[2025] UKUT 332 (AAC)

We have found it helpful in this appeal first to address what we would consider the effect of the legislation to be if we did not have the benefit of previous authorities on this issue. In doing so, we apply the well-established principles of statutory interpretation as recently re-stated by Lord Hodge in R (O) v Home Secretary (SC(E)) [2022] UKSC 3, [2023] AC 255at [28]-[31], i.e. by objectively assessing the meaning which a reasonable legislature would be seeking to convey by the words used in their relevant legislative context.

We set out our conclusions in this regard in this section of our judgment, referring at this first stage only to those principles established by authorities that are not in any doubt in this appeal. In the next section, we set out the previous case law and, where our view of the legislation differs to that reached in previous cases, we explain why we consider our reading of the legislation is correct. We then deal separately with the specific question of what is required of an application for revision to trigger a right of appeal under the legislative framework as we consider it to be. We summarise our conclusions at the end.

As can be seen from the legislative provisions set out above, a claimant only has a right of appeal under section 12 of the SSA 1998 in respect of the Secretary of State’s “original” benefits decision made under section 8 of that Act, or against a supersession decision made under section 12 of the Act. Section 12 confers no right of appeal directly against a revision decision made under section 9 of the Act. Rather, by section 12(1), the right of appeal lies against the original or supersession decision, but “as revised” (or not revised) under section 9: see the Tribunal of Commissioners’ decisions in R (IB) 2/04 at [38] and R (IS) 15/04 (the latter holding that the only way of challenging directly a decision not to revise for official error being judicial review).