- Domestic authorities on comity, extra-territoriality and utility
- EU authorities on extra-territorial effect and comity
- Certainty and foreseeability
- Proportionality
- EU law authorities on the construction of Article 2(2)(a) of the GDPR
- Relevant comity principles
- Our construction of Article 2(2)(a)
- Analysis of Clearview’s proposed intersectional construction
- Alternative analysis based on the ICO’s construction
- Would regulation of Clearview’s data processing breach comity principles?
- Article 3(2)(b) GDPR: territorial scope
- What was the policy objective behind Article 3(2)(b)?
- The meaning of “related to” in Article 3(2)(b)
- The meaning of “behavioural monitoring” in Article 3(2)(b)
- Ground 1
- Ground 2
- Ground 3
- Ground 4
- Clearview’s Additional Reasons
- Additional Reason 1
- Additional Reason 2
- Additional Reason 3
- Additional Reason 4
- Conclusions
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