[2025] UKUT 250 (AAC)

The Appellant advanced two grounds of appeal in support of his case. First, he argued that the Upper Tribunal’s decision in GE was not binding on the FTT as it was dealing with a different set of circumstances. GE was an ordinary case which arose from the application of Article 64(2)(b), whereas his GIP award had been made as a result of an exceptional Article 59 review on the basis of the Secretary of State’s ignorance or mistake. Although he understandably did not frame it in quite these terms, the Appellant’s submission was that the ratio decidendi (the reason for the decision) in GE did not read across to the different statutory context involved with his own case. Secondly, the Appellant contended that the FTT had erred in law by relying on the general rule in Article 16(10) and disregarding the express and specific provision made for Article 59 cases in Article 64(6), the latter being a provision directly concerned with fixing the ‘Date on which awards of benefit become payable’ (as the heading to Article 64 puts it).