[2025] UKUT 259 (AAC)

The real issue between the parties on this ground is whether the “solely in connection” imposes both (as says the Secretary of State) a temporal and purposive requirement, or merely a purposive requirement.

The Appellant submits that the 2013 Regulations permit phasing of an absence such that a claimant whose absence is disregarded under one basis may have his continued absence disregarded on another. That is not limited to regulation 11(2) (“the bereavement disregard”).

Regulation 11 neither textually nor structurally excludes such a disregard.

The basic conditions for entitlement to UC include being in Great Britain and regulations may “specify circumstances in which temporary absence is to be disregarded” (emphasis added)]: ss.4(1)(c), 4(5)(b) of the 2012 Act

A claimant must be entitled to UC immediately before the beginning of the period of temporary absence. Regulation 11(1)(b) sets out several different bases for disregard.

The argument that the phrase “solely in connection with” means both covering the entire period of absence and being for no other purpose than medical treatment is the “entire trip” approach, whereas the argument that “solely” simply means there are no other reasons than medical treatment for the fact that the claimant is outside Great Britain at any time is the “given time” approach.

First, the “entire trip” approach requires regulation 11(3)(a)(i) to be read as containing a requirement that the treatment be pre-arranged that its text does not.

In Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v NJ (ESA) [2024] UKUT 194 (AAC) at [35], a case in relation to the Employment and Support Regulations 2008 (“the ESA Regulations”), Upper Tribunal Judge Stout considered that the Tribunal judge was right to focus on the claimant’s reasons for extended absences going beyond the initial four week period permissible in ESA absences as “it is only the extended period that needs to fall within the scope of regulation 153. Any shorter period will be caught by regulation 152.” Regulation 152 and 153 of the ESA Regulations are structurally similar. Those appear to be different “pathways”, as might regulation 11(1)(b)(i) and regulation 11(1)(b)(ii).

The predecessor regulations both required an absence to be for the specific purpose of being treated for incapacity for work which commenced before leaving Great Britain.

Second, the structure of regulation 11 should not be a barrier to this analysis. If there is an issue, it must arise from the “solely in connection” condition:

The rarely used mariner/continental shelf disregard provisions (under regulation 11(4)) occupy the same position within the structure of regulation 11. Regulations 11(3) and 11(4) are direct alternatives: regulation 11(1)(b)(ii).

If a claimant who is a continental shelf worker is initially abroad on a one month absence, then moves to a “prescribed area” as to engage regulation 11(4), there should be no barrier to his taking advantage of the 6 month disregard period without first returning to Great Britain.

Nor should there be any barrier arising from the relationship of the related disregard provisions by moving from a regulation 11(1)(b)(i) to a regulation 11(3) absence.