(Reference for a preliminary ruling– European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)– Regulation (EU) No1305/2013

49By its fifth question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article30(1) of Regulation No1305/2013, read in conjunction with Article17 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that a Natura 2000 payment must be granted to the owner of a peat bog falling within that network on the basis that a restriction was imposed on an economic activity that could be carried out on such a peat bog, such as planting cranberries, where, at the time when he or she acquired the immovable property concerned, the owner was aware of such restriction.

The jurisdiction of the Court

50The Commission submits that the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the fifth question. It claims that Article30 of Regulation No1305/2013 does not create any obligation or promise to pay compensation to natural persons on account of all the restrictions allegedly affecting the use of property coming within the Natura 2000 network and, generally, that EU law does not recognise the existence of a general principle requiring compensation to be granted in all circumstances, that is to say for all those restrictions imposed by way of Natura 2000. The Commission takes the view that a solution similar to that adopted by the Court in the judgment of 22May 2014, Érsekcsanádi Mezőgazdasági (C‑56/13, EU:C:2014:352) should apply in the present case, since, in that judgment the Court held, in essence, that, since the obligation to pay compensation at issue in the case which gave rise to that judgment was based not on EU law, but on national legislation, the Court did not have jurisdiction to assess such national legislation in the light of the right to an effective remedy, the right to property and the freedom to conduct a business guaranteed by the Charter.

51In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the Charter’s scope is defined in Article51(1) thereof, according to which, so far as action of the Member States is concerned, the provisions of the Charter are addressed to those Member States only when they are implementing EU law (judgment of 13June 2017, Florescu and Others, C‑258/14, EU:C:2017:448, paragraph44 and the case-law cited).

52The Member States are implementing EU law, within the meaning of Article51(1) of the Charter, where, in accordance with the requirements of the ‘Habitats’ Directive, they take appropriate steps to ensure that the natural habitats and the habitats of wild flora and fauna’s species are maintained or restored at a favourable conservation status and, in particular, to avoid, in the special areas of conservation, the deterioration of natural habitats.

53Article6(2) of the ‘Habitats’ Directive provides that Member States are to take appropriate steps to avoid, in the special areas of conservation, the deterioration of natural habitats and the habitats of species as well as disturbance of the species for which the areas have been designated, in so far as such disturbance could be significant in relation to the objectives of that directive.

54Furthermore, the transposition and implementation by the Member States of the measures referred to in the ‘Birds’ Directive and the ‘Habitats’ Directive inevitably have repercussions on the right to property of persons to whom immovable property situated in the areas in question belongs, since, at the very least, they are subject to restrictions on the use of that property.

55Accordingly, it must be held that the Member States implement EU law, within the meaning of Article51(1) of the Charter, when they establish schemes that grant Natura 2000 payments and payments under the ‘Water Framework Directive’, pursuant to Article30(1) of Regulation No1305/2013. Moreover, it is also because EU law is being implemented in the present case that the general principles of EU law apply, as has already been stated in paragraph43 of the present judgment.

56Furthermore, it follows from Article6(1) and Article10 of Regulation No1305/2013 that the EAFRD is to act in the Member States through the rural development programmes of the Member States, which are to be approved by the Commission.

57It is true that Article30(1) of Regulation No1305/2013 leaves the Member States a margin of discretion in deciding what measures are to be taken, as is apparent from paragraph40 of the present judgment. However, where a Member State adopts measures in the exercise of the discretion conferred upon it by an act of EU law, it must be regarded as implementing that law, within the meaning of Article51(1) of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 13June 2017, Florescu and Others, C‑258/14, EU:C:2017:448, paragraph48 and the case-law cited).

58The mere fact that Article30 of Regulation No1305/2013 does not impose an obligation on Member States to provide for a compensation scheme cannot be interpreted as meaning that Article17 of the Charter is not applicable (see, by analogy, judgment of 9June 2016, Pesce and Others, C‑78/16 and C‑79/16, EU:C:2016:428, paragraph86).

