Case No. Case-No.-CO-5942-2017

); (b) It did not in any event comply with the duties required to end care (above) and in particular the duty under reg. 39 of the 201 Regulations, since it did not recognise the duty under s. 20 at the time; and (c) K was not able to return to suitable accommodation in which case s. 20(1)(c) applied and he remain a looked after child. 95.Mr Carter, for the Council submitted that:(1)The Council’s duty under s. 20 ceased, and K ceased to be a looked after child, when Social Services secured the return of K and his cousin to U’s flat;(2)K was looked after for a total period for 9 weeks and 1 day, ending on 11 October 2017 and therefore failed to meet the 13-week eligibility criterion to be considered a FRC under s. 23C.96.The Council’s submissions echo those of Southwark in D v Southwark, above, at [38] and [40] where Southwark contended that since it had arranged accommodation for the child with a former partner of her father’s it had discharged its s. 20 duty. Smith LJ rejected this and stated: “49 We are prepared to accept that, in some circumstances, a private fostering arrangement might become available in such a way as to permit a local authority, which is on the verge of having to provide accommodation for a child, to ‘side-step’ that duty by helping to make a private fostering arrangement. However, it will be a question of fact as to whether that happens in any particular case. … However, where a local authority takes a major role in making arrangements for a child to be fostered, it is more likely to be concluded that, in doing so, it is exercising its powers and duties as a public authority pursuant to sections 20 and 23. If an authority wishes to play some role in making a private arrangement, it must make the nature of the arrangement plain to those involved. … If such matters are left unclear, there is a danger that the foster parent (and subsequently the court) will conclude that the local authority was acting under its statutory powers and duties and that the arrangement was not a private one at all. 50 In the present case, the local authority took a central role in making the arrangements for S to live with ED. It directed the school that the father must not be allowed to take S away. It arranged a meeting attended by all the relevant parties. The father was told that he must have no contact with S. Those factors are far more consistent with the exercise of statutory powers by Southwark than the facilitating of a private arrangement. The father consented to the proposed arrangement with ED. S was consulted as to her wishes. Mr Dallas contacted ED to ask her if she would take S in. Mr Dallas delivered S to ED's home and checked that the arrangements were satisfactory. Those factors were equally consistent with an exercise of statutory powers as with the making of a private arrangement. However, there was no contact between ED and either parent. Mr Dallas said nothing to ED, either on the telephone or the following day at his office, about the arrangement being a private one, in which she would have to look to the parents for financial support or to Lambeth for section 17 discretionary assistance. Far from it, he gave her to understand that Southwark would arrange financial support. In our judgment, the judge was quite right to conclude that this was not a private fostering arrangement. Indeed, it is hard to see how he could have come to any other conclusion.” 97.See to similar effect the judgment of Mr Michael Supperstone QC (as he then was) in