Status
Status
The Appellant relies on status as a disabled person in establishing indirect discrimination. It is recognised however, that with status reduced to “vanishing point” (Stevenson v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2017] EWCA Civ 2123 at [41]) other, narrower statuses are plausible. Those narrower statuses, such as comparing with those who require treatment whilst in Great Britain (wherever that treatment actually occurs) with those who require treatment once physically outside Great Britain (even if treated as in Great Britain) are likely to be justified as not manifestly without reasonable foundation.
Person A, a person in full health, and Person B, a disabled person, are both subject to the same default one-month absence abroad rule in the absence of a relevant bereavement on an absence not intended to be for the purpose of medical treatment, assuming he is not an offshore worker or mariner. Though A and B are both subject to the default one month absence rule, B is at greater risk of losing entitlement of benefit for reasons connected with his status.
Issue is taken with the connection of the Appellant’s extended absence with his disabilities. His hospital admission included treatment for bronchial asthma. He was treated with oxygen and nebulisers.
- Heading
- Section 1
- The Statutory Framework
- The Background Facts
- The Decision of the Tribunal
- Ground 1: The Tribunal erred in its treatment of regulation 11(3)(a)(i) of the 2013 Regulations in requiring the need for medical treatment to predate a claimant’s departure from Great Britain
- Ground 1: Interpretation of the 2013 Regulations
- The absence is in connection with the death of a close family member and The Secretary of State considers it unreasonable to expect the claimant to return within one month
- A claimant who does fall within those paragraphs will have retain entitlement in assessment period 2
- The Secretary of State (or the Tribunal) may extend time by up to a further month
- Ground 2: Interference with Convention rights
- Status
- Difference in treatment
- Justification
- This is likely to be a relatively small cohort These are not concerns unique to a need for treatment postdating a claimant’s departure from Great Britain. Decision makers already need to make evaluative judgements on issues of intention to return
- Remedy
- Ground 2A: Discrimination with respect to housing benefit claimants
- Justification
- Why the Upper Tribunal is invited to grant permission: factors other than merits
- Ground 3: the Secretary of State’s concession as to the amount of overpayment
- Ground 3: assessment period beginning 24 February 2023 . The Secretary of State invited the Upper Tribunal to the appeal in part on an additional ground not raised by the Appellant. The Appellant’s ab
- Ground 1: even if the Appellant’s absence from 30 March 2023 to 23 April 2023 was solely in connection with qualifying treatment, that absence cannot be disregarded under regulation 11(3)(a)(i). The n
- Ground 2: the Appellant alleges that the one month rule in regulation 11(1)(b) discriminates indirectly against him Appellant as a disabled person in breach of Article 14 read with A1P1. There is insu
- Temporary absence
- qualifying convalescence: regulation 11(3)(a)(i) and (ii)
- Submissions Regulation 11(1)(b): assessment period beginning 24 February 2023
- Ground 1: interpretation of regulation 11(3)(a)(i)
- Ground 2: regulation 11(1)(b) and Article 14 ECHR
- No evidential basis for finding of indirect discrimination
- Justification
- A rule of this kind would necessarily expand the cohort of claimants who may retain
- Remedy
- Ground 2A: differences in Housing Benefit and UC rules and Article 14 ECHR
- Conclusion
- The Appellant and his wife were not entitled to UC from 24 March 2023 to 23 April 2023
- Analysis
- Ground 2A
- Ground 1
- Ground 2
- Justification
- Remedy
- Conclusions
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