59It follows that Article17 of the Charter is applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings and that, accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction to rule on the fifth question.

Substance

60It should be noted at the outset that it is apparent from the wording of Article17 of the Charter that that article expressly confers a right to compensation only in the event of deprivation of the right to property, such as expropriation, which is clearly not the situation in the present case.

61In this respect, it is necessary, in particular, to distinguish the main proceedings from those which gave rise to the judgment of 9June 2016, Pesce and Others (C‑78/16 and C‑79/16, EU:C:2016:428), in so far as those proceedings concerned the systemic felling of trees, namely olive trees, and therefore the deprivation of property of those trees as such. In the present case, the prohibition on establishing plantations of cranberries on property coming within the Natura 2000 network does not constitute a deprivation of the right to property of that immovable property, but a restriction on its use, which may be regulated by law to the extent necessary in the public interest, in accordance with the provisions in the third sentence of Article17(1) of the Charter.

62As regards the restrictions that may thus be placed on the use of the right to property, it should be borne in mind, moreover, that, the right to property guaranteed by Article17 of the Charter is not absolute and that its exercise may be subject to restrictions justified by objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union (judgment of 20September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB, C‑8/15P to C‑10/15P, EU:C:2016:701, paragraph69 and the case-law cited).

63It is therefore apparent from Article52(1) of the Charter, that restrictions may be imposed on the use of the right to property, provided that the restrictions genuinely meet the objectives of general interest pursued and do not constitute, in relation to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of the right guaranteed (judgment of 20September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB, C‑8/15P to C‑10/15P, EU:C:2016:701, paragraph70 and the case-law cited).

64First, it follows from settled case-law of the Court that protection of the environment is one of those objectives of general interest (see, to that effect, judgment of 9March 2010, ERG and Others, C‑379/08 and C‑380/08, EU:C:2010:127, paragraph81 and the case-law cited). Protection of the environment is therefore capable of justifying a restriction on the use of the right to property (judgment of 15January 2013, Križan and Others, C‑416/10, EU:C:2013:8, paragraph114 and the case-law cited).

65Second, it does not appear that measures such as those at issue in the main proceedings, thus taken for the purposes of protecting nature and the environment, under the ‘Birds’ Directive and the ‘Habitats’ Directive, which merely prohibit planting cranberries in peat bogs in order to prevent harm to the environmental interests thus protected, constitute, in the absence of compensation for affected owners, a disproportionate and intolerable interference impairing the very substance of the right to property (see, by analogy, judgment of 10July 2003, Booker Aquaculture and Hydro Seafood, C‑20/00 and C‑64/00, EU:C:2003:397, paragraph70). In the present case, such a conclusion is all the more compelling since, as is apparent from the statements made in the order for reference, that prohibition, and hence the restriction on the exercise of the right to property, were already in force at the time when the peat bogs at issue in the main proceedings were acquired by Sātiņi-S, with the result that Sātiņi-S could not have been unaware of the existence of that restriction.

66Although, admittedly, the Member States may consider, where appropriate, provided that they do so in compliance with EU law, that full or partial compensation is appropriate for owners of plots affected by conservation measures taken under the ‘Birds’ Directive and the ‘Habitats’ Directive, the existence of an obligation under EU law to grant such compensation cannot however be inferred from that finding (see, to that effect, judgment of 10July 2003, Booker Aquaculture and Hydro Seafood, C‑20/00 and C‑64/00, EU:C:2003:397, paragraph85).

67In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the fifth question is that Article30 of Regulation No1305/2013, read in conjunction with Article17 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that a Natura 2000 payment must not be granted to the owner of a peat bog that comes within the Natura 2000 network on the basis that a restriction has been made to an economic activity which may be carried out on such a peat bog, such as the prohibition on planting cranberries, where, at the time when he or she acquired the immovable property concerned, the owner was aware of such restriction.