Permitting Privacy International to intervene in the appeal
Permitting Privacy International to intervene in the appeal
On 25 April 2025, the Upper Tribunal received an application from Privacy International for permission to intervene in the proceedings to make submissions in support of some of the ICO’s appeal grounds.
Upper Tribunal Judge Church allowed the application in a determination dated 16 May 2025 on the following bases:
rules 5(3)(d) and 33 of the UT Rules 2008 provide expressly for the Upper Tribunal to permit a person who is not a party to take specific steps in respect of an appeal (including making written and / or oral submissions), and the UT Rules 2008 do not prevent a person, who is not a party, intervening in proceedings before the Upper Tribunal with its permission;
the correct approach to apply towards an application to intervene was explained by Upper Tribunal Judge Wikeley in his determination of an application by a potential intervenor in Information Commissioner v Experian Limited (UA-2023-000512-GIA) at paragraphs 4-5;
the overriding objective favoured allowing Privacy International to intervene because the scope of the proceedings had been expanded to cover the issue of territorial jurisdiction. Upper Tribunal Judge Church was persuaded that Privacy International had special expertise and experience in this area which would complement, rather than duplicate, the ICO’s expertise as the regulator of information rights in the UK and would be likely to assist the Upper Tribunal’s understanding of the issues; and
the overriding objective also favoured allowing the intervention given the limited nature of Privacy International’s proposed intervention, which was proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated cost and the resources of the parties.
Upper Tribunal Judge Church therefore granted Privacy International permission to intervene, to make a written submission of no more than 25 pages, and to address the Upper Tribunal at the hearing (listed for 09 to 11 June 2025) for a period of 30 minutes or such other period the panel considered appropriate.
- Heading
- The decision of the Upper Tribunal is to allow the appeal The decision of the First-tier Tribunal made on 17 October 2023 was materially in error of law. It is SET ASIDE under section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (“TCEA
- REASONS FOR DECISION
- Introduction
- The decision under appeal
- A summary of the relevant factual background
- The FTT’s decision
- The FTT’s findings of fact
- The FTT’s conclusions
- The issues in this appeal
- Appeal ground 1
- Appeal ground 2
- Appeal ground 4
- Additional Reason 1
- The scope of the appeal - admitting the additional reasons arguments for consideration
- Permitting Privacy International to intervene in the appeal
- Permitting Clearview to rely on a written reply to Privacy International’s skeleton argument
- Reliance on the evidence filed by Privacy International
- Reliance on legal arguments not raised before the FTT
- Legal framework
- Relevant legislative provisions
- The GDPR
- The UK GDPR
- “Article 2 This Regulation applies to the automated or structured processing of personal data, including
- 1A. This Regulation also applies to the manual unstructured processing of personal data held by an FOI public authority This Regulation does not apply to
- “Article 3
- The 95 Directive
- The Law Enforcement Directive
- State immunity and foreign act of state
- Material scope: the caselaw
- Territorial scope: the caselaw
- The Travaux in respect of the GDPR
- The EDPB Guidelines
- Data subjects in the Union
- The burden of proof in appeals against ICO Notices
- Analysis
- The parties’ positions on material scope in brief
- What the FTT decided in relation to Article 2(2)(a)
- General approach to construction of the GDPRs
- Domestic authorities on comity, extra-territoriality and utility
- EU authorities on extra-territorial effect and comity
- Certainty and foreseeability
- Proportionality
- EU law authorities on the construction of Article 2(2)(a) of the GDPR
- Relevant comity principles
- Our construction of Article 2(2)(a)
- Analysis of Clearview’s proposed intersectional construction
- Alternative analysis based on the ICO’s construction
- Would regulation of Clearview’s data processing breach comity principles?
- Article 3(2)(b) GDPR: territorial scope
- What was the policy objective behind Article 3(2)(b)?
- The meaning of “related to” in Article 3(2)(b)
- The meaning of “behavioural monitoring” in Article 3(2)(b)
- Ground 1
- Ground 2
- Ground 3
- Ground 4
- Clearview’s Additional Reasons
- Additional Reason 1
- Additional Reason 2
- Additional Reason 3
- Additional Reason 4
- Conclusions
![[2025] UKUT 319 (AAC)](https://backend.juristeca.com/files/emisores/logo_3a2BKne.png)