AC-2024-LON-001202 and AC-2024-LON-001207 - [2025] EWHC 2810 (Admin)

Fecha: 31-Oct-2025

The Appellants’ convictions

The Appellants’ convictions

By s.96(1) of the Education and Skills Act 2008 (“ESA 2008”), a person “must not conduct an independent educational institution unless it is registered”. Doing so is made a criminal offence by s.96(2). By s.96(3), a person guilty of that offence is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale (or to both).

“Independent educational institution” is defined at s.92(1) ESA 2008 as (amongst other things) “an independent school”, which is in turn defined at s.463 of the Education Act 1996 (“EA 1996”) as (amongst other things) “any school at which full-time education is provided for … five or more pupils of compulsory school age”. There is no statutory definition of “full-time education”, although the CPS and Department for Education have published guidance on this.

The Appellants were both involved in the operation of an institution called the “Advance Education Centre” (“ACE”) in London. The ACE was subject to three Ofsted inspections in the period with which I am concerned:

The first on 12 December 2018 when it is agreed that the school was offering all-day teaching.

ii)

The second on 5 March 2019.

iii)

The third on 6 March 2019.

Following that last inspection, the Appellants were charged with the s.96(2) offence. Following a hearing they were convicted before Westminster Magistrates Court (the hearing conducted by Senior District Judge and Chief Magistrate Emma Arbuthnot, now Mrs Justice Arbuthnot). The Appellants each received a custodial sentence of 4 weeks’, suspended for 12 months, and an order requiring them to undertake 120 hours of unpaid work.

The Chief Magistrate provided a written judgment which stated:

The criminal burden and standard of proof had been applied.

ii)

MD and SF were running the school on a day-to-day basis and were present during the three Ofsted inspections.

iii)

The charge was that MD and SF were running the school unlawfully between 11 December 2018 and 7 March 2019. The Chief Magistrate found that the offence had been committed throughout that period.

iv)

At the time of the 12 December 2018 visit, it was agreed that the school was offering education from 9.45am to 2.45pm. Following that inspection, the school was given a warning letter. MD and SF were cautioned and told about the potential offence.

When Ofsted inspected the school again in March 2019, they concluded that the same children were attending the school’s morning and afternoon sessions, and found documents showing that a full day’s teaching was being undertaken.

vi)

The Chief Magistrate concluded that the school was providing all-day education for the children, rejecting evidence to the contrary from MD and SF and observing of their evidence, “their evidence does not reflect what was happening at the school”. Her reasons for reaching that conclusion are compelling.

10.

The Appellants appealed to the Crown Court where their convictions and sentences were upheld (HHJ Griffith, Mr Manfield and Mr Brenner). MD and SF were represented at the hearing, which appears to have run over non-consecutive days. There is a transcript of closing arguments and the rulings in that hearing, albeit not of the evidence:

The Crown Court also rejected the evidence that there had been any material change in the operation of the school after the December 2018 Ofsted inspection. Documents relied upon to suggest that there had been a change were found to be “cosmetic”.

ii)

In upholding the sentence, the Crown Court found that the offending had continued for 3 months. His Honour Judge Griffith stated that while the court was not finding that there was deliberate dishonesty, there had been “stretching the rules and trying to hide what was continuing to go on after the inspection of December”.

11.

The Appellants have since completed their sentences. They informed the court that “they accept those convictions and do not seek to re-argue guilt”. However, their skeleton argument for the appeal seeks to re-argue the factual basis of their convictions in a manner inconsistent with the findings, reached to the criminal standards, of the criminal courts. I accept that, as MD explained, the Appellants found themselves in some difficulty in providing their own account of the circumstances of the offences, while avoiding any suggestion that they were denying or minimising their wrongdoing. However, there was no material before me which provided any basis for doubting the correctness of those convictions, even assuming it would have been permissible to do so.