Why the Upper Tribunal is invited to grant permission: factors other than merits
Why the Upper Tribunal is invited to grant permission: factors other than merits
It is acknowledged that this point is raised for the first time at a late stage and risks adding further delay to proceedings which have already involved significant delay, particularly given that the Secretary of State would need fair opportunity to respond.
The power to allow amendment is a broad discretionary power, to be exercised in accordance with the overriding objective in rule 2 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (“the 2008 Rules”), and on balance, permitting the new ground (if deemed arguable) would further that objective for these reasons:
The Secretary of State has filed detailed witness evidence from a senior civil servant on the justification of the absence abroad rules and provided supporting contemporaneous policy documents on those regulations. That evidence does touch on the housing benefit rules. Any further evidence required would build on that, and is limited in scope.
The Secretary of State is now recovering via deductions from ongoing benefit the overpayment which currently exists and that will not change (the deduction as things stand would be due to take place for a number of years). So further delay causes [??}, aside from the resources involved with these proceedings.
Any further delay should not be substantial. While the Appellant’s representative has certainly contributed to the delay, there has been delay on both sides in what is a complex case.
The inquisitorial nature of social security tribunal procedure extends to appeals on points of law to the Upper Tribunal. If it had become apparent that this was an arguable issue, the Upper Tribunal could in any event become obliged to deal with it.
The 2008 Rules give avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings. dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties. The Appellant continues to qualify for means-tested benefit and is reliant on charity assistance. Representation is outside the scope of legal aid even before the Upper Tribunal and in this case Exceptional Case Funding for counsel’s opinion was refused.
The impact of a refusal, if the underlying ground is deemed to have a realistic prospect of success, would be a risk of a s.6 HRA breach on the part of the Upper Tribunal.
It may be thought desirable for a conclusive answer on this issue which is yet (as far as we aware) to be decided by any court of record.
If the further ground might realistically succeed, it may be thought preferable to case manage to limit further delay rather than to refuse permission. The Upper Tribunal may consider that limiting any further exchange to written submissions may be sufficient to mitigate the risk of any further delay.
- Heading
- Section 1
- The Statutory Framework
- The Background Facts
- The Decision of the Tribunal
- Ground 1: The Tribunal erred in its treatment of regulation 11(3)(a)(i) of the 2013 Regulations in requiring the need for medical treatment to predate a claimant’s departure from Great Britain
- Ground 1: Interpretation of the 2013 Regulations
- The absence is in connection with the death of a close family member and The Secretary of State considers it unreasonable to expect the claimant to return within one month
- A claimant who does fall within those paragraphs will have retain entitlement in assessment period 2
- The Secretary of State (or the Tribunal) may extend time by up to a further month
- Ground 2: Interference with Convention rights
- Status
- Difference in treatment
- Justification
- This is likely to be a relatively small cohort These are not concerns unique to a need for treatment postdating a claimant’s departure from Great Britain. Decision makers already need to make evaluative judgements on issues of intention to return
- Remedy
- Ground 2A: Discrimination with respect to housing benefit claimants
- Justification
- Why the Upper Tribunal is invited to grant permission: factors other than merits
- Ground 3: the Secretary of State’s concession as to the amount of overpayment
- Ground 3: assessment period beginning 24 February 2023 . The Secretary of State invited the Upper Tribunal to the appeal in part on an additional ground not raised by the Appellant. The Appellant’s ab
- Ground 1: even if the Appellant’s absence from 30 March 2023 to 23 April 2023 was solely in connection with qualifying treatment, that absence cannot be disregarded under regulation 11(3)(a)(i). The n
- Ground 2: the Appellant alleges that the one month rule in regulation 11(1)(b) discriminates indirectly against him Appellant as a disabled person in breach of Article 14 read with A1P1. There is insu
- Temporary absence
- qualifying convalescence: regulation 11(3)(a)(i) and (ii)
- Submissions Regulation 11(1)(b): assessment period beginning 24 February 2023
- Ground 1: interpretation of regulation 11(3)(a)(i)
- Ground 2: regulation 11(1)(b) and Article 14 ECHR
- No evidential basis for finding of indirect discrimination
- Justification
- A rule of this kind would necessarily expand the cohort of claimants who may retain
- Remedy
- Ground 2A: differences in Housing Benefit and UC rules and Article 14 ECHR
- Conclusion
- The Appellant and his wife were not entitled to UC from 24 March 2023 to 23 April 2023
- Analysis
- Ground 2A
- Ground 1
- Ground 2
- Justification
- Remedy
- Conclusions
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